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I 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TORT LIABILITY 
San Diego State Building 
July 18, 1977 
(Products Liability Public Hearing) 
CHAIRMAN JOHN KNOX: (See Appendix I) If the meeting 
will come to order, please. I think we'll start the hearing 
promptly. We have a number of witnesses to hear today, and we 
want to give everyone a chance to explain their point of view nd 
respond to questions from the Committee. This is a regular called 
hearing by the Joint Committee on Tort Liability of the California 
Legislature. Today's hearing is on the subject of products 
liability and is the second in a series of three hearings we're 
having during this month of July on various aspects of tort 
problems in California. 
In Los Angeles on July 11 we heard testimony on pro-
fessional liability and on July 22 we'll be in San Francisco, and 
that's this Friday, to hear testimony on insurance company under-
writing practices. 
The particular problem we're considering today is this: 
California manufacturers and consumers have in recent years been 
confronted by a crisis of potentially disastrous dimensions. In 
1974, which is the latest year for which we have statistics, 
products liability losses and loss related expenses totaled almost 
$200 million nationwide, and if current actuarial studies are 
correct, this figure may now be approaching a billion dollars. 
While the breakdown is not precisely known for California, it is 
clear that as in medical malpractice and other liability areas, 
that California's share accounts for the largest portion. It is 
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also clear that most insured manufacturers in California have had 
premium increases ranging from 100% to 5,000%. 
We are told that the cost of products liability insurance 
in many instances may exceed 20% of the manufacturer's sales receipts 
for essential products like medical supplies and packaged food items. 
For simple household products such as chairs and ladders, this 
cost may be as much as 40% of the receipts. These charges are 
eventually reflected in higher retail prices, and as a result an 
added burden is placed on the consumer's pocketbook in an era of 
chronically high inflation. 
Small and medium sized manufacturers lacking the bargain-
ing and economic power of the corporate giants in many cases have 
been forced to go without coverage or funded self-insurance programs. 
Still more serious are the reports our Committee has received that 
several manufacturers have ceased production altogether. Quite 
obviously, if this denotes a trend, we're on the verge of a 
calamitous situation for California business. 
We are presented with a dilemma. On the one hand, if we 
do nothing, the result could well be economically catastrophic, but 
on the other hand,presently proposed legislation may only immunize 
manufacturers from suits, leaving large classes of injured parties 
without remedies and without manufacturers receiving a meaningful 
reduction in premiums. 
Accordingly, the purpose of today's hearing is to consider 
the causes of and possible solutions to the problem facing manu-
facturers while also assuring victims of faulty products that 
they will be fully compensated for the injuries they suffer. 
2 
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Our witnesses today include distinguished scholars and 
representatives of manufacturers, insurance underwriters, and the 
legal profession. Testimony will form a basis for interim recom-
mendations we intend to make for legislation before the next 
session of the California Legislature. We are aware that the 
blame for the present situation has been laid on all sides. 
Responsibility has been fixed upon a myopic judiciary -- I d 't 
write that, may the record show -- avaricious insurers and rs, 
and careless manufacturers. The problem is indeed complex, and 
we only ask that the witness give primary consideration to the 
recommendations to the public's interest, even though this may 
not always coincide with their immediate economic interests. We 
are primarily interested in suggested solutions to the problem. 
I think the Committee, as I indicated at the hearing we had earlier 
in the month, is pretty well convinced there is a problem, and 
while we'll be glad to listen to your horror story-- we've heard 
an awful lot of them-- what we're interested in now is in 
proposals for legislation that may be of assistance in solving 
the problem. 
Our first witnesses this morning are from the American 
Mutual Insurance Alliance, Mr. D. K. Holliday, Vice President of 
Sentry Insurance, and Thomas Conneely, Regional Vice President 
and Counsel of the Insurance Alliance. Gentlemen. 
While you're coming up I should introduce my colleagues. 
On my far right is Senator Newton Russell of Los Angeles county; 
next to him is Mr. Fred Hiestand, one of the counsels to the 
Committee; on my immediate right is Martha Gorman, also Counsel 
to the Committee; on my left Joyce Faber, Committee Secretary, 
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and to her left, Assemblyman Alister McAlister, Santa Clara County, 
and to his left Assemblyman Floyd Mori of Alameda County. As other 
members come in during the day, we'll introduce them. 
Gentlemen, if you want to proceed. 
MR. TOM CONNEELY: Mr. Chairman and members of the 
committee, I'm Tom Conneely. The association I represent has 
recently changed its name and we're now known as the Alliance 
of American Insurers, but the process of the change is a little 
slow, so I'm basically the same organizatLon. 
My sole function here this morning is to make a couple 
of ief comments and describe the Alliance and then turn the 
microphone over to Mr. Holliday, who represents Sentry Insurance 
Company, which is one of our member companies. 
The Alliance is a trade association of over one hundred 
property and casualty insurance companies. Most of our companies 
are mutual companies. Among the services we provide to those 
companies is to appear at hearings such as this and endeavor to 
available to the committees, such as yours, as much information 
as we can gather. My only intention is to, at the conclusion of 
all these hearings, submit something in writing and some material 
that will fill whatever gaps that seem to be there from our point 
of view. I prefer not to inundate you with a lot of stuff which 
will simply duplicate other things which you will receive. I want 
to make it clear that I'm available to any members of the Committee 
or staff at any time to attempt to respond to questions. With that 
I 11 simply turn it over to Mr. Holliday. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Mr. Holliday. 
4 
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MR. KEN HOLLIDAY: (See Appendix II) Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is Ken Holliday. 
I am Vice President, responsible for commerc 1 lines, underwrit 
and loss control for Sentry Insurance, a mutual ny. Sentry 
is a medium-sized company and we'll handle about $150 million in 
commercial business this year. 
My background has been primarily in underwriting for 
almost 19 years. I have a BBA degree, a major in insurance; I 
have an LLB degree, and am a member of the Georgia Bar. I am 
also a CPCU. I have been active for the past year and a half in 
several industry committees dealing with the products liabili 
problem. At the ISO, which is the Insurance Services Office, a 
rate-making and statistical organization for the industry, I 
am currently serving as the Vice Chairman of the Products Liabili 
Committee, which is looking into several aspects of the situation, 
the major effort being a closed-claim survey which involves 
something over 20,000 products claims closed by some 23 companies 
during the last part of 1976 and the first quarter of 1977. The 
final report of that survey will be available sometime toward the 
end of the summer. 
I also serve as Vice Chairman of a subcommittee of that 
committee which has done a complete review of the standard coverage, 
insurance coverage that is being granted for products liability. 
Some recommendation for amendments of coverage have been made and 
are still in committee and they are not finalized at this point. 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners last 
year also appointed a task force to study the products liability 
situation. They held several hearings and were to submit a final 
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to the NAIC Executive committee in December in Phoenix. 
I was appointed asa member of an advisory committee and some 15 
sentatives from industry, trade associations, and so forth 
nd advised that committee on its final report. We were charged 
December with developing a voluntary mechanism for the insurance 
stry to deal with complaints on availability of insurance. 
And that was finalized by the target date of February 15 and 
to the task force and has ultimately been adopted by 
the NAIC. 
One of the recommendations was that each State Commissioner 
an Advisory Committee locally to deal with products com-
pla ts on availability and work to solve them, to find markets 
at were willing to write the coverage for those insureds. 
nt to that, we did form such a committee in Wisconsin, 
and I am currently serving as Chairman of that committee. 
I have given Ms. Gorman copies of three or four documents 
I th would be informative to this group. The first is a 
let or paper prepared by Insurance Services Office on rating 
s and statistical procedures for products liability 
(See Appendix III) . A lot of good information is there on the 
rat difficulties. Also a pamphlet prepared by the American 
Mutual Insurance Alliance outlining some of the problems with the 
proposed mandatory residual market mechanisms which some people 
have thought would be a solution (See Appendix IV) . And also 
Sections 3 and 5 of the NAIC Advisory Committee report to the 
Task Force (See Appendix V). 
I understand, essentially, you would like to know some-
th about how the process of underwriting goes on. As the paper 
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from ISO points out, the rate-making methodology employed in the 
past by ISO produces manual rates for a minority of the business, 
that is from the standpoint of premium volume for products liability. 
The majority of the premium comes from what we call A rated classes. 
An A rate is simply that there has been insufficient data .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Can you speak more directly into 
mike please, Mr. Holliday? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Better? Okay? The A rated classes, again, 
simply means that there is not a manual rate that is statistically 
justified. There are some broad parameters that are arrived at 
through judgment largely by analogy with other classes of business. 
Some of the classifications, particularly in manufacturing, are 
simply those of a wide variety of products and the quality of 
products within a given classification. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: What's an example of an A rated product 
in the last few years? Can you think of one? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: You mean as a classification of business? 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, you said a product is A rated --
I guess it's a new product that there is no experience on. Right? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Well, or that there's such a wide variety 
of exposure within the product that there is no credible rate base 
to break it down to the fine classification. One good example 
would be farm equipment machinery manufacturers. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I see. 
MR. HOLLIDAY: That classification includes anything from 
a simple plat point all the way up to combines or very sophisticated 
machinery. So when you look at that and try to establish an 
average rate, it obviously would be unfair to the plat point 
7 
manufacturer and would probably be inadequate for the more hazardous 
mach 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you. 
MR. HOLLIDAY: So those are the classifications that 
are largely -- the price is largely determined by the judgment 
of the underwriter involved. I might just mention a few of the 
things that he takes into consideration in determining a price. 
Fir t, there is probably a departure point in the schedule of 
lished A rates, or a range somewhere, an average for the class. 
So you must consider characteristics of the product, which would 
either it more hazardous or less hazardous than the average. 
He his information from the producer, the agent or broker, or 
alesman who gathers information from the insured about his past 
losses, how many losses that he suffered, what has been the outcome 
of those losses. Products brochures, loss control engineers' reports 
that he orders, he looks at management experience in that line, 
considers what happens if the product does malfunction. Would it 
take an arm off or would it just simply bruise a knee? This is 
the extent of the hazard. 
The question of hard goods versus soft goods and the 
life of the product. In other words, if you're talking about some 
of the capital goods which have experienced quite a problem, punch 
presses, the life of those products sometimes runs 40 or 50 years, 
so there is a great accumulation of exposure on the market as 
opposed to a cooking manufacturer where most of their products 
re consumed within a short period of manufacture. 
Discontinued products, and we find that is quite common 
where an insured may have tried a product in the past, maybe started 
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to make a snowmobile, started for a couple of years, then discon-
tinued it. And we have to know how was out, what was the 
loss history on those products, and determine a price for that 
exposure which still may be out in the market. The markets where 
he distributes, for example. We were looking at a case recently 
where about 75% of his product, and it was a farm equipment 
manufacturer, was in canada, and the products climate is al 
different there, so a substantial credit was given in his rate, due 
to the fact that this product was primarily used in a country where 
we don't have the growing strict liability doctrines and so forth 
that we have in this country. 
Labels, warnings, proper instructions, design -- whether 
he handles or distributes foreign products or incorporates ign 
components in his product. We have a problem of getting to the 
manufacturer of the foreign products with our court system. 
whole harness agreements that he might have signed or have signed 
in his favor could be a plus or minus in his rating as it af cts 
the exposure. There is what we call a vendor's endorsement, where 
a distributor may be covered under the manufacturer's policy . 
Of course that cuts down the exposure for the insured distributor 
so there's a credit usually given for that. The quality control 
programs and record keeping are important. The testing that is 
done and the records kept. Whether he has enough records in terms 
of serial numbers, warranty registrations and so forth to undertake 
a recall program in the event he determines that he has a very 
unsafe product that's out. We find quite a few of the smaller 
manufacturers, particularly, that don't have that kind of record 
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available, and it would be impossible, virtually, to recall faulty 
In the design you look at the quality of the product 
itself. That is, if it's an economy model versus a quality model 
with good safeguards on it. Changes in design in the past. Perhaps 
we find in our loss control survey that they are making a good safe 
now but that only began two years ago. There are still a 
of products out without the safeguards, and that has to be of 
concern. 
Defense costs are a big item and we find that particularly 
1 of the manufacturers of machinery for the work place are sued 
ly and have defense costs even though they may escape paying 
a j nt. So the defense cost has to be priced into the coverage 
cause 's a real factor in products liability. 
Another thing is reinsurance availability in the cost 
re nee for the primary insurer. A variety of other 
t s go into looking at that individual's product. For 
le, I was discussing with Tom a case we had recently with 
facturers of a posthole digger, an auger type with a power 
ff from a tractor. It is almost impossible to guard that 
part entirely, so we were asked to insure or look at the 
manufacturer. It so happened that we were aware of the particular 
we had incurred a claim lodged against the distributor 
r state on that particular auger. So in going to our 
la person who had been handling that case, he had done an 
aus investigation and we found out that this was one of 
the few that they had put out without a safety device, and as a 
lt, an exposure that normally an underwriter would shy away 
10 
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from, through the knowledge that we have gained through handling 
the investigation of another insured for that product, we were 
able to give him a quotation, at least. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Now you're surveying 20,000 products 
claims? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: A little in excess of 20,000, yes, s 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: And what are you looking for when 're 
surveying? What information in categories are you going to ? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: This is a rather exhaustive questionnaire 
that each claims person as he closes that claim completes. it 
is designed to gather information on a variety of questions that have 
been raised about products liability. 
CHAI~~N KNOX: Who is filling out these claims, the 
claims people for the insurance company? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I see. 
MR. HOLLIDAY: The claims person who closes the claim 
finally for the compnay. So he is familiar with the file. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: It would show the nature of the claim, the 
nature of the injury, how much was paid, what the cost of fense 
was, etc. 
MR. HOLLIDAY: The theory of settlement, whether punitive 
damages were alleged, and whether he felt that impacted on the final 
judgment. Some of the proposals for schedule of benefits, questions 
were constructed so that those could be evaluated and priced out or 
at least get some evaluation of a no-fault .... 
CHAIR}ffiN KNOX: And you're going to summarize all this and 
publish it? 
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MR. HOLLIDAY: I assume we'll have that summary toward 
the end of the year. It will be published and widely distributed. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: We'll look forward to having a chance 
to look at that. Do you know if the Insurance Commissioner has 
appointed a Products Advisory Committee in California? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: I'm not sure. The last update I had, 
we had about 13 states that were either appointed or in the process 
of inting. We have Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, 
some of the eastern states, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and 
Minnesota that are in the midwest, and Kansas. California, 
I think, had expressed an interest, but the status of that 
advisory committee, I'm uncertain. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Now from the standpoint of an under-
writer, if you were going to see if the law could be adjusted in 
some fashion that would cause you to set a substantially lower rate 
general for manufactured products, what changes in the law would 
you suggest? Generally speaking, that is. 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Yes. As a member of the Alliance without 
getting into this in detail, we have served on several committees 
there and the Alliance has published a pamphlet which does include, 
and I believe Tom will leave a copy of this with you, some of the 
modifications in the tort law that we favor. In terms of whether 
those modifications, were they to go into a given state this year, 
would that impact on the premiums being paid by those insureds 
in that state, that would be very doubtful. Because of the way 
products claims arise and in the state perhaps, and the union, 
maybe even overseas, the modifications in a given state would 
have little impact on the rates. If those were enacted 
12 
• 
uniformly, country-wide, they certainly would impact on the 
escalation of cost, depending on when claims that were affected 
by those statutes arose. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: In other words, it would take a while, 
regardless of what we did, before it would have an impact on the 
industry and thus on prices and what not. Any questions from 
members of the committee? Senator Russell. 
SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL: Yes, I was wondering, if 
there are no changes toward liability, if things go on the same 
as they are, what is your prognostication as to the ability of 
the insurance industry to continue to provide product liabili 
insurance coverage? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: I think, by and large, we will continue 
to provide a market. The big question that we're facing now is 
the cost of providing that coverage. The affordability to the 
buyer. Given enough time, working with a system and given some 
stability in that system, I think the pricing for the coverage 
can be handled by the insurance industry. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Assuming that we do not have those 
stabilizing factors, do you see a continuing escalation absent 
some type of legislation? 
MR.HOLLIDAY: Yes, I was working toward that. What we 
have seen in the last two or three years really is a catching up 
of rate level. We were inadequately pricing it in the past years, 
with the emergence of strict liability doctrine and the theory of 
entitlement that it brought the claim activity up to a level. 
I'm not certain that that will continue to escalate, that is in the 
pricing, as much the next five years as it has in the past five 
13 
years. But it 11 to esca te 
s ns of claims escalate. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
your company because let's as 
10 r general 
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quite far behind 
can say it's an 
well informed 
recent history 
and projection, how adequate is that formed judgment? Of course, 
I guess I can't expect you to say not very 
give us some kind of an idea? Are we still worki 
can you 
in a maze, 
or do you really think you have a handle on this now, assuming 
no legislative changes? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: I think the attention given to 
liability ten years ago, six years ago, was slight, simply 
in terms of the overall commerical lines book of business, it 
accounted for a slight fraction of it. With the emergence of what 
has occurred in the last few years, this is fast becoming a major 
line of insurance. For our own company, for example, we have 
increased partly through rates, and partly through taking on 
additional exposures, is about ten times over what we were writ 
in 1969 and 1970. So now it has become enough of a major part of 
our book of business, it's getting more education of underwriters, 
loss control people. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well that being the case, why are we 
told in California that a lot of -- it's harder and harder to get 
insurance and product liability, not just the cost but a lot of 
companies are going out of that line entirely or in California. 
You say the contrary, that your company is increasing its business. 
MR. HOLLIDAY: But there are still types of business 
that we are not equipped to write. We don't have the expertise 
to write aircraft products, for example, not the capacity, because 
you're looking at great catastrophe type losses, and most of that 
is handled through pooling arrangements. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So as far as your company is concerned 
then, you have a handle on it, you know where you're going. 
15 
It's 
increasingly a larger part of your total business which musn't 
mean it's going to be a profitable part, and aside from the fact 
that it may be too costly and so forth, as of now you're in control 
of the situation? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: In 
expertise, but we are certain 
.markets where we feel we have the 
not able to provide every product 
with a quotation. And that's really ion of the State 
Advisory Committees that I alluded to earlier. It is to take 
these accounts that cannot t insurance quotes, and put them 
in the hands of some experienced and sophisticated producer-type 
people and underwriting people from larger companies in the area. 
They simply go to work trying to match up perhaps that agent who 
doesn't have access to all the markets with the market willing to 
write it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well in the areas in which you are 
expert, have there been products that you have dropped and you will 
not insure even though you're expert, because of .... 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Because of individual loss history? 
Certainly. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: For example? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: There's a period --well, thinking of an 
automobile jack manufacturer wh was to consumers, and he had a 
very lax testing program. We had a lot of failures to these jacks. 
If that customer won't take the necessary steps to build in quality 
controls, positive locking devices, and so forth, then you will 
find generally the companies are unwilling to insure that product 
in its present form. 
16 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: In a specific company, is there a 
general category of a product that you don't touch anymore, even 
though you're an expert, because of various problems? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Not any product line that we, Sentry, 
have gotten out of, no. But individual cases within there, 
because of the variations in quality control, variations in 
management expertise, of design, this sort of thing, we would 
not write. Or we might write one just like it from another firm . 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Any questions? Mr. Hiestand. 
MR. FRED HIESTAND: Yes, Mr. Holliday, do you break down 
or do you know if there are any statistics that show of all 
different rating classifications, what percentage falls into the 
large A rating and what percentage is in the composite rating, 
either in terms of like gross sales of the companies, the total 
premium dollars that are written by insurance companies? What 
criteria that you divide this up so that one would just have some 
notion as to .... 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Yes, the yellow pamphlet from ISO shows 
that for the latest year, which is the policy year ending in 1974 
if you have that, it's shown on page 13 -- it shows that broken 
down by the monoline manual rating classes. The monoline A rated 
classes and the composite rated, loss rated and large A rated 
classes, which is by far the majority of the premium of the total. 
MR. HIESTAND: The large A rated class? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Yes. 
MR. HIESTAND: And this is broken down in terms of the 
premiums that are charged? 
17 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Premiums nd the incurred loss by those 
categories by year. 
MR. HIESTAND 
you would normally 
If an 1 manufacturer is in a line, 
a large A class rating, but he says, 
look, I've got a different it. Like we've 
been told, there was a manufacturer of presses that used remote 
control but yet he found his nee premiums for the operation 
of these punch presses was just as h as was for people with 
manual control punch presses7 they just wouldn't consider it. It 
was just a punch press. Is there any way someone who wants to 
get insurance can have the 
that particular product and s 
come in and actually evaluate 
, you , look we're a punch 
press, but we do it a different way? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Yes, certa The loss control engineers 
of a given company well go in and look at the problem. In 
that particular case it comes from modification that might be 
made by a purchaser in ssing the remote control. There have been 
instances where the manufacturer, regardless of modifications made, 
has been involved suits, lved in a lot of expensive defense, 
whether he's held 1 or not. 
MR. HIESTAND: Well, determining -- I mean, if 
someone makes what is a s fe ct, you then anticipate that 
the user may not use the as it is supposed to be used. 
Therefore it could be haza , therefore it goes into a different 
rating than it would if it was used as intended? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Wel , I'm simply saying that may have been 
the case in the remote control 
of those are modif They are on 
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market for fifteen, twenty 
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years and it really isn't a guarantee that claims won't arise. 
MR. HIESTAND: Well, I know, but it seems that with any 
product, no matter how safely made, you can ant ipate that someone 
may not use it as it was intended or may take off the safety 
equipment. In determining how to rate it and what premiums ought 
to be paid, do the insurance companies anticipate that the most 
dangerous use which this product can be put will likely be put by 
the least reasonable person in determining what insurance ought to 
be? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Well, that may certainly be the considera-
tion of some people. The loss history of that manufacturer is 
a governing consideration as well as the industry in total. If 
he has been manufacturing remote control or guarded punch presses 
throughout the life of his firm, then I would think certainly he 
would be paying a lower rate than one who did not. It may be that 
he started this three years ago when the majority of the outstanding 
exposure did not have that safety device, too. So the rate credit 
being given currently would have to be a very minor one, if at all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN S. FLOYD MORI: You mentioned the problem 
of having goods or products that are manufactured with foreign parts 
or from foreign manufacturers. What is the problem when you have 
different state laws and goods are manufactured in a different 
state and sold and used in another state? What kind of problems 
arise there? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Normally, you can still bring in the 
manufacturer into our court system here, if he's in the United 
States. We find many cases a manufacturer might be incorporating 
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a subassembly or distributing rts that are manufactured overseas 
where there is no way to 
of the manufacturer as 
determining what qual 
wherewithal to make a tr 
manufacture that product. 
t to them, so he stands in the shoes 
as that su t s. difficulty of 
s we just don't have the 
to Germany to see just how they 
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI: Even at that ~- 's say the cotton-
picking machines that are used Cal forn , but manufactured 
Kansas, whichrns a dif 
of standard than we 
as soc th 
nt quality control state-administered 
here in California. Are there any 
? You different standards in 
dif rent states. Manu cturing, we are told, for example, 
that California has higher standards than any place else. But yet, 
if products are here and manufactured in Alabama, what kind 
of problems we have, or do we? 
MR. HOLLIDAY: Well, the rati that is established for 
t liability assumes countrywide distribution. We are not 
es ishing rates by state's own product liability. So it assumes 
that whether 's manufac in California or in Alabama that 
re in the country. the suit could arise 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Do you largest common denominator, 
then? nts are h 
pay based on California j 
is that some 
manufactured 
surers of 
Ca ifornia. 
r Californ In Iowa they've got to 
ts. 
One of things we've been hearing 
s say won't insure products 
s is statement made saying that 
our current law in Californ s cha ing manufacturers out of the 
state. That doesn't fit with what just said, does it? 
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MR. HOLLIDAY: That has not been my experience. No, 
we make no such distinction in our company. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Right, anyth further? Thank you 
very much, gentlemen. We appreciate your attendance very much. 
I know that you've come from a long distance and it's very kind 
of you to be with us. Mr. Creighton White of the Fireman's Fund. 
While Mr. White is coming up, I would like to introduce Senator 
Robert Beverly, Vice-Chairman of the Committee from Los Angeles 
County and recent visitor to Alaska. Mr. White. 
MR. CREIGHTON WHITE: (See Appendix VI) Chairman Knox, 
members of the Committee. My name is Creighton White. I am V 
President of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. I have nationw 
responsibility for commercial auto and liability underwriting. 
The remarks I make here today are directed at underwriting 
practices in the product liability area. Of course, Mr. Holliday 
touched on many of the same sort of issues that I intended to 
touch upon and are contained in my statement. Therefore, I will 
skip over those things that he's already addressed. Fireman's 
Fund is the seventh largest property-liability insurance group in 
the country and a major market in California for all types of 
personal and commercial property and liability coverages. It has 
substantial interest in the findings of this Committee. Last year 
Fireman's Fund wrote an excess of $10 million of identifiable pre-
miums for product liability coverage. About 15% of this amount was 
in California, that is, involved California sellers of goods. The 
policy of Fireman's Fund regarding product liability coverage is 
the same as with other lines of insurance. We want the business, 
but only when it is adequately priced. The adequate price for 
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products liability insurance S 1 r, become very difficult 
to ascertain because of new doctrines and s in the tort 
liability system that 
spawned enormous increases 
Chairman of the u.s. consumer 
stated that in Cali ia 
al scope of liabil and 
Sa 
liabili 
and jury verdicts. The 
ssion recently 
awards increased 
800% since 1965. He also affirmed 
of ten $100,000 product-re ted 
This activity has transformed the 
t there is now an average 
week in the state. 
liability line from 
a miscellaneous, rather minor exposure, to a most volatile, 
d ff lt one and a very short r of time. Naturally 
enough then, product liability underwriters are taking a close look 
at applications for the coverage and are charging premiums 
sufficient to cover the loss potential and expenses. Following, 
I listed some of the things that a product liability underwriter 
will look a . I think Mr. Holliday did an excellent job describing 
most of se and perhaps I could sk over that in order not to 
bore you too much. 
CHAIIDJ!.AN KNOX: It's one of the last things that is 
interest What is the financial standing of the manufacturing 
concerns? It's been our experience that n bus sses are 
compelled to making cuts, safe 
to feel the cutback. 
MR. WHITE: That i 
to s 1 ili situat 
wha have you, when there is 
it is in safety area. 
rams are among first 
exper not only re ted 
s, workers compensat situations, 
nse cutti to be done, we often 
Of course, often applicants for 
products liability coverage are defic nt in one or more of these 
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areas. But when they are willing to adhere to our loss control 
recommendatioM the problems can be corrected. Consumers are 
protected, underwriters can assume the risk profitab in most 
instances, and thus develop a capacity to accommodate the always 
growing insurance needs of our society. I might ment that 
in the State of California we have 62 loss control engineers on 
the job in the field, including two industrial hygienist engineer 
types. As I perceive the product liability market today, the 
situation is more one of affordability of the coverage than of 
availability. There are ready sources of product liability 
insurance in California and across the country. As we have 
determined in these marketing assistance programs, which are 
blooming and have already been described, we find, for example, 
that most people, most manufacturers, most sellers of goods with 
products liability problems may not have received the type of 
marketing assistance that they require. In these marketing 
assistance programs, we have found to date that we can take care 
in the regular market of most of the product liability problems 
that come to the fore. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In the small business, say a new 
business or a new order of business, can those types of individuals 
meet these standards and remain solvent economically today, or does 
it really take a going establishment of a larger size to be able 
to meet the criteria? I recognize that it would depend on the type 
of product, but let's say one of the tougher ones. Are we in a 
sense sort of precluding the small entrepreneur from getting into 
that type of business? 
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MR. WHITE: It could be higher depending on the 
product. What I was saying was that it's diff lt to answer because 
when you get that big they are often on a la deductible basis. 
They assume more of the risk themselves or are on what we call a 
retrospective rating plan. That is, after the fact, the losses 
below a certain level are looked at and then charged back to h 
through a rating formula agreed upon between the two parties . 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, let's take one that is modest size 
and growing. Can he expect his insurance cost, as a percen 
keep pace or increase faster? 
MR. WHITE: It would keep pace because the rates are 
based on total sales without regard to size. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Did you want to finish the statement? 
I had a question about Exhibit 1. It says that for each dollar 
of loss, I assume that is dollar paid to a claimant, there was 
, to 
an additional 42¢ of expenses incurred by the insurance company in 
defending the claim. 42%, your guys are getting more than the 
plaintiffs' lawyers. 
MR. WHITE: That may be true. Not all that is attorney 
fees, incidentally. The close claim study indicated, though, that 
about 80-85% was. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: But this doesn't include brokerage fees 
for selling the insurance or general overhead of the company. 
This is the actual defense for that particular claim, 42¢ per 
dollar paid to a claimant. 
MR. WHITE: Out of these 7,791 close claims studied, 
this was the fact. 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: Excuse me. Doe this lude those 
claims where you 't ing? In other s you success-
fully de or c and you 
MR. WHITE: The s d , but th s 
ratio -- gosh, I have to 
CHAIIUJ'JAN KNOX: 
t back to the sta i 
I mean, 
anything. 
rticular dollar 
s. 
to at is 
that for a dollar of loss, 
It has nothing to do 
's 4 se on that cla alone. 
or for some reason or a 
r cla 
you d 
where you successfully defend 
't pay. 
MR. WHITE: To answer that I would have to get back to 
bas statis s. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Okay, well 's not. 
MR. WHITE: I would 1 to mention that this is a pre-
liminary report of the c cla 
mentioned by Mr. Holliday and on 
that has already been 
7,700 records were analyzed, 
and we'll have excess of 20,000 soon. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, they 
President with a smal sample t. 
the election of the 
other question I 
wanted to ask. You t out t 30¢, based on the study so far 
the pre nary 30¢ of each dollar of loss that the 
employer was 1 to some ree. that the so-called 
strict 1 ili r warra or whatever it is, 
~s not re s for at s 0¢ of the lar of loss. 
MR. WHITE: 11, remember the r is not required 
to r these ki f iabil t s. 's exc from this 
because the Worker's nsat Act, etc. 
CHAIRMAN We re ta ing product liabili loss. 
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MR. WHITE: That's right. Where the employer himself 
in the estimation of the claim man .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: We're talking on Workers' Compensation 
now, as opposed to a consumer .... 
MR. WHITE: This is all products liability stuff. What 
we're trying to say here is that the employer of this injured 
employee, this injured employee brought suit against our manu-
facturer. The employer, in the estimation of the claim man, the 
man filling out the form, was also negligent. He might have been 
negligent by failure to maintain the machinery if the machinery was 
involved or overcoming safety devices or whatever. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Okay, anything further. Yes. Mr. Hiestand. 
MR. HIESTAND~ I just have a couple of questions. One is 
on "C", the next item which Mr. Knox is referring to. This would 
mean, I gather, just from simple logic that based on your experience 
a statute of limitations for products liability that barred claims 
beyond six years would eliminate 45% of the total products liability 
claims for the companies that you have insured. 
MR. WHITE: This is not just us, but that ~s the early 
indication. The preliminary indications from this close claim study, 
yes. 
MR. HIESTAND: You mention in your prepared testimony 
that you feel that insurance acts as a check and balance on 
shoddy products, but part of that is just because of the cost in 
the marketplace. And that cost that is becoming high is also in 
response to the tort lianility system which you then comment you 
feel has become more of a check than a balance. So my question 
27 
is what do you feel to be 
system so that omes more of a 
MR. WHITE 
the plain ff and 
You have heard from 
Insurance As soc t 
proposals for 
rights as 
think I will fer to 
CHAIRMAN KNOX 
MR. t 
Exh it 2, I bel one of you 
about ck of j t in the j 
insurance indus and s 
row of f res, the "A" rated ss 
relating even to po r of 1 
was noted. I think the rest of the 
sel lanatory. 
CHAIRMAN you 
attendance 
I 
I have a 
be avai le to 
scuss most 
to me that the is f s 
to cha the tort l 
than a check? 
ility 
nt 
rt s, r 
major alliances. 
o the American 
a list of 
11 return the 
basis and I 
of comments. On 
previously commented 
areas on the part of the 
you can see on that 
at ions in the ss ratios 
125.9% loss ratio 
its are pre much 
I iate 
L formation for us. 
of Chicago, 
i Professor, 
? 
nd VII) Well, 
now wh 11 
I wou rather not 
s tement. It seems 
have been raised the 
• 
Committee have turned on specific proposals for recommendation. 
Much of what that statement was designed to do was to recount 
the chronicles. Much of the shifts in s liability law 
above and beyond the commonplace one of negligence in strict 
liability, it seems to be that it is reasonably self-sufficient, 
and I would rather devote myself to some of the issues that came 
up here and to direct attention in particular to some of the 
problems of a substantive nature that have been raised. I ink 
one of the best ways perhaps that one could begin this is to 
begin with the statement which was read before and which it was 
noted that there is always going to be a trade-off; that is, 
there seems to be very little way in which somebody can find the 
situation or scheme which will on the one hand relieve manu-
facturers of some of the burdens which seem to be imposed upon 
them by the current situation in products liability without 
cutting down by some degree of measure of plaintiff's recovery. 
The dilemma is not perhaps as difficult as it sounds because it may 
well be possible to reshape some of the substantive rules in a 
manner which will reduce the very high administrative costs which 
are now associated with the operation of the system. I think, for 
the most part, if one could find a way, as it were, to eliminate 
the friction which takes place in many of these products liability 
transactions without reducing recovery, things would be best. 
Unfortunately, it seems to me that that is going to be fairly 
difficult to do unless you are prepared in the course of this 
Committee to take a comprehensive reevaluation of the entire 
system of civil procedure and related instances which are current 
in this state and indeed in many others. So what I thought I 
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might want to do is, as it were, make the case for our statute 
of limitations in a way which is somewhat different perhaps than 
that which is presented in our 
effect, it supplements what s done. 
thing a bit more concrete, what I'll is I 
I think, in 
order to make the 
11 go to my 
strength, which is talking about cases rather than to the 
strength of the prev witnesses, wh is to talk about general 
underwriting pract s and the like. As I was reading the advance 
sheet, I came across a case that was decided recently in California 
which I think is a very instructive vehicle by which you could talk 
about some of the problems which plague products liability cases 
and which indicate some of the problems a prices which you have 
when you deal with this kind of coverage. The case Price vs. Niagara 
Machine and Tool Co~any, and I have it here. It is 136 Cal 
Reporter 535. In one sense it is a perfectly routine products 
liability case. A fellow gets his fingers cut off by a machine 
in the course of its operation when there is some unexplained 
malfunction. The question is, what do do? Twenty years ago 
it was quite clear t one did with a case l this. It clearly 
rose out of and in the course of nt and it was a Workmen's 
you had to decide was the Compensation case and the on 
extent of med ls and 
particular accident. 
course, to get the Workmen's 
i 
disabili 
growth of 
nsat 
t was caused by the 
ird actions, of 
f s (and I think 
that's quite proper) and then you start to bring an action against 
some th party manufacturer, suppl r, distributor of the line. 
In this case what you did, you had a tool press which was manu-
factured in New 1940, which was so to some other person 
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before it was sold to the employer of the injured worker. It 
turns out also that the press was originally equipped with certain 
kinds of guards which had been removed when the machine had been 
sold from one carrier to another. So in order to deal with this 
kind of case, what you had to do was to go through a whole variety 
of que~tions all of which were shrouded in uncertainty in order to 
get some kind of resolution of the questions, simple questions, 
as to whether or not the defective machine which was put on the 
market by this defendant was the cause of the injury of this 
particular plaintiff. The statement looks very simple when you 
state it like that. It doesn't look to be too much different from 
the question of whether or not Jones ran down Smith in an inter-
section, but the moment you start to look at the way in which these 
cases unpack themselves in trial, you begin to wonder how it was 
that you could even solve them at 42% of the total claims dollars 
because it seems to me that the cost should in reality be a great 
deal higher. The first thing one has to note about this case is 
machine tools are generally made as multi-purpose items which 
are going to be customized by any individual employer or manufacturer 
after they are purchased by the product liability defendant. One 
of the problems that you have in the product liability area is that 
recent documents -- I guess the major California cases -- Balito v. 
The Improved Machinery corporation -- something like that, decided 
in 1973. Before this case, the general rule was that you made a 
machine and the question of customization was strictly an employer's 
responsibility, not that of the original manufacturer. That being 
the case, in effect, if you made it in accordance with your own 
specifications, the fact that certain safeguards were not put on 
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the machine at the time it originally started which persisted until 
the time of defect. Now what happens? You have to decide whether 
or not the customization should be on by the original 
manufacturer or by somebody else, and that's a question upon which 
you could have endless kinds of debate because it turns out some 
customization may be possible at the general level. Some types 
of customization may not be. It may be possible to put on an 
all-purpose guard but the all-purpose rd may not be particularly 
good for any one purpose and it may well be that better substitutions 
will take place later on in the chain of distribution. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Is the issue of foreseeability relevant, 
as far as the manufacturer is concerned? 
DR. EPSTEIN: I think foreseeability is one of the great 
inheritants of the modern tort law. It seems to me that it domin-
ates a great many of the discussions in ordinary negligence but 
it seems to me that it is an essentially unmanageable test. You 
can foresee that anything will be done with the product. Nothing 
is more foreseeable than that a safeguard would be removed by 
some employers who sh to increase the machinery's output and 
efficiency. What you really have to ask is not the question of 
whether or not the gua is forseeable. The issue before these 
cases is whether or not some party other than the original 
manufacturer has full over the machinery and could make 
the decision one or a r in order to keep that guard on or 
to take it off. It seems to me if you start to look to full 
control as the tests in these kinds of cases, what you will be 
able to do is to sert the more sensible traditional common law 
view of causat back into case and to say that it is possible 
even if there is an or nal de to cure, or if there was an 
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original machine which was safely made, to convert into one that 
was defective by subsequent use. If you start to use the question 
of foreseeabili , all you are going to do is to make each and 
every one of these cases jury determination and then you are just 
going to have no principle judgment because whereas the jury may 
come up with an answer, doesn't have to defend it, which is very 
convenient in a case like this for the very simple reason that 
is no principle way that you could start to defend these 
judgments one way or another. It seems to me that if you want to 
get major institutional reforms, one of the important things you 
have to bear in mind is that rules have their place and anyth 
whi just constantly opens up a very broad range of factual 
inquiries to a jury without what it encompasses, to what to do or 
where to go, is going to increase uncertainty, if going to increase 
the difficulty of making estimations about underwriting, it is 
going to make it very unclear to people who not only manufacture 
machines but those who service them and use them as to what their 
responsibilities are. At this point, virtually, under the Calif-
ornia law of products liability anything goes to the jury and it 
may do with it what it wants. There is nothing which has a kind 
hard edge, tough-minded quality about it. It seems to me that if 
you had a good rule which talked about cures and curing causes in 
products liability and machine tool cases, you would be a lot better 
off than with the current situation that we have today. For 
example, in Price case which I just mentioned, the plantiff's 
at , having lost the case at trial and now trying to get 
either a retrial or directed verdict in his favor, argued that 
really you can't cure an original defect because what happens is 
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somebody else might install a guard on there but it may not be 
connected with screws which are quite as strong as those which 
the original manufacturer would have put on there, so therefore, 
it is a little bit easier to disconnect it, as though somehow 
or other it should make a difference whether it is going to take 
a screwdriver or a rachet wrench in order to get that guard off. 
It seems to me that kind of point, once you reach that level, you 
are really talking about the kinds of speculation which do not lend 
credit to the judical system and yet that's exactly where we are 
in the current situation in california. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: What was the holding in the case? 
DR. EPSTEIN: The holding in the case -- it was nice 
there was no holding in the case. There were a series of objections 
raised by a plaintiff's attorney after the fees which were rejected 
by the Appellate Courts and one of the reasons why the case is so 
important is this is the kind of case which one can lament even 
though it turned out in the defendant's judgment which was affirmed 
on appeal because the important question was not to my mind 
institutional, it was not the outcome of the case. The important 
question was the proceedings that were used to reach th~kind of 
decision. If you had a strong rule which said the state of the 
art governs the time in which this thing is put on the market, 
there is a directed verdict for the defendant, a summary judgment 
which would take you maybe a nickel per trial, literally, because 
no one would bring it. If you start to have these kinds of open-
ended cases, open-ended indefinite rules, what you are talking 
about is 100 grand on either side, if the injury is large enough 
to warrant that kind .... 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, obviously in this case, the 
defendant's motion for a non-suit failed at the trial and it 
went to the jury. 
DR. EPSTEIN: It went to the jury. And the jury decided 
for the defendent. What they did, Mr. Knox, in a sense they 
reinvented the wheel. Every single major issue of substantive law 
came up in the course of that decision to be passed upon by the 
jury. I think you ought to examine the opinion because it's .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I will . 
DR. EPSTEIN: ... it's instructive of the way in which 
you had, in effect, not an accident case anymore but some sort 
of a litigated form of World War III in which people bring you 
truth and force from every conceivable point in order to interpret 
safety ordinances by the New York Department of Safety in 1931. And, 
in fact, what is so remarkable about this case is that they manage 
to talk about eight or nine issues of causation without ever telling 
you how the accident happened. Because as it turns out the products 
liability law has gotten itself so convoluted and so bizarred to 
death that you don't really care about the immediate elements. 
You only care about those things that are remote and distant in 
time, and never about those things that are immediate and proximate. 
It is a complete conversion of the general rules of causation that 
say you start from the accident and look for the nearest things 
first and the remotest things last, to exactly the opposite 
situation. We ignore plaintiff's conduct, we ignore employer's 
maintenance, we ignore rehabilitation 1 modifidation and repair, 
and we go after that poor guy, who 40 years ago shipped out a 
machine which was not only in accordance with specifications but 
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in accordance with the customs, standards, and practices of doing 
business at that time. There is no way that one can develop a 
system of incentive effects, you know, based upon your incentive 
effects that they create to undo acts that have long been done, and 
yet that is exactly what you get in this kind of a case. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Now what do you suggest as a remedy? 
DR. EPSTEIN: What do I suggest as a remedy? We do have 
our package, and, I think, that obviously I don't think that it 
is necessary to go down the 16 or 17 other factual issues that were 
raised by this case. Suffice it to say that each of them were 
shrouded in uncertainty, dripped in confusion, but what one needs, 
I think, are rules which will give you some sense of what counts 
as a safe harbor. It seems to me that it is absolutely important 
to have the type of situation that says that if you do it right at 
the time that you let that thing out on the market, come hell or high 
water, you are going to be safe from liability, even if somebody else 
is not; and it seems to me that that is what you want with the future, 
and also the past. 
Now, in the discussions of underwriting, I think it is 
important to have to distinguish two issues, and I would like to 
make a point perhaps a bit more forceful than was made before. 
When you price a mach tool, say your punch press, Mr. Hiestand, 
you don't only price the punch press that comes off the presses 
today, as it were, because n you do have to worry about modifi-
cations upon which they can hold you to account, but there is no 
rule that says it is just a safety. You also have to price the 
backlog of mach that is already on the market. It turns out 
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that that is just a terrible problem because you don't know who 
owns the machine, you don't know the extent to which they have been 
maintained, you don't know, as it were the value of the laborer 
who happens to be using the machine, whether it happens to be low 
level labor or high level labor, or whatever. And you have to 
really do this on an individualized basis, and you can't do 
so when they look at this guy with a recent development of 
innovative machinery, they are going to charge him with all the 
sins past, present, and future with respect to things already 
out on the marketplace. And it seems to me that in order to 
handle that problem, both in the grading problem and in terms of 
the sheer equity in favor of the defendant, who did everything 
that was expected of him at the time that he did it, that you 
have to have some kind of statute of limitations based upon, 
and which guarantees you some sort of protection, based upon the 
use of the product out in the market. Now, the question then is, 
what is the size form that you could use, and here I think it is 
important to mention the alternatives, which I would reject, and 
which were endorsed by the Interagency Task Force in its report. 
They had two types of things: one said that we could start the 
use of useful life type of limitations, and say that for each 
particular product, you are going to start to assign some form of 
useful life and the moment the product is out on the marketplace 
before that useful life, it seems they say that liability or the 
defendant should beinsulated from liability. There are several 
problems with that. One, you never know how to calculate the 
useful life for any machine that is constantly undergoing provisions 
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prepared for maintenance and improvement. If you take a building, 
for example, its useful life is perhaps 20 years without maintenance 
and 50 years with, and so when you start to try and figure out 
what it is, you are not going to be able to do it product line 
by product line. You're going to have to do it product by product. 
At that point, it seems to me that the entire system just 
collapses of its own weight as a generalized kind of defense, because 
there are too many individual dllicriminations that have to be made 
in order for it to be working. All you will do, in effect, if you 
make that into a statute, is to give another layer of common 
law, of statutory confusion above and beyond the common law con-
fusion that we have. 
Now, I don't wish to say that the useful lives are 
unimportant, but it seems to me that as a matter of case law, 
you can introduce that into cases and arguments, you know, in this 
great battle of negligence and strict liability and whatever, and 
do it with a fair bit of force and effect. I certainly would not 
want to introduce a statute which would foreclose the defense which 
in principle makes good sense. What I want to say is that it 
seems to me it is a singularly unpromising line for legislative 
reform. It seems to me that rather than to have to bite the 
bullet of how these cases ought to go, and try to do it in a manner 
which knocks out most of the bad cases on principle, which costs a 
great deal to bring and defend, which clutter up the courts, 
which take a great deal of resources away from all persons concerned, 
whether it be social resources, plaintiff's resources or defendant's 
resources; and the only way you could do that, I think, is by 
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straight time limitation, and then you build into that time 
limitation certain kinds of exceptions I will get to in a moment 
in order to try to preserve those rich loads of decent cases which 
ought to be brought or try to keep out the dross which ought to be 
kept out. 
The second kind of proposal that one might consider, 
which I also think ought to be rejected, is one which is based 
upon contractual types of situations. It has been suggested in the 
Interagency Task Force study that we engage in a system that deals 
with an elaborate set of disclaimers, and what you do is that you 
start to make your products and put disclaimers on the product 
thing and use that thing for 10 years at your peril. Well, what is 
wrong with that? I don't think there is anything wrong with it 
in principle, so long as you could be sure that the network of 
communication is going to take place between worker who uses the 
machinery and the defendant who does not. The problem that you get 
with contractual solutions is two-fold. On the one hand, with respect 
to the products that are going to go into the marketplace in future 
years, it is clear that you are not sure that the communication is 
going to make itself known; the warnings may get rubbed off, they 
r1ay get effaced, they may get removed, the product goes from hand-
to-hand, the parties that use them may not read them, so it's a 
real question as to whether you get anything that even looks like 
the contract. And oddly enough, here the statutes of limitations is 
better, because by making it a public declared statement, this is 
what we want to do, everybody will be given notice of it, not 
because the manufacturer in the individual case will have to give 
notice, but because the law, as suitably publicized, will be put 
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into work places with notices of the effect, will make the 
communications take place much more easily because it will be done 
by better and independent sources. 
The other problem that you get with the disclaimer type 
situation, or the second one,who is going to set the statute of 
limitations. If you have the manufacturer set it, there is always 
the question of whether or not there will be an advantage taken by 
third parties, not subject to the original agreements. I have 
less fear about that than most people because I basically believe 
that markets work even when it comes to safety if you know what 
the rules of the game are going to be. But if you don't share my 
kind of confidence, and I must say that most people don't, you 
are going to have to find somebody else who is going to set those 
warnings and the last thing I would want to do is have a committee 
of 500 sitting down on each of 10,000 products that come on the market-
place each day, saying you are eight years 4 you are ten years, you 
are nine and a half, or whatever. It seems to me that you get your-
self in the worst kind of political morass imaginable if you try 
to make those individuated judgments. 
The second problem that you have with the statute is it 
doesn't deal with the backlog of products that are already on the 
market. That is, I wou guess the several millions of machines of 
one kind and description wh are out there already, and to the 
extent that you start to talk about disclaimers, it seems to me 
that it would not work with products that are already in the 
marketplace. To take the contractual metaphor one step further, 
unilateral variations of previous contractual arrangements by one 
party are not binding on the other, and it seems to me that the 
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disclaiming causes that are instituted for products that are 
already on the market would amount to a unilateral disclaimer. 
So it seems to me, therefore, that you are driven back to the 
kind of standard statute of limitations that we have had, and the 
trick that you have to do with a statute of this sort is to say 
what you think the dominant principle ought to be and what you 
think ought to be the exceptions to it, and we have struggled at 
great lengths with the AIA to see if we could try and figure out 
those areas in which defenses are appropriate by way of statute and 
those areas in which they are not. And my own guess about the 
situation is that you wish to have pretty much a blanket statute 
with a single time period across the board. I am in favor of a 
fairly generous time period, the statute itself as granted says 
eight, I gather the Committee revision says ten and that is fine 
as far as I am concerned. Then what you have to do is figure out 
what it covers. I would like it to cover all liabilities regardless 
of the theory in which the case is brought. That is, it seems to 
me that if you were to say, for example, that only strict liability 
actions were barred, there would be a resurgence of negligence 
cases, because the truth of it is that the distinction between 
strict liability in negligence, which may have been perfectly clear 
in 14th Century road accident cases, is not at all clear when it 
comes to modern product liability cases. If you stop and look at 
the kinds of things that you are supposed to take into account in 
design defect cases under a strict liability theory, you find that 
it was the exact same list of things that you take into account 
under a negligence suit. The way in which you can combine them 
may be somewhat different, but, in fact, the difference is so 
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marginal that you will not have the kind of major systematic 
institutional effect that legislation ought to aspire to, ought to 
achieve, it seems to me. So it seems to me you ought to go across 
the line and then what you ought to do is to create a set of 
exceptions. Now, what are these exceptions to be based upon? 
Well, one of the exceptions that I think you are doing to want in 
a statute of this sort are exceptions based upon duties imposed 
upon a manufacturer after he has parted with possession and control 
of his product. 
Now, it is quite clear under the modern institutional 
framework, many of these obligations today are imposed by statutes, 
and as far as the total loss is concerned, whatever you think about 
the merits of the statutes that impose them; these don't present 
any kind of a particular problem. But, for example, if you have a 
product that is going to be recalled because it was discovered to 
be dangerous 11 years after it was first put on the marketplace, 
and the manufacturer refuses to honor the statutory obligation to 
recall it, I should be appalled that he could hide behind the original 
10 year statute based upon manufacturer production, when in fact the 
duty upon the manufacturer arose only after the statute of limita-
tions. It seems to me you could have a very strong case, for 
cutting off some remed s, but not all remedies, because remember, 
you could still sue other de nts even with our statute of 
limitations, after the defendant has done with his product. But to 
have a statute of limitations which runs even before the defendant 
has committed his own wrong strikes me as being foolish, dangerous, 
perverse, or worse. Then the question 1s precisely, which duties 
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are you going to worry about; and here I must say, the Price case 
is giving me some concern, because there is a suggestion there that 
if juries are allowed to say that a manufacturer, once he is allowed 
to put a machine on the market, is constantly under a continuous 
duty to update, modernize, and to warrant subsequent uses of the 
machines as to what's to come, and it seems to me as a substantive 
matter, if you have no standards for that, it is an open-ended source 
of confusion and despair. I, for one, would like to see that statute 
of limitations coupled with a substantive provision which gives you 
some clear guidelines as to precisely what the source of these 
substantive duties are going to be. For the most part, I would 
want to limit it, I think, to cases where the statutory and 
administrative control and maybe couple that with other provisions 
that it may be a duty to inform those people whom you know, 
in the event that there are reports back to you about the 
imminently dangerous characteristics and qualities in the machine. 
We try to deal with that to some extent in our duty to warn 
statute. We don't put it forward as, shall we way, a monument to 
perfection. It is an exceptionally hard area to go by. It may well 
be that you have to do it product by product. Drugs require one set 
of rules, automobiles another, machine tools another. I am ndreal 
that sure about it, but it seems to me that if you have ,a statute 
of limitations with the subsequent duties, and then you say that 
every time you don't correct that original defect you are in breach 
of your subsequent duty, what you have done is created a statute 
of limitations which requires the plaintiff to replea an original 
cause of action. That is not our intention in connection with the 
statute of limitations package, and if the statute is construed 
that way, you can see why the commendable conservatorism of under-
writers, which, I think, you have heard mentioned already before, 
will indeed be justified. 
The second of the kinds of exceptions, I think, that 
one would want and that I have been able to identify is one which 
would concern reconditioned, refurbished and modernized products. 
Here, when you are dealing with a product originally put on the 
market by "A", 15 years later as we have done by "B", it seems to 
me that "B" to the extent that he is responsible for any wrong or 
for the condition of the product, and I would make his responsibility 
for that product total if is going to put it out as a reconditioned 
product, ought not to be able to get the benefit of the statute of 
limitations which runs for "A". Again, we get into a very awful 
situation where the statute would run, not only before the occurrence 
of the injury, which is a difficult one, one concedes that freely, 
but also would run before the occurrence of the wrongful act. 
The third of the exceptions that I think one could start 
to make is one that deals with the question of fraud. Now, there 
is a real problem as to 
gross misconduct on the 
jury to say that 
for a jury to find 
you describe fraud, willful at one time, 
rt of the defendant. One doesn't want the 
consc design choice was an open invitation 
it was a lent disclosure or concealment 
simply because they didn't an additional guard on it. You want 
the sense to be t the defendant knew about the risk, thought 
that he would be able to escape liability by playing it fancy, 
and even though he the improvement was warranted, for 
some reason or another decided not to use it. So it seems to me 
you could isolate that class of cases that involves willful and wanton 
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misconduct of the sort for example which, in my judgment, would 
support a case of punitive damages against the product manufacturer. 
It seems to me then that no matter what the time, you would not 
want the statute of limitations to protect them. The only argument 
that you could make against that exception, which shows you the 
difficulties of the Committee that you have to face, is whether you 
can police it. If you can police it, I would like to see it in 
there. If it turns out to become a royal road for the evisceration 
of the statute of limitations, I would prefer that it be kept out. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, you know, the problem that I see 
with the -- I mean I can readily understand the flat statute, and 
I think that is something we are really going to have to tussle 
with, because there is no effective statute at all now, as best I 
can tell. 
DR.EPSTEIN: You know, Mr. Knox, I must admit .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I mean I am assuming that we're looking 
from the standpoint of trying to reduce premiums. Now, maybe we 
are going to decide that we can't reduce premiums this way. 
DR. EPSTEIN: You know, I don't think that anyone 
can come up here and say that the only thing we have to do is 
reduce premiums. It seems to me we have to .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: No, of course not. 
DR. EPSTEIN: To reduce the premiums by eliminating those 
cases which are least meritorious, by getting rid of that portion 
which of course is the most unwarranted. If it turns out that even 
after these statute premiums remain wHat they are and you are 
happy with the substance of rules of liability that you have, and 
the answer is so be it, I mean, you know .... 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: I agree with you. 
DR.EPSTEIN: It seems to me that that is it, but the 
hard question is, I would like to argue the mild view about it that 
when you put statutes forward, I think the first thing you have to 
do is assume that it is going to be a fair degree of judicial integrity 
in the way in which they respond. I mean, I know and I have 
seen cases, indeed, the recent statute of limitations in medical 
malpractice is one I recall, shall receive the tour de force 
interpretation in wrongful death cases by the California Supreme 
Court. And so, there is a the question that they will be, as 
it were, more pla iff-oriented n the Legislature would be. 
But I think at least at the first approximation since you do 
reserve the right to amend it, I hopeand pray that there are no 
constitutional issues which work in this kind of a case. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, they always work, you can't avoid 
them. 
DR. EPSTEIN: But I mean that they would not dominate. 
I would hope that after Schwall v. Jones, that the California 
Supreme Court would recognize the utter error and futility of its 
ways in the guest statute case. I mean the guest statute may or 
may not be a good thing, but to say it is a constitutional issue 
is to my mind utterly sgui You might as well say that the 
statute of frauds raises constitutional questions. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, you can always with a due process 
clause, it just depends on whe your life, liberty and property 
is being taken away courts. 
DR. EPSTEIN: Well, you know, I mean if you say that 
of course every cha tort liability whether by the courts or by 
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the Legislature will make it a constitutional issue. If you expand 
liability, presumably somebody could come in today or tomorrow 
and say, "Aha, what you have done is deprive defendant of his life 
liberty and property." If you have contracted, you have the same 
issue the other way around. I don't believe the Due Process Clause, 
the Equal Protection clause, or the Eminent Domain Clause was ever 
designed to have such a bizarre result, which is to say that any 
shift in the substance of liability within the state, however 
minute, was to call upon a constitutional crisis. It seems to 
me that if you have statutes of limitations which go from two years 
to one year, that is a constitutional issue under this inte ta-
tion. Now, I think that one has to recognize, at least under 
current trend that with respect to economic matters not regard 
fundamental rights, race and the like, for example, the recent 
view in California in Schwall v. Jones is the correct one, which 
if you give them a fair degree of legislative deference, and so 
as they are trying to respond socially identified and perceived prob-
lems, we are not going torub too hard on the due process issue. I 
would hope that that view would prevail, and I think when you are 
writing legislative history you ought to address the constitutional 
matter so as to indicate that you consider them, it may even help. 
I mean you have to write as it were a brief for your own legislation. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, no, just to get back to my question 
for a second though, is it, from the standpoint of clarifying the 
law inthe public interests, is it better to have a flat statute or 
is it better to have a flat statute plus the exceptions you propose? 
DR. EPSTEIN: I am in favor of the exceptions because 
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I think they can be managed. The only one that gives me real concern, 
well, the first and the third give me some concern, but I think, 
in fact, you can draft the third one so as to say, "provided that 
it is understood that there is no continuing duty on the part of 
the manufacturer to upgrade his product after he has parted with 
possession and control." Or you could simply, and alternatively, 
you could simply say that the subsequent duty exception is limited 
to those cases in which the obligation is imposed upon the defendant 
by regulation of public rule, and if you didn't like that, you would 
get the recall cases and the drug cases and you would leave out 
cases like Price, where somebody argues that 35 years after they put 
a product on the market, you want to go into the factory that owns 
the machine and tack on the guard. It seems to me then that maybe 
the answer is we change the exception somewhat from the way in 
which they are situated and are built, but you keep the principle 
and the exceptions. 
I would like to to get some equity out of this, and 
I recognize it's a trade-off, and I think that your original 
statement was very prescient on that point, correct. And then 
the question is, where do you draw, and I sweated enough since 
we first worked on this thing s months ago that the open-ended 
subsequent duty issue is one t you just cannot let lie. I am 
also persuaded that you really want to define the fraudulent excep-
tion fairly narrowly. Now, if I were to do it over again, I 
would t that exception in our statute of limitations, more 
closely to the punit damage statutes so as to indicate that we 
are really talking about extraordinary case and not the usual 
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one, and the reputable manufacturers have nothing to fear from 
that. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, you sort of have common law fraud, 
a false statement, reliance on the falsity and damage therefrom, 
but then a vicarious involvement because the reliance is not 
necessarily going to be by the individual injured. 
DR. EPSTEIN: That is right, but I think you are going to 
have to satisfy it, and, I mean, the bystander cases, I have no 
desire to see that rule overshifted. That is not the source of the 
insurance thing. Casual conversation in the halls, this is where 
all my empiricism comes from, indicates that's less than 2 percent 
of the premium. If you think about the impacted area, rare is 
bystander injured by the fall off the ladder; rare does the bystander 
sort of throw his hand into the machine tool. The only case that you 
have to worry about bystander liability really is, I think, auto 
cases. I don't know why, and there the statute of limitations 
won't touch it, because most automobiles on the road are under 
10 years of age, so it seems to me that if you want to get to the 
bystander problem in some of these cases, you are going to have 
to work your way through the state of the art. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: No, but you have the third party claiming 
workers' comp. case. It is like the Price case. 
DR. EPSTEIN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I mean, is the worker relying on the 
false statement? I don't think so. 
DR. EPSTEIN: No, I mean .... ' 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: He is just doing what he is told. 
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DR. EPSTEIN: The argument that is really here is not 
that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a misrepresentation 
theory, rather plaintiff's theory well, rather the plaintiff's 
theory is argued that not only is there a defect in the design 
of construction, but which is one that is known and asserted to by 
the defendant by the time they put it on the market, and so it is 
basically a willful and wanton version of the strict products 
liability, what would otherwise be a strict products liability. 
The other point, too, is that there is also a weak 
misrepresentation claim that can be made, and I think Traynor was 
quite right, Judge Traynor, when he said that, implicitly, in the 
famous Greenman case, implic in the presence of the machine on 
the market, is the representation that it will do the jobs for 
which it was intended. I think basically what happens is that you 
have this whole web of social interactions between individuals in 
which I put something there, a chair, and you know you are supposed 
to sit upon it, but not to put an army of 15 on it, and that the 
chair represents weight of the normal individual, and to some 
extent, it seems to me t you could say that the machine itself 
contains the representat and eliminates the vicarious representa-
tion argument that you are go to do. But if you define it 
narrowly enough with respect to the mental state, I think you could 
live with that kind of a statute, but aga , you have to make your 
own assessment as to how you th the courts are going to respond 
to the situat As to the basic statute, I think it is really a 
very principled one. It gets you out of all of these terrible 
confusions that you get in cases like Price, it doesn't deprive 
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the plaintiff of all remedy because in every products case 
somebody other than the manufacturer has control of the use of 
that product in the interim and those part s will not be ted 
by the 10 year statute of limitation. There will be problems 
with the Workmen's Compensation situation, but it seems to me that 
you have to answer this question flat out. If Workmen's nsation 
is inadequate, then maybe you have to reexamine benefit structures 
and coverage, but I regard that as essentially beyond the scope 
of this Committee at this time. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I have two questions on scope: one is, 
how would the AIA feel if we put in a tough statute that we also, 
at the same time, would concommitently put in a stronger regulat n 
of insurance rates? 
DR.EPSTEIN: Well, it seems to me, I would be appalled in 
some sense, because I think the only reason California has managed 
to survive the insurance prices here is that basically it has more 
competition in the marketplace. If you have these vast changes 
in exposure and risks equally, the resurgence of liability and 
a regulatory process, what you would simply do would be to dry up 
the amount of capital which would go in there, and everybody knows 
that the amount of business that you could write is a function of 
the amount of reserves that you could keep otherwise, that the best 
way that you could handle the insurance thing is to leave it open 
to market ~echanism. This state has been .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: We have just witnessed damndest 
market mechanism situation I have ever seen in my life. We were 
told, probably by the insurance people, that they were going to, 
now, this year, come up with a study of 20,000 cases. They are 
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going to share all of this information and they are going to provide 
the rates based upon the largest common denominator. Now, if that 
isn't a combination of restraint of trade, I have never seen it. 
DR. EPSTEIN: No, again you have to be careful. The 
pooling of information .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: The pooling of underwriting information. 
They set the rates based on experience. They are going to pool all 
their experience and set the largest posssible rate. 
what they said? 
Isn't that 
DR. EPSTEIN: They said that the information will be made 
available to each ividual firm so that each firm can take it 
into account when it comes to the setting of the rate, What is 
going to happen, it seems quite clear to me that the minimal rates, 
either based upon the number of products put upon the market, the 
number of tires, the number of fillings of carbonated beverages or 
the percentage of sales, are going to decline in importance, as it 
turns out the risk becomes so large that individualized safety features 
are going to have to be taken into account. There is nothing about 
the ISO study that says that since all of you got the same study, 
that all of you are going to Sit down in the same room and start 
to peg your rates together. I take it that it is prohibited by 
the anti-trust laws with respect to setting rates in the marketplace. 
The rates are going to be higher, it seems to me, than they were in 
1950, 1960, 1965, no matter what this committee does. That is, 
it is very hard to go an area as richly textured as the 
common law area, and sort of say, "friends, the clock says 1952 
is the law, and we have a one cent statute, the products liability 
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law of 1952 shall govern in this state", and sure enough, they 
would say implicit in the earl law is the later law, we would 
be right back to where we started from before. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Let me ask you this question. We are 
tussling, and this committee is charged by the resolution creating 
this committee, to look at products liability. Are we real 
going to do anything for California business and/or Californ 
victims by comprehensive statute change in California alone or 
would we be better off to simply help draft federal legislation 
and strongly endorse it? 
DR. EPSTEIN: I mean, again, I must say I rega that as 
one of the very hardest questions that you could possibly ask, 
and one to which you could go both ways. My instinct is that I 
would rather see it done at the state level first than at the federa 
level because it seems to me that the moment it goes to the 
federal level, you have no control over what ~s going to take place. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: There's a bill in the hopper back there .... 
DR. EPSTEIN: I know. It's not a very good one. There 
are many of them in the hoppers back there. It seems to me that you 
are dealing with common law substantive issues where all the expertise 
is located on the state level. Very little of them at this point 
are located on the federal type level. It seems to me, too, that 
the arguments that you can make in favor of some reform in the 
products liability measures are not only based upon cost to manu-
facture but also because recoveries are given in cases where in 
principle it ought to be denied. The constant refrain in California 
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is the plaintiff can do no wrong no matter what it is he has done 
is to me a great disservice, a great offense to principles of 
corrective justice, the principles of common law. The constant 
confrontation of defenses is something that one has to take into 
account, how they all become matters for the jury and then with 
heavy instructions that the presumption is strongly~ainst them 
in each and every case in which they apply. It seems to me that you 
could do a great deal here for the manufacturing community. Calif-
ornia is a very large part of this business. This is not South 
Dakota when it comes to either the buying of manufacturers or the 
buying of cases, and it seems to me, also, that legislation in 
California would be important in another respect. That is, if 
you get it through in a state like California, places that might 
otherwise say, why should we worry, we look to California as an 
example. And the courts here have been the most "progressive" 
(I use the word in quotes), and the Legislature's response to 
it, I think, would be a strong argument to getting statutes, 
either this statute or others like it through, and you would help 
the situation to a very large extent. If it failed at the state 
level, one might move to the federal level. But there, I don't know 
what the political forces are going to be applied, and I don't know 
what kind of a product is going to come out of the hopper. So it 
seems to me that the best thing that you could do is sort of face 
up to the local responsibility, and then if it turns out that 
federal legislation is needed, take that as a second bow to your 
arrow, arrow to your bow. 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: I suppose, too, if it were -- I suppose 
if we are looking at the underwriters mend their ways, lowering 
the rates, for example, that it would take longer to validate 
federal legislation than it would state legislation. 
DR. EPSTEIN: I think one of the nice things about the 
statute of limitations, you cannot make any representations that 
premium levels will go down, because there are still a lot of other 
things that remain in the hopper after it goes through, but you could 
say that the tendency of the legislation is going to be unamb s. 
It will remove a very large number of products as potential sources 
of liability and allow the commerce to continue at its ordinary 
rate. I mean, one of the real inequities about a statute like 
this is you get a company that makes bad products in 1930, and it 
is out of business by 1940, you have a perfect cause of action 
but no defendent. The only people who are left are those who are 
good, and they survive in the marketplace, and what they are told 
is that they now are placed with an unanticipated tax on their 
revenue, which probably equals the entire net worth of the company 
that they represent. And, you know, the insurance companies, I 
think, are designed to provide a service at a profit, and the 
manufacturers feel the same way. They work perfectly well in 
market situations when you have sensible liability rules, but when 
you start to throw this huge, huge set of costs upon people, the 
market will take time to react, and it will not react in ways which 
people find happy. I mean they are basically, if you want to put 
it in crude terms, the products liability reforms or changes 
through the courts, I would say California about '66 is when the 
trouble started to begin in this state until about the 70's, have 
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resulted in a wealth shift of billions of dollars and nobody responds 
very happily to that. Those who lose it feel grieved and those who 
get it grow, and they insist that their rights are going to be 
protected and nobody is going to take it away from them. What 
you have to do is to make a judgment as to how much of those gains 
are deserved and how much of them are ill-begotten. I don't envy 
you. It seems to me that the task is a very hard one but what I 
will state, what I will reemphasize, I am quite happy to advocate 
most of these reforms are products liability without the empirical 
data as to what the extent of the dislocations are because it seems 
to me as a matter of sheer substance, looking only to the equities 
of the individual cases, something has got to be done. Why the 
Niagara Machine and Tool Company should be hauled through the mud 
in a case like Price is simply beyond my comprehension. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I appreciate the philosophical implications 
of what you are saying but as a practical politician, it is very 
difficult to change the law unless you are responding to a crisis. 
DR. EPSTEIN: I understand. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: You know if you get up before a committee 
and say that it is right and just that we do this, frankly, 
unfortunately, it doesn't get very far. 
DR. EPSTEIN: I want to put it this way. It seems to me 
that there is -- let me make the following kinds of arguments; 
I did not say that rightness and justice is the only reason why 
you make change. It seems to me that once the pressure comes on, 
and it is here, and it ought to be here, then what you try to do is 
do the best that you can. I mean you are all politicians, but there 
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is always a little bit of you I hope which is a statesman, and 
to the extent that we find both components .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: No, a statesman is a dead politician. 
DR. EPSTEIN: Dead politician. Well, maybe we can resur-
rect him from the grave, I would say, but to put it this way, 
Mr. Knox, you can have a crisis and what you could do is make such 
a mess out of it by way of legislation that you will have two crises 
and it seems to me .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: That often happens . 
DR. EPSTEIN: ... that also happens. What you've got 
to do is pick your spot and to go in there and get a very strong 
sense of the way in which things work. And it seems to me, you 
know, I could talk about the underwriting practices, I know 
something about the economics of the situation, but if you just 
look at the cases, what you will find out about it is that the 
simple proposition is that everybody is responsible for me but me, 
and so no matter what happens to you there is always going to be 
somebody else whom you could try to hook with a liability thing 
and the expansion of liability basically doesn't treat that as its 
fundamental publicly stated proposition. But when you get down to 
it, that's what is at work in all of these cases; that is, you 
will just find some little thread, however tenuous, upon which you 
can then hold some manufacturer and disregard the plaintiff's 
conduct in its entirety. It may well be, and I would say if I 
thought that I could draft a good statute on product modification, 
state of the art, contributory negligence, by which I mean a 
statute which was not only just but one which prohibited deviation 
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in the courts, I would not want the statute of limitations. 
But it seems to me that you've got such a climate of opinion in 
the Legislature, such a deference to the jury. We can't figure 
out what we will do. We will let them decide, because they 
don't have to publicize their reasons. You have to go to some 
broader gauged statutes than we otherwise have. And, in fact, 
one of the things that we did with the AIA package, we did it both 
ways. We had the broad gauged statute on the statute of limitations, 
we have a very complicated statute on duty to warn which is an 
effort to track out the elements of the cause of action, we have one 
on product modification which handles some of the problems but not 
all of the problems, and I could give you a string of hypotheticals 
that our statutes do not cover. The reason it doesn't cover is 
because we don't want the Encyclopedia Brittanica in the form of 
a product modification statute. You try and get 80% of it, and if 
we got the four or five other statutes through and they were respected, 
that would be fine. I think it would take a lot of pressure off the 
statute of limitations if they were construed in the manner which I 
would hope. But the equity of the statute always permits the courts 
to imply an exception. I would rather than have to fight the 
statute of limitations when it came from exceptions than to have 
to deal with the other statutes, because I could draft -- invent 
exceptions to them, some of them which would be desirable, some of 
them not. What is happening today is essentially the inquiry which 
we have before the court is utterly standardless. When you talk 
about asking whether a product is duty safe, that's not an answer. 
That's a question and nobody seems to be able to find any way to 
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get to that question and what you have now LS a sense of the 
collective incremental j t in the courts which has swung so 
far over in the wrong direct that no product is safe. If 
that machine principle won't do it, nothing will do it. There 
were 19 possible defenses in that case and yet you could still get 
a plaintiff's verd t over all of them. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I come to the conclusion -- we were 
always taught in law school that for every wrong there is to be 
a remedy. Now, we are learn 
to be a remedy. 
that for every injury there has 
DR. EPSTEIN: We need a remedy. That's right. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: And that's the problem. 
DR. EPSTEIN: That's a problem. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Yes. 
DR. EPSTEIN: And I mean -- I have always believed in the 
tort system. I have always believed in strict liability for 
construction, defense, protection for bystanders. Somehow or other 
somewhere between 1969 -- '66 to '69, the California courts have 
gone off the rail. I have some hopes lately in the last three 
or four opinions I have read coming out of the intermediate 
court have been decisions wh have upheld the defendant's 
contention upon appeal, but these haven't set the thing back. 
They are rather like Price wh is to say, we are not going to 
go three steps further. We are going to allow this thing to be 
a jury question instead of hav 
a matter of law on facts as sk 
in the Price case. 
directed verdict for plaintiff as 
as the ones that were presented 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: Any questions? 
SENATO~ ~P~BEYERL¥: If this witness gets into court 
very often, there must be a whole army of court reporters .... 
DR. EPSTEIN: I've never been to court in my life. I 
may have had some expertise but I would never hire me to try a case. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: All right, Mr. Hiestand. 
MR. HIESTAND: Could you illustrate, using the statute 
of limitations how something like the cancer-causing drug DES or 
any sort of drug that years after it's released on the market 
is found to cause injury to people where it would fit in here 
how it would be covered by the exception or not? 
DR. EPSTEIN: I gather you did not have, the committee 
thought an exception would be appropriate for carcinogenic drugs 
in the previous meetings. Let me tell you about the University 
of Chicago DES case. Maybe we could help change your mind. Now, 
the University of Chicago ran in a case, ran a study on DES in an 
e to determine whether or not the drug was good at preventing 
miscarriages during the course of pregnancy. It turned out there was 
a woman at the Harlan Medical School who took care of diabetic 
tients and used DES at a very high success rate. The people 
thought t it was the drug that did it. It turned out that what 
did it was that this gal was so terrific when it came to handling 
nant mothers that she could have used no drug and gotten 
better results than anybody else with the best technology on the 
face of the earth. So they had a thousand people in two pools, 
the one 1 got the drug and the other got a placebo, done in 
1953, '54, somewhere around there, but they had no written consent 
form. don't even have a record as to which people got the drug 
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and wh people a placebo che Now, 20 years later, there 
is some ev nee 
a lot of evidence 
the le prev 
a great debate as to the 
is a probabili of 
that each and every se 
l.SSUeS: Was it 
MR HIESTAND 
Epstein, if you 
12 years you have a 
later is found a 
DR. EPSTE 
case never have 
that case is bee 
are the stronges 
th with it, wh 
warnings g n, if 
weren't g I wa a 
rece more than su f 
a Universi that 0 
of dollars to defe 
is. The case is not for 
It is the upset and me 
s il that their 
un day and i 
not my a of one. 
ing 
I 
c 
ncer. There s also 
idents are a lot lower than 
might have been. There is 
and it turns out that there 
from other causes so 
to sort out the following 
or was something else? 
don' to get sidetracked, Dr. 
that 10 years, well 
r 
cas of 
tute of 1 itations, 12 years 
wa clearly carcinogenic. 
ink will ever have that 
don't think you will have 
re be pushed forward today 
cases. By the time you get 
a id the drug do it, were the 
g were they adequate, if they 
se 
benefit which the plaintiff 
o fset the condition? Here is 
to spend hundreds upon hundreds 
want you to know what the case 
the carcinogenic drugs. 
mothers have when the pos-
get the cancer at some future 
t that kind of a case is 
quite blunt about it, that when 
you are dealing with new drugs, that if you want a risk distribution 
mechanism, the last thing you want to do is to force all of those 
costs back on the defendant, because the cost is not going to be 
random if there's a disaster. You will break every insurance 
company and every drug company by doing that. You'd rather this 
would be handled by first party mechanisms, and the second point 
is that it seems to me that when you have a system in which you 
such exhaustive regulations, ex antum, designed to prevent 
these drugs from being released on the market by all kinds of 
tests, that what you should do is rely upon those regulatory 
mechanisms to handle these problems rather than try to turn your 
attention to the tort mechanism in order to deal with it. So 
that for my own money, is that if you start to deal with the tort 
remedy in these cases, it is just another perfect instance of 
ing to handle a situation where the issues you get involved in the 
case is simply beyond the capacity of any judicial body to handle 
any kind of an intelligent way, and therefore, -- I'm sorry 
about these cases. I mean everyone finds them tragic, but it 
seems to me that the cost is too great. And I might add that 
there is another cost involved in this. Let's suppose we change 
th s rule and say to every drug company, "Even if you follow 
every single precaut that is required of you by statute or 
the state of the art which is ever hard and even though you 
tell the other fellow who takes it, you assume the risk either 
for yourself or for your heirs or descendants, as the case may be, 
that you are going to have this kind of liability, you have to 
then ask yourself, what's going to be the effect of this upon the 
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introduction of new drugs into the market. It seems to me today 
that the major problem that we have in the drug area is that the 
FDA and its assessment of errors simply takes the error of bad 
drugs into account but does not take into account the error of 
keeping good drugs off the market. Saccharine is a bizarre and 
extreme illustration of this inability to take into account two 
types of error within the regulatory process. We can't cure that, 
but it seems to me that, if in fact all the regulatory biases are 
in favor of protection to an unwarranted extent by it, to then 
throw on to that a kind of a tort liability with respect to future 
drugs will inhibit the development of drugs more effectively than 
the FDA could do it. One of the costs that you have to mention and 
measure is not only the costs of injured people who don't recover 
because of our statute of limitations or our state of the art 
legislation, you also have to take into account the people who 
will never be able to bring this suit against anybody by virtue 
of the fact that they were injured when some drug which was 
manufactured and in wide use elsewhere, might have been able to 
alleviate that condition under which they have suffered. This is not 
the place to go into harangue against the FDA and its drug kinds 
of policy but I do think that it is appropriate to mention that 
given those legislative biases that this might be the one thing 
that in the end will do more harm to the very public that you 
are trying to protect than the statute of limitations cum state 
of the art defense. I heard about from Jerry Wilson the exception 
drafted into the statute for carcinogenic drugs and I was somewhat 
distressed to hear it because it seems to me that if I were to try 
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to illustrate our statute of limitations with Case #2, I would have 
gone through the DES cases either in Detroit or against the Univer-
sity of Chicago and Ely Lilly as the perfect instance of a basic 
and traditional tort cases which usually involve, you know, 20 years 
ago a collision which lasted 15 seconds is now taken into something 
which is a worldwide search for truth about the state of the art 
25 years ago. You cannot handle that through the judicial process. 
A jury may come up with a decision but the only reason it does so 
is because it knows darn well it doesn't have to defend it publicly 
but I think we have .... 
MR. HIESTAND: You indicated that if you had to do your 
statute of limitations over again, you would be making some changes, 
particularly in the exceptions area. Are you in the process of 
doing it over again or is your work with this statute essentially ... 
DR. EPSTEIN: The work is never over. We will probably 
come back. As a matter of fact, I wrote one paper here because I 
wasn't quite sure how the committee would evolve and when I came 
to Los Angeles, I wrote another one. This paper which I have given 
you is, at this point, here it is, and I probably should write this 
thing up too and when and if I do, I and the AIA committee will 
start to put in some of the rework language for the statute of 
limitations. I am also quite happy to say if you want this, ask me 
outside the committee, precisely how would we reword this. I would 
be more than happy .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: We will undoubtedly be in touch with you. 
Anything further? Go ahead, Mr. McAlister. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER MCALISTER: In Workmen's Compensation 
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law, there is a body of law known as cumulative trauma, where the 
workers are recovering for, for instance, ca 
to asbestos and recovery 30, 40, 50 years after 
exposure. Are there tort suits? 
sed exposure 
initi 1 
DR. EPSTEIN: Yes. Let me give you -- there is one tort 
suit which is not being brought. I think is in New Jersey 
which has the following parameters which would indicate how bad the 
enterprise has gone. Every worker in an individual factory from 
1925 to the present, say several thousand people, who were a lot, 
have brought actions in third parties against, a I i , every 
supplier of varnishes, paints, solvents, anything wh izes, 
and they have claimed that collectively they have cau 
accumulative trauma which they have suffered. What ns is 
the original action was brought by the thousand name pla tiffs 
against 250 named defendants. After that they went the 
books and found other component manufacturers of 1 s of all 
of this stuff and they joined them and it turns out that we now 
have literally squads of lawyers working not to dec the merits 
of the cases, all of which are individual and differen , but just 
to coordinate the defense efforts between the parties. And it 
strikes me that those cumulative trauma cases are essentially 
unworkable within the Workmen's Compensation bracket, at least 
arguably in many situations, or have but limited viability within 
that context. In a third party tort action situation wherein fact, 
you have to figure out what each defendant did and what each defendant 
did not do, it simply is a case where in order to shi hundreds, 
thousands, ten thousands dollars worth -- many of these injuries are 
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very small -- of losses, you are going to have to an 
is f or s t s as la tho a are injury wh 
very new. t s, if I were to s one o the ings 
s 
have to 
joinder add, you real have to g another to 
not only class act 
join 60 defe nts a 
because cases like that which allow you to 
50 plaintiffs, 300 ss le actions and 
trials with the ord framework simp means that administra-
tive fees are vast la r n pass recovery which might 
be granted and I think that that is something which real has to 
be very high in because if are in New Jersey, 
it won't be long be 
already. 
they are in Californ if are not 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you very much. 
attendance today. It is always very stimulat 
I appreciate your 
Our last witness 
in the morning sess 
Trial Lawyers Associat 
11 be Mr. Wyl Aitken of the California 
While he is com up, I would like to 
introduce another r of the Bruce Nesta , Assembly-
man from Orange Coun Mr. Aitken. You know se was 
for Professor Epstein, not for Nestande. 
(See VIII) I have a 
written presentation with the .... 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Mr. Chairman, 
this morning. He ited the ent San D 
hearing. I don't know how they responded. 
I saw Wylie on television 
area to attend the 
A good job, by the way. 
MR. AITKEN: Thank you. Having heard the first three 
speakers, I feel a little bit like the Appellate Justice in one 
of the more famous appellate cases where he indicated in his dissent 
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from the opinion, he had one sentence in the dissent t I dissent 
for reasons stated by the major I think par that's 
what we've seen here this morning. I would 1 to make a few 
observations. I am pleased, for instance, to hear that Firemen's 
Fund is willing to admit that shoddy products may some way be 
contributing to the so-called products liability crisis. Now, 
if we would only get Firemen's Fund to go along with Truth in 
Advertising and add that fact to their full page ad in Time 
Magazine, we would all be a lot better off. I think it is also 
interesting to note that they have made it quite clear, I think, 
through Professor Epstein's testimony and the test we have 
heard here this morning regarding the Mutual Alliance and the AIA 
plans and proposals, that they have obviously made California a 
target state for what they believe are proposals that will lead to 
tort reform. I have yet to see any proposal come out of the 
liability insurance industry that was labeled under tort reform that 
did not mean some limitation of the rights of inj 
basically, our Association, of course is conce 
and 
I suppose 
that we have been described by Professor Epstein as representing 
those people who are now supposedly the haves are now trying to 
hold on to what they have. I think there are some myths that are 
present within the analysis of the products liability f ld that 
should be discussed. First of all, I think it is qu clear to 
anyone who has ever practiced law in this field that these are not 
cases that you file and suddenly somebody hands you a check or 
some type of recovery to your client. These are difficult cases. 
The doctrine of strict liability is not a doctrine of absolute 
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liability. There are still many diff 
and the case tha Professor te 
case, to me restores my faith the s 
and I bel at these cases shou be 
lt ev nt ry ssues 
llate 
had, 
the courts. 
Obviously, the jury made a correct decision that case and 
obviously the appellate decision was correct also, so I think that 
rather than speak against the system, I il stration 
really supports the system as it now present exists. When 
the so-called products liability crisis f st came us, we 
were told, of course, that there was some of tort ion 
going on within this that somehow was increasing and 
causing the high insurance rates. Basical 
was and always has been a myth. An opportuni 
tort 
on the 
los ion 
down 
here to review the latest Judicial Council statist s tell 
us that 4.3% in the prior year was the percen c il filings 
that had to do with personal injury cases 
cases. That 4. represented all of your 
cases, all of your products cases, all of 
1 
automatic 
ctice 
cases and 
all of your government tort liability cases. r latest 
Judicial Council statist s, that 4.3% of all civil fil s has 
not dropped to 4.1% of all civil fil s, or the area of 
products liability medical malpractice, etc. a crisis, 
hardly any indication that there is a so-called tort osion 
within this state or any other state. Also, I think that it is 
interesting to note that their own publ ations raise serious 
questions as to why we allegedly have a crisis within products 
liability. Basically, the Business Insurance Journal, their own 
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publication, carried a story where it indicated that a very large 
broker was of the opinion that the insurance was being w ld from 
certain companies and certain small manufacturers mere to create 
a crisis and merely as an attempt to stampede legislators into 
so-called tort reform which again, always gets down to limitation 
of liability and taking away the rights of the injured. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: May I ask a question, please? 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Certainly, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I would like you to give this Committee 
the reference of the insurance broker or the magazine or wherever 
that was. Can you do that, please? 
MR. AITKEN: I will. I will be glad to. It is in the 
Business Insurance Journal. I don't have it with me but I will be 
glad to send it to the Committee. I have the copy of the issue back 
and I will be glad to send it to the Committee. Also, I am well 
aware .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Maybe we better subscribe to it. 
MR. AITKEN: It is a very fine publication, very 
interesting information in there. I also found during the course 
of the so-called medical malpractice crisis if one looked at 
Medical Economics, one found a great deal of interesting information 
as well. As this body is well aware, there has been the Interagency 
Task Force Report on products liability and I am sure this Cowmittee 
has received a copy of that report and have had a chance to review 
it. But what was very interesting about that study produced by the 
Federal Government and not produced by trial lawyers, not produced 
by anyone who supposedly has a self-interest in this particular 
controversy, one of the conclusions that was overwhelming when one 
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reads the report is that it is impossible under current rate-
sett 
even obta any 
s a curre t 
cise informat 
they set rates. What the s 
nee ct s to 
as 
did te their 
own insurance study was that at least two factors are significant 
in why we have seen a substantial increase in insurance 
to manufacturers. Number one, their bad rat ng ctices and 
number two, stock rna sses of 1972 a 197 . t was documented 
within the Interagency Tort Study. Also, teresti ly 
also came to the conclus that one of the reasons, a 
, they 
one of the 
substantial reasons, we have ts 1 li a ts 
liability losses is because of the s and the unsafe 
products that are be g put upon the rna ind ted, 
for instance, at page 15 in that study tha ev nee was that 
the products liability lem stems t some 
manufacturers are i unreasonab at there 
are relat new te is s that ca garme ts that nite, 
hammers that ch I la rs that break, rna ne tools t confront 
a worker higher risks than are reasonable a that careful 
product liability prevent techn area of li 
control may well have curbed many of these awsu s. I think that 
goes to one ofthe points that I think we o overlook terms 
of evaluating the tort system and t is that the tort system number 
one, above all, is geared to provide reasonab and fair compensation 
to those people who are injured through no fault of their own and 
secondly, we overlook the fact that the tort tern has been very 
therapeutic in terms of preventing more of these unsafe products 
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to be distributed throughout the community. I saw an interesting 
interview that was featured in the Los ~ngeles T s with the 
Vice Chairman of the National Consumer Safety Council and he pointed 
out, for instance, that with a slight change in the caps that we 
put on medicine bottles, how many lives have been saved. He 
pointed out the fact that it cost one penny to the manufacturer to 
put the plastic cap on the aspirin bottle to prevent our children 
from getting into the medicine cabinet and consuming dangerous drugs. 
It was quite clear that the technology to put on that plastic 
one cent cap was present long before the industry responded and 
put the cap there. He also related a very interesting conversation 
with a manufacturer. This particular manufacturer came to the 
consumer Safety Commission and proposed that he be allowed to 
distribute a 50 cc motorbike to 7-year olds and they had designed 
this bike for 7-year olds. Now, that, of course, came as a great 
shock to the Chairman of the National Consumer Safe Commission 
and it obviously raised the first initial question to this manu-
facturer -- do you realize how many young children will be injured 
if you put out a 50 cc motor bike for 7-year olds and he said, 
"Yes, I appreciate that. But can you imagine what kind of profit 
I could make with a product like that?" That was the 8tatement 
that he made and that's what we are trying to curb by the 
existing tort system. I think it makes it quite clear to all of us 
that to, in effect, to allow that product to continue to go on, tc 
allow high rates, and to allow that type of product to be insured, 
would be a dereliction, a failure of the duty of the insurance 
industry. I was pleased to hear the earlier comments by the 
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testimony from t:he insurance individuals who are here today that 
they are concentrat now on loss controls. ey are putt g the 
sis on lo prevent and I was pleased to hear that there 
were so many quali 
the community. 
control engineers who are now going out into 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Do you think it is appropriate to change 
any tort laws in this regard? 
MR. AITKEN: I think that obviously there are matters 
that we can look into and if this Committee .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: IJike what? 
MR. AITKEN: Well, a question of what to do in the 
workers' compensation situation. I think there have been ~orne 
interesting questions raised as to what hC1.ppens V>Jhen someone puts 
out a machine and that machine is then altered the employer and 
that machine then injures an employee. Under the present law, 
you may well have a third party suit against the manufacturer but 
because of the Workmen's Compensation system being an exclusive 
reme , there is no cause of action for the injured employee who 
rece min 1 compensation through the compensation system to 
bring a similar cla against the employer. I think that we cer-
tain should look to the question of whether or not either 
in an indemnity action, after the original action, or part of 
the action filed by the plaintiff as to whether or not some of 
that cost where there is an abuse of the system, abuse of the 
machine, should not be transferred to the employer and should not 
be solely borne by the manufacturer. I think we should certainly 
look into that. We do have a tort study committee also within our 
Association. We are studying all of these areas and we will be 
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making a final report to this commission because obviously we 
are dealing with a system devised by human beings. is an 
imperfect system and an rfect world re certainly could be 
improvements in every area of the law, including the tort system, 
but I would again emphasize the point that when the insurance industry 
comes forward with so-called proposals for improvement, every single 
one of them has to do with the question of limitations of rights 
and limitation on the injured party. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: What's your reaction of Price v. Niagara 
that was referred to by Professor Epstein where you had, as I 
recall, a machine manufactured in 1931 which had been substantially 
altered .... 
MR. AITKEN: I believe he indicated 1940. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: 1940 or whatever it was. Some time ago. 
MR. AITKEN: Well, I think the reaction, as I indicated 
initially in my testimony was that that shows me the system is 
working. I don't think there is any way we can pre-screen every case 
that is going to come up and make some type of islat determina-
tion that these lawsuits will be allowed to go forward but these 
will not. The example he gave, where the attorney brought that case 
and lost the case and then went on appeal and lost on appeal, to me 
illustrates why the system is good. Because that now is a bellwether 
case which will advise other lawyers not to invest a great deal of 
time, not to invest a great deal of their money in that type of case 
because the leading cases are the bellwether cases that help direct 
the system and recognize that lawyers who handle these cases have 
no interest in spending thousands of dollars in time and money 
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handling a case that they are going to lose at the jury level and 
appeal and lose at the appellate level. There is no reason 
for those cases. So that opinion to me illustrates why the existing 
system works and illustrates why the juries listen to these facts 
and make intelligent decisions, why we should leave these cases. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: What about a suggestion of say a 10-year, 
or some such, statute of limitation with an exception for recondition-
ing for fraud or for duties to warn that could be built in? 
MR. AITKEN: I really don't think you can do that for a 
number of reasons. It's got a number of problems with it. Number 
one, I think that many major products have life expectancies beyond 
ten years -- elevators, other types of products are expected to be 
used beyond 10 years. Also, in every proposal I've seen, it makes 
no difference whether or not there are already many pending lawsuits 
against that product. Theoretically, you could have a situation 
where at 9 years 50 lawsuits were filed and in 10 years the same 
product that was just as dangerous the year before suddenly now 
becomes immune from any further litigation and what happens if you 
clearly find that some product is still on the market and still 
being used, is clearly defective, and the ten years have passed and 
there is no incentive now to take that particular product off the 
market because what you've done is granted immunity to the manu-
facturer of that product. I think that the laws that now exist 
where basically the j judges the case based on the state of the 
art that was available at the time the product was manufactured is 
the best type of statute of limitations that can be. That statute 
of limitations was exactly the statute of limitations that was 
applied in the Price v. Niagara case cited by Professor Epstein. 
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Because basically what the jury obviously determined was that the 
state of the art back in 1940 was such that this manufacturer should 
not be held liable. That is, in fact, a form of statute of 
limitations and they found for the defendant in that case. So 
I think the system itself, which judges the manufacturer based on 
the data that was available at the time of manufacture, is the 
fairest form of system. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: It is kind of ironic, as Dr. Epstein 
pointed out, what you do in a sense is penalize the good manu-
facturers because they are the ones that are still in business 
and have a deep pocket. Those who manufacture the really schlock 
stuff have probably gone broke and gone out of business and nobody 
will bother to sue them. 
MR. AITKEN: That's probably true but the point is that .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I don't know what you'd do about it. 
MR. AITKEN: What would the 10-year statute of limita-
tions accomplish in that regard? And I also would point out that 
obviously one of the things we are concerned about is the question 
of cost, and we certainly have seen no analysis that any such 
statute would have any effect upon rate setting. I am sure it 
would not. As a practical matter, probably .000 percent of the 
cases we are dealing with involve any product beyond ten years. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: How about reforms with respect to pro-
cedure? Do you think there is a little wastage in the -- I think 
we discussed this the other day. 
MR. AITKEN: I don't think there is any question that 
we have to streamline .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Is your Association going to come up with 
suggestions as to ways that we can make this whole process a little 
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less costly both sides. 
MR. AITKEN: We have a special committee looking purely 
into the quest of court reform and court procedure because I 
think the real tragedy in the products liability field is the fact 
that the person who is injured has to wait two and three years to 
get their case to court and wait as long as sometimes four or five 
years to be compensated for their injury. That's the tragedy of the 
system. That's why we have to do something about court reform and 
procedures and more judges, because there is where I see that the 
system has truly been neglected. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Professor Epstein indicated, at least 
I understood him to say, that there doesn't seem to be in the case 
that he mentioned and others, any standardized way of looking at 
things, any rhyme nor reason -- everything is up for grabs when 
it goes to the jury, and would you comment on that, whether you 
think that's the way it should be or that is the way it is or .... 
MR. AITKEN: I don't think that's the way it should be 
and that's the way it is not. There is nothing in terms of up 
for grabs as far as the jury system is concerned or the present 
law of products liability in California. The law is quite clear. 
If one puts on a product, that is, on the market that is defective, 
if that product because as a failure because it is defective and 
causes injury then that person is entitled to recover. That is 
not an up-for-grabs system and obviously what is and is not defective 
is a question of fact and that question of fact rightly belongs to 
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people picked at random from the community. I seriously question 
his statement that it is up for grabs. These are very difficult 
cases that are very clear jury instruct s that have been 
loped in Cali as to what the is and g s very, 
very clear guidance to the jury as to what they can and cannot 
decide and I think that statement is fallacious. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, Senator, as you recall, I had a 
discussion with Professor Epstein up in Sacramento. There is an 
explosion in the field. I think you will have to agree because we 
have gone beyond just physical defect. We are going into defective 
design which -- or defect in design for the purpose intended or the 
foreseeable purpose or whatever it is. There is almost no limita-
tion. It is a much larger field in the last ten years, eight years, 
than it was before. 
MR. AITKEN: I think the concept of seeability as it 
has been applied in the products liabili field is really nothing 
different than when we were in law school and studied Palsgraff 
and whether or not one could have anticipated the scale falling 
from the shelf. I think the question of foreseeabili has been 
applied in all kinds of various situations and it is certainly 
true in the products liability field. I haven't seen any radical 
change or direction in the area of products liability since the 
concept of strict liability was adopted by the c~lifornia Supreme 
Court. We are now just seeing case-by-case applications of what a 
defect is and what one can anticipate. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You don't think the defenses over the 
last ten years have been broadened by court decision? 
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MR. AITKEN: In the products liability field I don't 
think we have seen any dramatic change. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Then I guess I get from your statements 
and others from your field who have appeared before this Committee, 
and on medical malpractice also, that you really don't think that 
there needs to be much change except maybe some streamlining of 
action in the courts to do it more quickly but that the system is 
working well, that there is really no problem. 
MR. AITKEN: Well, as I indicated, senator, there are 
always problems in each area and we are certainly looking at it very 
strongly, but I would submit to you and it definitely is the position 
of our Association that the basic law as it now is, is basically 
fair and does not need any radical revision as suggested by the 
insurance associations. I think there is one thing that has always 
been overlooked in this whole question of the so-called tort 
explosion and the so-called change in law. We have spent four or 
five or six years of active propaganda in the area of consumerism. 
We have bas ally made Ralph Nader a national folk hero before 
someone at least became concerned with his so-called ethnic background. 
What I am saying is that what we have done is now, in effect, 
educated people on their rights, we in effect, we as lawyers, have 
made services more available. We are criticized for bringing too 
many cases because we are supposedly contributing to the tort 
explosion; on the other hand, I read numerous criticisms because 
we don't extend our services far enough. Now, I think you cannot 
have the best of both worlds. You are either going to have to decide 
that consumerism was good, extending legal rights to everybody in 
the communi was the ri th to do and the court 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: How about the possibility of forcing 
the manufacturer, the company, to buy newequipment every ten years? 
MR. AITKEN: Well, if you truly believe that at the end 
of 10 years, that is going to be an unsafe product and there 
is a reasonab projection, then obviously it should be pulled 
off the market. I think it is interesting to note that we don't 
seem to have the type of recall system for anything other than 
automobiles. We have seen a fairly sophisticated system develop 
through the majormanufacturers of automobiles. We constantly are 
be ised and warned about defects in automobiles and they 
are be recalled at the expense of the manufacturer and 
then being corrected. I think we obviously have to look at the 
quest of whether or not a recall system should be expanded 
much farther than it is so that the unsafe machine is recalled 
as fast as unsafe automobile. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Mr. Hiestand. 
MR. HIESTAND: Is your organization going to make any 
recommendat regarding ways to save money in terms of cutting 
down the costs t go to both defense and plaintiff's lawyers 
for resolving these matters. I know you can streamline the courts 
and that might save some, but don't you have a feeling that, for 
instance, we have heard testimony that for every dollar that is 
actually paid the products cases, 42 cents goes for the defense 
of them. In malpractice we have heard before that it is for every 
dollar that is paid out, at the most 33¢ gets to the injured person. 
That seems tremendously wasteful. Isn't it possible to resolve these 
disputes with say 10% going for the resolution, and the bulk of it 
I 
going to the injured party? 
MR. AITKEN: There are obviously a number of factors 
involved in a premium-- broker's commission, attorney's fees, 
litigation costs and a lot of everything else, but in the area 
of attorney's fees, there is no question that we can make 
recommendations in our study on that point; for intance, we 
have seen an explosion, if one wants to use that term, in regard to, 
when one files a products liability case, I have seen many examples 
where the other defendants immediately sue six other possible 
distributors, manufacturers, component parts, other people they 
feel are responsible, basically what we call complaints for indemnity, 
if in fact they are justified at all, really should not arise until 
such time as there has been a payoff by the defendant. What's 
happened is that we will file a case against the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer will, in effect, file six cross complaints against 
other entities and suddenly now you've got one plaintiff's lawyer 
and seven defense attorneys. Now, it's got to be a high increase in 
cost to the system, so I don't think until somebody has actually 
paid some money out of their pocket, they should be so anxious 
to bring so many parties into the litigation. I think what you 
see in that instance is they are looking for somebody to share 
the cost with and they are every bit as guilty as we have been 
accused of so far as filing suits that I think sometimes are 
frivolous; that is, they just file and bring in a bunch of 
other people hopefully to get a contribution to cut the cost to 
that particular manufacturer; so we are going to propose that 
in terms of indemnity, if it is a true indemnity case, it should 
come out after the payout and not increase the operation of the 
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system and not prolong the trial, not overly complicate the 
issues se I think there is one place we can pick up some 
of that cost. 
MR. HEISTAND: That could make it more expensive though 
because you would haveessentially, if you've got an award for 
the plaintiff, you would be retrying the case later for indemnity 
to save the case .... 
MR. AITKEN: Well, the facts have already been established 
and most of those cases are tried through a court and not with 
the jury and most of those cases are resolved by the insured them-
selves. Most of the cases, in effect, mount the contribution of 
defense costs and then they resolve the case. I think once they pay 
and the case is over, they are going to be very reluctant to get 
involved major additional litigation when they recognize the 
indemnity wasn't even proper in the first instance. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you very much. We appreciate 
your attendance here today. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI: Jack, just a short question. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Oh, I'm sorry. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI: You mentioned the manufacturer 
bears the cost of recalling automobiles. We talked of costs. 
It seems to me that we want to minimize the costs. Then the 
manufacturer's cost only becomes the next season's consumer 
costs that whatever the cost is, the consumer generally ends 
up paying it anyway. 
MR. AITKEN: Not entirely true but oftentimes it is 
true. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI: Well, through increased prices or 
R2 
diminished liability or rights or whatever. 
MR. AITKEN: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MORI: I don't think 1 ili becomes the 
question. I think certainly people are go to be liab for 
problems that exist. To me the question is, how do we minimize 
the probability of a problem occurring rather than trying to 
decrease the court costs and decrease attorneys fees in whatever 
event? It seems to me we need to diminish the probability of a 
problem occurring with the product. The cost is going to be borne 
somewhere, some place, and I think we all have to realize that 
if we want safer products, it is going to cost us more either 
through the courts or through the product self. I think it is 
up to us to determine, where do we minimize those costs -- in 
the product itself, in the courts or with lawyers or where. 
MR. AITKEN: I don't think there is any question, 
Assemblyman Mori, that you are right, and that the real solution, 
at least the long-term solution should be hopefully to produce 
safer products and eliminate the injury, eliminate the 30,000 
deaths that occur every year because of consumer products. Let's 
eliminate the 110,000, the speaker mentioned disabilities, that 
occur every year because of consumer products. There is no 
question in my mind that I would rather have to close up my 
doors because nobody is being injured than to, in effect, take 
away the rights of the injured. So hopefully through a loss 
prevention program and with better quality control, that will be 
the best control factor possible. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you very much. We will recess now 
and be back here promptly at 2 p.m. 
(BREAK FOR LUNCH) 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: Mr. Behr or Mr. Bonaso, of the 
Management Ana is Center. Are either one of those gentlemen here? 
How about Mr. Norman Lynn. Mr. Lynn here? Mr. Cashion or Mr. 
Romney? You want to come on up. You gentlemen represent the 
California Liability Task Force. Is that correct? All 
right. 
MR. GERALD CASHION: (See Appendix IX) Chairman Knox 
and Committee members, I am Gerald Cashion and I am President of 
Meyer Machine Company located in Los Angeles and Redwood City 
a I am the sentative of the California Product Liability 
Task Force, wh is an unincorporated organization, association, 
and we are a group of wholesalers and distributors in the State 
of Cali , working together for one common purpose, that of the 
enact of islation at the state level to provide product 
liabili laws. And how many businesses in california are affected 
by this? In the 1972 census there were approximately 24,000 
wholesa a distributors that generated some 28.9 billion dollars 
worth of revenue for our state and employ some 269,000 people. In 
our op ion, 
for small bus 
t liability has reached a crisis in this state 
sses. The proliferation of product liability 
suits poses a threat to the industry and especially the small 
businessman, a reat unequal to that of the medical profession. 
It is driving surance rates out of range for many small businesses. 
It is fore some companies to close their doors. It is eroding 
the foundat of the industrial system and common marketplace. 
It is, as a result of this, pumping millions of dollars worth 
of inflat to the economy annually in the form of higher 
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1 9"/o had 
a 100% increase. The other 19% had a 300% increase. 8% of this 
group had a 
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survey would have 
rease and 24% of this group 
insurance We 
sed these 
reporting were companies that had 25 
s 
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a 500% or 
l that a 3-year 
l Those 
s and we feel 
that it is a good cross section of small bus ss of our state. 
I would 1 to share some of my own exper s you. The 
company that I now own is 49 years o It emp some 30 people 
and in the last two rs our surance s increased from $2,400 
for products liabil to $27,000 on the speci cation that 
I cut one-third of my business off 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Mr. Ca 
not sel 
' I 
any 
to 
equipment. 
terrupt 
you but we have a long agenda this afternoon. Wha we are 
primari teres ted here -- we 
experience, but we are well aware of the severi 
What we are interested in is what we 
MR. CASHION: We, as a task force, th 
1 
f this problem. 
to do about it. 
t you should 
have a statute of limitations. I di ree with our learned friend, 
the attorney. If he thinks there is no need for , then why do the 
attorneys have a bill before you now for a statute of limitations. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: A very good point, I voted for it. 
MR. CASHION: Then the other thing is .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: I have sa , Mr. Cashion, now that 
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a are being sued, the time has come to do something about 
this problem. 
MR. CASHION: We think you should be in the same boat 
that we are and we will go on forever, because in 49 years we 
are still being sued for machines that were sold before some of us 
were born. There is no statute of limitations nor state of the 
arts. We need a state of the arts in this country because I 
am certainly sure the engineers that are designing equipment and 
products for the consumer today are doing the very best they can. 
You can see that in your automobile. We need a reform on tort 
law. We would need our Workmen's Compensation laws revamped to the 
point ultimately that could be the answer for any liability on 
injured persons. We feel as a group that these measures have to 
be done and have to be done now. We can't go on for three or four 
more years dragging along because some of us will not be here to 
be in business. We cannot pass on to the consumer as wholesalers 
and distributors the cost of this rising insurance. It has to 
come from some place. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Do you have other suggestions besides 
the statute of 1 tations and the state of the art approach? 
MR. CASHION: I would say that your workmen compensation 
laws, if we could change those, and also the .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Change them in what fashion? 
MR. CASHION: Well, 30 years ago that was the method 
that protected the workman against injury. 
that was the avenue that he .... 
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If he was injured 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Outlaw the th pa cla 
MR. CASHION 1 over 
these ts a we sell walked to your home, 
if I sold you a cha and 10 years later it had a cracked leg on 
it and I am sorry, Senator Knox, you can't s in that chair 
anymore, you would throw me out of home. same thing 
when we go back to a plant that us this equ , or 
whatever t be, and we tell a man not to use that 
machine anymore that it is not safe because he had done this or 
done that to ification, he runs us out, so we have no 
middle man and we are t this to control. We are 
the point where profits that we do make go for insurance. I 
think it is time now that we do someth 
about the summary of it. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Okay. We 
is it? 
this and that's 
c that. Mr. Romney, 
Ye , sir. See ndix X) 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Do you 
add in this regard? 
MR. ROMNEY: I am answering 
someth would like to 
letter of June 6th 
wherein you a me three questions. I am Dick Romney. I am 
President of Pac-Power, a firm in Walnut Creek and Woodland, 
Cali ia. We sell, service and rna tain aerial manlift equipment 
and mobile d rnrrick equipment like the public utilities use. 
Our customers are public utility companies, municipal governments, 
the State of California, the Federal Government and so forth. We 
employ 27 people. We are licensed by the State to perform 
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mobi crane certification. We represent two of the leading 
manufacturer 
only been 
ment f ld 
the midwest of these types of products. We have 
business since 1973. I have been in the utility equip-
33 years. You asked three questions in the letter 
addressed to me. The first is how much have our premiums increased 
since 1974. When we were founded in '73 with a major insurance 
carrier, we were able to obtain $500,000 primary and $1,000,000 
umbrella for about $3,000. In '74 the carrier declined to renew 
coverage and we had to seek an eastern and southeastern firm for 
the same $500,000 and $1,000,000 which ran us up to $3,220 for one 
and $3,112 the other, or an increase of 100%. Before those 
polic s expired, one carrier cancelled. The other one did 
expire then we were able to get no help from any major 
carr We were finally given coverage with a Michigan firm 
for $21,250 for $300,000 coverage, with a $500 deductible. Now 
this is a mill two hundred less coverage for a 335% increase but 
that isn't bad part of the story. The Insurance Commissioner 
of Michigan forced this company out of the California market and we 
were cancelled ten days before Christmas. We had an audit in our 
agent's ha s the night of the lOth day, yet it took us better than 
two months to get a refund on our unused premium and we received it 
on a short-rate cancellation basis. I was informed last week by 
a reliable insurance firm that this company is still selling 
insurance in California but many of the firms that were insured by 
them have not received return on their premium as yet. The second 
question was, have you been refused coverage by any insurance 
company and my answer to that is, yes. We have to date approached 
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vigorously 42 carriers. We have received coverage from none. 
I may back for one moment. We have d one 1 ili action 
since we've iness and we have suffered $900 in 
liability loss. None of the major carriers would insure us, as 
I mentioned. We have utilized a small-town agent. We have utilized 
a specializing broker in transportat equipment that knows our 
field very well and we have utilized three of the largest 
brokerage houses in San Francisco and to date we have been able 
to get no decent coverage. Three weeks ago, after a detailed 
plant inspection, documention and testing review with a carrier, 
we received this quotation, three weeks ago, for $100,000 coverage, 
and this is all they would offer us. With a $10,000 deductible 
per occurrence written on a claims made basis, they would be 
happy to extend us coverage for $63,000 premium. Now, I'm not 
very bright .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: You are ing close to where you should 
book it yourself. 
MR. ROMNEY: Well, that's --
I'm not very bright but that's spend 
that makes no sense was my conclusion. 
S 1 S -- this, as you say, 
73¢ to protect 27¢ and 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: What do you think we ought to do about 
this? 
MR. ROMNEY: I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Oh. All right. 
MR. ROMNEY: I think a statute of limitations would be 
the first thing. I only have one more short point to make. 
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CHAIRMAN KNOX: All right, go ahead. 
MR. ROMNEY: We have been repeatedly turned down by 
major carriers and both these gentlemen who spoke for the 
insurance industry this morning, I can speak to personally, 
who write firms in other states doing the same job, representing 
the same lines we do that now have realistic premium costs. Salt 
Lake City, Denver, Portland and San Antonio, Texas are all 
examples. The Colorado Company in June saved some $19,000 in 
premiums in anticipation of their July first law that was passed and 
Texas efforts have been through the Insurance Commissioner. We 
have gone so far now that twelve of us western utility equipment 
dealers are investigating a captive insurance company. The money 
up front in an offshore Colorado company is staggering and it seems 
to me totally unrealistic that I must go into the insurance business 
to survive. The third question you asked -- do you know any 
companies that were unable to obtain coverage due to the cost of 
premiums. Yes, I know three here in California. Product liability 
is the most serious problem we face today. Premium costs have put 
a new partner in our business. The lack of product coverage is now 
spilling into the general liability market. We must have legislative 
relief in California or the legitimate dealers will be no more. 
Thank you, sir. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you very much, gentlemen. We 
appreciate your attendance. Oh, excuse me, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It is not a question but an observation. 
It is interesting to hear the gentleman representing the trial 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: I don't understand that, Mr. Chairman. 
Will you explain that? 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Senator Russell, thats .... 
ahead, Professor. 
Well, go 
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS: If the plaintiff were found to be, 
for example, 30% negligent and another defendant found being 60% 
and the other defendants the remainder, the plaintiff would 
recover all of his damages less 30% and he would recover them in 
proportion against those two defendants, according to their degree 
of 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: The Li v. Taxicab case in California 
has abolished the old common law principle of contributory 
negligence as far as the plaintiff's action. If the plaintiff 
were even a little bit negligent, he was totally barred. They 
substituted comparative negligence but the problem is, of course, 
in products, we have what is called liability without fault, so 
there is some question as to whether the Li case applies in 
that situation. What the professor is suggesting is that we might 
want to have comparative fault, that is, if the plaintiff is 25% 
at fault and somebody else is 35%, and somebody else -- the fact 
the jury can make that decision. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You can have a multiple suit then. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, you have a multiple suit anyway. 
This would just allow the jury to say -- to parcel out the fault 
as they felt it -- as they felt it lay. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: They wouldn't be able to do that under 
previous .... 
• 
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS: I 't th it s been done in 
Cali 
fault or 
so-cal str l 
causat 
ili 
rative 
nded to 
actions. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Excuse me. r current situation, 
it is not be A person would be sued a he would be 
liable the ing? 
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS: pla ff's would not 
be taken into account as I understand the present California law. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX t's 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank 
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS: Another lem that I think is 
substantial and has been on several of the s 
today, has to the '..Yorkers sat situat I can 
remember i a recent case where the court tha 
employer, or ra fact f r found the r some 
65% negl nee, and the negl t, a manufacturer 
for rem a r, yet the manufa turer paid the ent 1 ility 
in that case, the courts saying, we cannot do a ing about this. 
It is a quest for Legis ture. Now the sal t Mr. 
Epstein put forward or the Amer n Insurance Associat put forward 
is that there be no subrogation l and that the amount of worker's 
compensat be d from amount f recovery against a 
third party. I th that is a good proposal so far as it goes 
but it does not go far enough. It seems to me if you adopted an 
across-the-board comparative fault, comparative causation approach, 
you would let the worker collect from his employer the amount of 
worker's compensation, whatever the limits may be and then sue 
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fault attr 
aga t the manufacturer reducing, however, from 
amount of employer's fault, plus the amount of 
t, if any. So that, for example, you might 
's compensation $20,000 but the percentage of 
le to the employer might be $100,000. That would 
be so far as recovery against the manufacturer but it 
should be. The manufacturer is not responsible for that fault 
and should not bear it. If it cannot be borne in the present 
worker's compensation system, if the rates cannot be raised, 
then there is no reason to shift it to the non-fault party. Now, 
ss some of the proposals specifically, the statute of 
lim t s sal an outer cut-off limits has been adopted in 
a number of situations; in medical malpractice cases, 
construct industry statutes and under the Uniform Comrnerical Code, 
is so basis of recovery, a 4-year statute of limitations 
running from the date of sale. Some constitutional question has been 
raised about these outer cut-off statutes and in some jurisdictions 
they have been declared unconstitutional. The question is certainly 
there as was discussed this morning. I think the three time period 
cut-offs sugges by .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Was that on equal protection or due 
process .... 
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS: Due process. The three time cut-off 
per s that Dr. tei 's statute proposes, I think, in itself 
presents a canst 
A di rent t 
the 
ional problem of inequality in protection. 
period for the retailer, for the manufacturer 
nt part manufacturer. A sort of problem that 
bothers me with the statute of lim t s absolute cut-off has 
to do with the f case l tha of vs. 
Mathos of , several years The Motor 
Company manu plast ball to be on its gear shift 
lever. They used black and they used white. White, it was known, 
was subject to deterioration by the ultra v let rays of the sun 
so that within a period of a year or a year and a half, the knob 
would become total useless as a ice the event 
of impact. Underneath the knob was a 
lever. It came to a spear-like int 
sharp-po ted gear shift 
pla tiff was impaled 
se of the automobile. Now, on the knob 13 years after the 
if that accident had 
after the sale of 
wi i a year or a r and a half 
car, would been exactly the same. 
It lay dormant for 13 years s because no one was so unfortunate 
as to be thrown a st in a collision. cases, it seems 
a time bomb to me, that type of case, where the s 
from the beginning and simply does not manifest itself until 10 years 
later, it strikes me as sen a substant 1 Moreover, 
I do not think that you can equitab and perhaps not even consti-
tutionally foreclose the various loopholes that may eat up the rule 
to continuing duty, loophole , the fraudulent concealment 
loophole. If your wrote a statute without those exceptions in it, 
the courts would e them on statute and if you expressly 
said they were not to be exceptions, I think you would raise a 
very serious constitutional problem. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question very briefly. Are you saying 
that if somebody had been injured the year or second year afterwards, 
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it wou 
tha 
you are 
fact 
as 
t no jury occurred in 13 years, 
year. Is that what 
PROF PHILLIPS: It seems to me the product is just as 
defect a as it was 13 years later. It was fortui-
tous that c nt came on 13 years later. Another problem 
a sta tute of l tat 
on is, is to what extent would 
s, and Professor Epstein touched 
really benefit your manufacturers 
and sel 
out of 
s this state. Their products, I presume, go as much 
e te more they stay in the state. If 
would be ect to statutes of 
1 ta e iding not this kind of protection. It 
wou result 
re 
disa ge to Cali ia plaintiffs with 
pe a very stantial adva to California defendants. 
IRMAN KNOX: Well, t's the ultimate question, but 
I 't a him that until we get through. 
SSOR PHILLIPS: re are a number of cases also 
involv con inued use of a If you take a drug, for example, 
over a 5, r period, those cases, I presume, as the 
statute is wri would for recovery because a sale 
contr t i j occurred within the 10-year period 
al a tan ion of the sale contributing to the 
injury would fall period. It seems to me those cases 
would rema 
move on to 
for see 
CHA 
PROF 
coverage of the statute. If I may, I will 
if tion statute. 
1 right. 
PPS: And is raises the whole question of 
s wh the proposed statute does not take 
account of. We a case out of Tennessee wh demonstrates 
the 11 th 
350 1 Sect 378. It is a ~ se 5, 
applying Tennessee law. There the fendant built a cement 
manufacturing llat for an and constructed 
conveyors of cement high off the ground and r constructed 
them so that the stone and the cement and so forth spilled 
over out of the b onto a be where the workers 
were watching the operation. In 
the employer negl nt I apparen 
of the platform. roof was not 
the collection of the droppage 
periodically as should have n. Eventual wi the build-up 
of the mater 1 on top of the roof, t fell on rs under-
neath. The manufacturer of faul bins in f st instance 
was held liable for the ent to s Why? 
Because was it not seeable that if someone constructs t type 
of situat , someone wou a to avoid , to remedial 
measures? The court held, yes, I that presents a good 
foreseeable case. There is the inv if tion type of case --
, 501 Federal Second 617, 
1.s an Eighth C it case of 1974. was a protect guard 
on top of a mach used for mixing cellu se fiber seeds, 
water and so forth for sowing of grass. The protective device 
there was such that it got in the way when you were trying to 
feed the machines. It made the machine practically unworkable. 
The employees naturally removed it, they folded it back, in order 
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a 
11 
meant to be used. r got 
when was to kick 
se cases it seems to me, sent 
foreseeabil of alterat Where 
that is 
and 
t 
are 
statute 
able 
t 
do its j and does not impede 
it is less taken off by an 
ing the manufacturer 1 le. If 
cases but bad cases cannot be 
There is another problem 
Cali ia has the landmark 
1964 case involv 
retai r of an automobile. 
quite possib resul 
dealer, not I, when left my hands. In 
was not 1 alteration did it. 
court sa 
rule has bee 
a nondelegable duty of 
lowed New Jersey. It 
to a situat 
be as 
sure wou 
state of 
where product was sent to 
the user. There is a sub-
1 ili that type of 
want to eliminate it. 
art, this to me seems to be 
most unjustified measure 
And I doubt that user ex-
1 as sta in this supporting 
t the state of art will control liability 
in negl law, not just str t liability, 
• 
but negligence dating I think back to 30's. famous 
T. J. r case Lea Ha e i stry 
practice was sa beh so find. 
If the ent does s cannot 
be left to the indus The courts have to be final 
arbiter in this situation; otherwise you would have turned over .... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In nt, sir, do they lag 
behind? makes that decis ? 
PROFESSOR PHILLIPS: The expert testimony may be required, 
depending on the 
that it is a situat 
to have expert test 
been done more safe 
All I'm saying is 
tion of case. Some cases are such 
the person who is sett 
it seems to me. re 
of common 
It could 
It would 
cannot leave 
his own sta 
not be a 
You don't even have 
been, 
on the 
st 
s. 
should have 
s of the case. 
ultimately to 
It is very unsound 
cases where state 
of the art will not control, but there is a suf nt residual 
that to 
as well. 
se out entire it seems to me would be very unwise 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Mr. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Mr. McAlister. 
irman. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: As I understand it, the objection 
that the industry raises to the state of art defense or the 
lack of the state of art defense is that they are judged 
today by standards of today when they made the machinery a long 
time ago. Am I incorrect on that? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: That's r t. I was addressing myself here 
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a 
t 
f the state of art as it is defined in 
s. 
it if the is 
any of the try that will 
t 
statute 
t is most 
raised goes more directly 
is the non-introduction 
ly the situation 
turer be j st hoc standards. 
you could not introduce evidence of 
de to improve your product taken after the 
se it was not necessari probative 
the l of encouraging 
at ev nee to come in. California, 
case, ld that it could come in, 
il of making the product sa fer, 
considerat at least in design cases 
cases as well. If that is the main issue 
to me d ff to s that it is indeed 
nu and says, this could not 
not worked, the trade-offs would have 
you re to t. You say, it is 
ng now. If it can be done now, why 
done then? shift the burden to the 
it was sc ntifically impossible 
m t lie in a of jurisdictions 
unsafe defense. But most of these cases 
t, very invo scientific impossibility 
reason or a r decisions of production, 
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• 
research and development or whatever it 
later. 
not done then until 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: We used ra 1 ss cases 
by having a j view of the crossing to show that they put up a 
crossing subsequent to the accident. It was definitely, it was a 
strong view for a time that you cou not bri subsequent .... 
PROF. PHILLIPPS: To prove 
for other purposes. 
1 nee, but you can use it 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: . .. in fact, got it in. 
PROF. PHILLIPPS: This o course, is is a 
major problem. Where the su t ir or cha or improvement 
is made by the de ndant himself, and the j is ins I now 
lad s and gentlemen of the jury, this is not an admiss of 
negligence or fault on the of defendant jury probably 
hears that in one ear and it goes ou the other ear. t is the 
great da or not low tha ~ t I nobody 
knows. If wou be no I suppose. 
But I personal ink that post-ace nt ts at least when 
made by the defendant raise a very severe risk of undue prejudice 
to the defendant himself, but I 't see how you can solve the prob-
lem at least where evidence is ing used for s of 
impeachment. defendant comes court and says it would 
and he has made a change in not be feasible to make a safer 
his own product subsequent to injury. What naturally ask 
him in that situation on cross-examination. How can you say it is 
not feasible? You did it yourself. To cut off the right to ask 
that question, I think would constitute a very severe incursion 
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s 
t wh 1 s at the center of our 
se the manufacturer cou 
ace oc he just didn't realize 
the s to cause that kind of an 
to the to warn al, Professor 
at least 
have been 
his commentary, an admission 
in more areas than here; namely, 
at 
de 
ast s ctable or incapable 
the cases depend t 
nces of each , which is typical of tort 
He s , dete ning by 
warned, and the th of the warning, is 
la down a mean ful standard way 
, doe ss a couple of questions, 
f causa , and he suggests that the 
ld immed te cause of the 
uage make any 
It is used somet s by some 
substant l cause, I 
t more wou make any difference. 
ses are a complicated questions of 
that the quest s can or should be 
cause are not capab of 
an example of a case 
in nvo the sale of charcoal briquets. 
Up until a 
was and 
use, cook on 
le of rs ago 
-ve 
indoors in a non-well-ventila 
the industry 
s were used 
area, resu death 
a of an ent 
allegat of the 
carbon monox 
intiff's a t the warning could 
have been more str a s if s," wh the 
Federal Government now requ s, "you may suffer dea by asphyxiation.' 
That is now the present warning. Well, suppose that warning had 
been on that se were i 
heating s electr f for lack 
of payment of the utili bill. Wou have on anyway, 
assuming t had to have the the on thing 
they had to heat a that well 
venti ted e era s ? 
Who knows? Would take that 
it is an te warn case se we don't 
know if would have d a i 
those cases, order to do just 
' 
have to be le to the court 
or to the fact fi The warn statute so effect 
restr ts recovery aga st retai rs a 
tors to a situat 
non-manufac 
or ctual mi 
distribu-
t. I 
see no reason why at 
for retailers and ~ 
st you would ot retain a l nt standard 
there are s t s where retailers stand 
in the shoes of manufacturers re they hold themselves out as the 
manufacturer of the product itself. In that s t , I suppose 
you would treat them and should treat like manufacturers. 
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cont 
c es of 
my 
st 10 
and 
construct 
tute is 1 tat on itive damages to 
nsa s recoverab re 
be recove 
aw s to whether or not 
at all, they being 
so forth. However, you do see cases which 
of damages and Dr. Epstein's 
the illam case where a television 
ision of the extreme risk of fire 
them even though there were repeatedly 
case simp required imposition of punitive 
seems to me t one thing you might want to 
r not, as a matter of lie policy, such 
If can be absorbed, due to 
sm and ssed on , the very punitive 
s avo I th nk this is the extent of 
that we 
PS: 
I will ask Senator Russell's question 
a ny substantive changes in 
ili as it has developed in the 
to make? 
than the workmen's compensation 
Yes. Well, no I understand you made a 
t we look at comparative fault but do 
other cha s t we should look at? 
PS: I th t in carrying that forward, 
amount of recovery by the amount of the 
• 
• 
employer's fault. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What is the workmen's comp case? 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Well, he suggesting that a typical 
case is if a worker gets hurt on a machine and he had his 
Workmen's Compensation benefits and his attorney also files an 
action against the manufacturer and it is argued that if you had 
comparative fault that the jury could ascribe certain damages 
against the manufacturer but would also look at the amount of 
fault of the employer, for example, in taking off the safety 
guard or whatever else the individual has done, perhaps the 
place where the machine is or any other kind of fault. Is 
that the proposal? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Yes, the result .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: So that the manufacturer doesn't 
carry the full load. He carries whatever the jury thinks is 
appropriate. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Something that encourages the 
concept of worker's comp? 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: No, he still gets his worker's comp. 
Of course, that's .... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Encouraging from the employer's 
standpoint. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Yes, encourages the employer to be more 
careful, I assume. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Also, violates the principle 
that the employer is liable only in the no-fault system of 
worker's comp. 
be 
worker's 
I 
of 
the 
use 
's 
's 
know if or 
PS: The al I was putting forward 
ent worker's comp liability of the employer 
1 against a third party. 
effect, employer is at fault, would 
amount of of the employee, if the 
did not equal the amount of the fault of 
KNOX: Let s 
1 understand 
the jury 
leav 
the emp 
. PHILLIPS: 
The 
of the 
1 
I 
Let 
be 
on 
The 
care 
c 
the 
$75 
was 
s s 
a col 
would 
concrete case because 
Let's say there is $100,000 
gets $25,000 1n 
lity rating and what 
i now if you recovered 
t $25,000 goes to the 
0 for the employee. Now, if 
2 at fault, what happens? 
that the jury finds them 
of $50,000 only from 
end up losing $25,000 because 
on who actually at fault, the 
I am not sure I understand that. Let's 
100,000 the J finds that that's the 
ffered. He has received $25,000 from 
He $75,000 but the first $25,000 
10 
• 
collected goes back to the worker's compensation carrier under 
the present law California. Now, what under the 
comparative that are ting, if the jury finds 
that the employer is 25% at fault; in other words, $25,000? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: No, it wouldn't go back if you 
eliminate the subrogation lien. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: You eliminate the subrogation lien. 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Okay. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that what you advocate? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Why? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: The subrogation lien apparently has been 
a strong incentive for the breeding of litigation and indeed for 
the financing of litigation where the employer who is partly at 
fault, urges and cooperates actively with his employee in an action 
over against a third party. But what's most offensive about it, is 
the situation where the employer is substantially at fault. He 
knows of the dangerous condition. He does nothing about it 
whatsoever. He leaves it. He has been warned, (the Balito case, 
for example) and he brazenly goes ahead with the situation and yet 
he is being the one at fault is entitled to recover over. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The third party being the manufacturer. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: He gets his money back. 
PROF. PHILLIPS: There is no equity in that at all. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: The employer gets his money back. He 
gets the first money back, even before attorney fees for the 
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the 
c 
tate 
as 
whether 
speci 
was 
there are two 
I understand the California 
where the at , the 
t the 
There 
for the amount of 
a contribution to 
to that extent. 
t or s 
, unless the law has 
since I've looked at 
t an employer for fault now is willful 
ed to be a 5 , but it is almost 
iforn It very difficult. Well, 
All right. 
be 
questions? Thank you, 
Oh, excuse me, Fred 
Could you ust c the state of the 
comments for the committee, because, 
state o art defense would not pre-
as to what the state of the art is. I 
remarks that if you adopted the 
't have any expert testimony 
of the art actual was at the time and 
to the circumstances of the 
No, what I was directing my attention to 
statement the proposed statute. When 
re poss le 
1 use 
designs, the adoption of 
the defendant's trade or business 
lOB 
or an allied or similar trade shall be treated as being in com-
pliance with the state of the art. So defining the state of the 
art at the time of manufacture leaves the determination of what 
is adequate to the conduct of, as here, substantial use. 
MR. HIESTAND: So the law is a common denominator. 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Exactly, exactly. This does not address 
the separate question of whether or not you should have a state 
of the art defense determined at the time of manufacture and if 
so, what would be that standard. That standard I suppose would 
be determined by, not law, but what was actually being done at the 
time and what was capable of being done. That is the true state 
of the art standard, it seems to me. 
CHAIRMAN KJ:iiOX: Okay, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What you are saying -- your proposal 
then rests solely on the comparative negligence approach. That's 
what you feel would be helpful in addressing this problem .... 
PROF. PHILLIPS: And extending that to worker's situation, 
worker's compensation situation. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The other statute of limitations and 
warnings, and so forth, you do not support? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: I think that you will have so many, of 
necessity, so many exceptions to an absolute cut-off period that 
you will not accomplish the purpose set out. That's without 
addressing, that's without even address the fundamental question 
of why should you cut off a valid claim that can be well shown 
such as in the Nicole Blackman case I mentioned in South Carolina. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So you would oppose then a flat statute 
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of 
no 
? 
? 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Yes. 
RUSSELL: And to add exemptions would be too 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Well, if you adopt a flat statute, I 
need at least the three major exceptions 
or four, and therefore, I am saying as a 
matter you won't accomplish what you set out to do 
th statute. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You do not agree then that there is 
You do feel there is a problem that needs to be 
addressed. 
PROF. PHILLIPS: Apparently there is. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Okay. ~hank you very kindly. Mr. Behr 
or so are you here yet? Norman Lynn? Berry Griffin? 
Mr ff 
members of 
Gri 
MR. BERRY L. GRIFFIN: (See Appendix XI) Mr. Chairman, 
Committee on Tort Liability, my name is Berry 
and Benefits Manager of Baker International Corporation 
, California. I appear here today as a practicing 
, as a member of the Orange Empire Chapter of the 
sk and Insurance Management Society, or RIMS, and also as the 
Re 
1 Pres of RIMS in charge of Government and Industry 
down to 
Rather than telling a lot of goodies about RIMS, let's 
I'll have the goodies in the passouts. We 
are charged with the responsibility of protecting our 
's assets t the risk of loss as a result of static 
losses such as , earthquake, auto liability, products liability 
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generally considered as insurable risks, either through self-
insurance, or the more traditional purchase of insurance. In 
other words, the professional risk manager spends 40 hours or 
more a week dealing with nothing but the management of the risks 
of his firm. I can assure you that we risk managers are very 
aware of the products liability problem facing not only the 
business community, but the entire citizenry of the State of 
California and the nation as a whole. And I can assure you that 
we face this problem daily. Much has been written about why we have 
a products liability problem today. Because so much has been 
written on the subject, and in the interest of brevity, I will 
not rehash the many reasons why we find ourselves in this position. 
What I would like to do is to propose solutions to the products 
liability insurance proposal so that manufacturers can find 
adequate insurance at an affordable price. Firstly, manufacturers 
should be producing products free from defect. Industry must 
continue these efforts. Several governmental agencies are care-
fully watching industry's efforts and believe me, they are. 
Secondly, much more must be done to educate the public concerning 
the tort system. Let the public know what happens to their 
insurance premiums and to the price of any product purchased when 
tort liability is abused. Thirdly, the insurance industry must 
get a handle on products liability. They must develop meaningful 
statistics that substantiate the enormous premiums that they now 
demand. Lastly, the American tort system, encompassing the 
judicial mechanism, is a viable concept which should be retained. 
The erosion of the fault concept of liability, the increased use 
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s 
a 
cost s and inefficiency 
our tort 
the We 
and action which will 
lity problem. Among 
One, enact a statute of limiuations 
statute from time a particular 
stream of commerce. 
KNOX: What do mean by 6-10? Do you mean 
between 6 and 10? 
6 and 10. We don't 
a our repres 
KNOX: I unders 
Two, court awards to economic loss, 
fees, thus eliminating pain and 
l source 
awards and permitting 
This, we feel will 
more reasonable 
trial. of cla 
recommend 
to an 
all state worker's compensation 
j 
neg 
be reduced 
12 
and recoveries of 
ted to the statutory worker's 
against fellow employees 
and manufacturers should be 
RIMS supports this as 
, under which awards 
ly by their 
negligence in causing their own damage or injuries. 
Fifth, state of the art -- a prohibiting the 
introduction of evidence of in products 
resulting from advancements in technology. 
Sixth, enactment of a statute which would regulate plaintiff 
attorneys' contingent fees. We recommend a graduated scale or 
possibly in the alternative, court-awarded fees. 
Seventh, compliance with federal or state standards 
such a compliance should be at least a rebuttable presumption that 
a product was not defective. 
Eighth, contribution among tortfeasors. We support 
meaningful contribution among tortfeasors. 
Ninth, advance payments -- RIMS supports evidence rulings 
which will exclude such payments from being disclosed or imply 
admission of liability, and permit such awards to be offset against 
subsequent awards. 
Tenth, bifurcated trials -- we support the use of bifurcated 
trials, or separate trials, where the sues of liability or 
negligence are first tried and if liability is found, a second trial 
may be held on the issue of damages. This will separate the 
emotional issue of damages from the more objective issue of 
negligence. 
Eleventh, advance notice of claim -- we will support 
a requirement that prior to any liability suit being filed, a notice 
of claim must be filed with the other party and a reasonable 
opportunity given to remedy the defect and compensate for economic 
loss to the claimant. 
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as to 1 
we 11 support a requirement 
and damages in 
caseload on courts. 
to the smaller cases. 
fee tern,-- we recommend the 
so as to reimburse the attorney 
on that of the award or settlement 
t settlement offer made by defendants 
was engaged claimant. 
payment of winner's costs --we recommend 
11 1 court costs and attorney's fees 
law and encourage more 
before trial and more important, 
ad damnum -- we 
because 
the elimination of 
-- because of 
means that can't say, I sue 
or s 
MCALISTER: 
Yes, 
of 
as an a 
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you just say, I'm suing 
't we do that medical 
done the medical -- AB lXX, 
tallment payment of awards 
of awards to periodic 
to large sum payments 
• 
• 
and possible reduction of awards in the event of the early demise 
of the claimant. 
very much. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you for those modest suggestions. 
We will take them under submission. I'll submit them to the Trial 
Lawyers Association for their comments. No, I think you have 
raised an inventory on some of the issues before us and we 
appreciate it very much. Are there any questions? Ms. Gorman. 
MS. GORMAN: Do you represent self-insureds? 
MR. GRIFFIN: I am a self-insured, yes. I self-insure 
my worker's compensation. Baker does. Many, many RIMS members 
self-insure, at least a portion of their risk, if not all. My 
goodness, Standard Oil of New Jersey self-insures the first $10 
million of their risk. 
MS. GORMAN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: If I had $10 million I'd do it too, but 
I don't have $10 million. 
MS. GORMAN: What's been the experience among, say 
Standard Oil -- companies like Standard Oil of New Jersey in 
recent years? 
MR. GRIFFIN: Well, I can't speak for Standard Oil. I 
think I can speak in general. They wouldn't be doing it if it 
wasn't saving them money. 
MS. GOR~~: No. I understand that, but if they had a 
dramatic increase in the cost of claims in the last two or three 
years .... 
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have an increase in the 
near the 
premiums if they had 
KNOX: You are to give us a copy of your 
Sure. 
KNOX: Thank you very much. Thank you very 
Mr. 11 s 
of 
Mr 
, of Simpson's Safety 
Applicants' Attorneys 
, members of the 
and I am appearing on behalf 
Association. Attorneys 
ured employees, both for 
and on occasion for third party 
lege to in the past to 
or employees in actions against 
, some successfully and some not so 
1 to share some perceptions that I have 
as with the Committee in an 
after 
tance to the committee in that area. I feel 
there are c 
what exact 
s myself br 
6 
, both this morning and 
misconceptions that may be 
going on in the battlefield and 
that area. It appears that 
• 
• 
the two major so-called reforms have surfaced the discussion 
so far here today 
actions and statute limitations s , with the 
state of the art. As a matter of fact, the law today in California 
is that the injured employee, the injured plaintiff is required 
to prove that an article was defective at the time it left the 
hands of the manufacturer. It is my feeling in this area that 
we have a built-in statute of limitations this area. Because of 
that and also because of the instructions that are given to juries 
in these cases that have been formulated by the various decisions 
of our appellate courts as to the of a manufacturer. Now, with 
respect to the state of the art problem which has been presented 
here, I would like to quote some rather direct language from the 
decision that has been mentioned before Balito v. Improved 
Machinery, Inc., which was a case dec the California Court 
of Appeal in 1972. It was a design case. 
digress for a moment, seems that from 
here today that the problem lies not so much 
, if I may just 
has been presented 
the area of the 
manufacturing defect where the article that was manufactured and 
sold on the market just in a certain period of time fell apart 
because of the fact that a part was not up to the manufacturer's 
own specifications or was underspec 
objections from the manufacturing s 
in some manner. The 
, from the insurance carrier's 
side, seem to be directed more of a design case and Balito was one 
of those cases. It contained some important language as to what 
an injured employee must prove in the course of his presenting 
his testimony. It says that strict liability for deficient design 
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f ed on a f the product was 
e and turn, the 
must neces ly be derived 
the art at time of its design. A danger 
fores and the manufacturer's 
ab or potential, to forestall unreason-
measure of duty the design of its·product 
A manufacturer's lure to achieve full potential and design 
and 
des 
f the art 
the courts 
and 
was that the 
foresta unreasonable danger forms the basis for its 
tort. I that this is the -- if there 
that ts as to the responsibility or 
manufacturer under current California law, it is the 
us extracted and read from the Balito decision. 
that 
We a 
state 
to state of the art, we 
have the language of the Ccurt 
that the responsibility of the 
be determined on the basis of his potential 
and be in part by the state 
ted at the of the products manufacture. 
is, there be one, or the 
a self-correcting one. I believe 
~~~~~ and Vandermark in 1963 
us out of it with cases such as 
Professor referred to earlier. 
forgot to tell you, or emitted to tell you, 
lved Price case was an open-back 
s was, fact, manufactured in 1940 
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and was in fact manufactured 
ultimately 
a young 's 
s 
State of New York and 
the loss of 
subs 
from 
But 
at the time it was manufactured in 1940 in the State of New York, 
it was manufactured in violation of existing statutory safety 
standards that existed that state at the time and the evidence 
that was produced in that case brought out the existence of those 
standards, brought out the fact what those standards were, 
but allowed any trial judge, as any court would allow, the manu-
facturer to state p ce, and he and he presented his case, 
and he presented well, and he presented effectively, because 
the jury decided in that case manufacturer wasn't 
responsible because was a multi-purpose machine and perhaps 
the responsibility rather than being on the manufacturer 
should have been 
possession sale of 
every case 
same sue would result 
that certainly where 
upon 
equ 
a 
and the subs 
am not 
s and 
chain of 
ting that 
lving the 
same What I am saying is 
a case to be made on the part of the 
manufacturer and to be exonerated, exonerated, we 
see where Price v. Niagara 
cases in the same I think 
been stated here, that as one 
that. And there are other 
is this, that it has 
ier stated that 
something like five or ten years we had no claims. This year 
we had 40 claims I don't statistics he cited. But 
I don't think we can go back to 195~ or 1962 for that matter. 
This has been a recent phenomena. It wasn't until 1960 and a 
119 
a 
a 
and 
that 
th 
the 
has 
have 
been 
California Supreme Court that an injured employee 
had the right or even the standing 
an against a third party manufacturer 
had no connection whatsoever other than it was using 
that once sold, that there had to be a direct contact, 
re direct hands across the table agreement between 
consumer, the injured worker and the manufacturer. So 
saw an 
something very recent. It wasn't until 1963 
the landmark cases in California and Vandermark v. 
I 
v. Yuba Power that the rule of strict liability 
Now, it wasn't until a few years later 
rease in the number of losses being filed because 
available to injured consumers and injured 
we are saying perhaps that the crest of 
t and a pressure on this type of litigation 
like Price v. Niagara with another look at 
an ebbing in the consumerism movement which 
ed here earlier -- I strongly feel that the 
to kind of seek its own level and it is going 
I think respect to most of the problems that 
, with respect to most of the reform that has 
t and they are working. Professor Phillips 
negligence situation. That issue is 
ifornia Supreme Court right now and we are 
momentarily .... 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Is it a products case? 
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MR. STEINBERG: A products case -- forgive me, not 
a products case -- that one case. But there are several cases 
presently before the Supreme Court dealing or worker's 
comp subrogation, number one, dealing also the application 
of comparative negligence in a product liability case. As soon 
as there are decisions in these several cases, we may end up 
a decision from the high court momentarily, bas lly holding what 
Professor Phillips has suggested with respect to the subrogation. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: How do you feel about that? 
MR. STEINBERG: Well, I have to concede that there 
nothing today which, except the Occupational 
Administration enforcement procedures, that encourages employers 
to update their equipment, to do something to encourage them to see 
that a safer product is operated within their own 
environment, that perhaps if the employer from the 
limitations of the worker's compensation system where he 
guilty of a violation of the safety statute or for s 
or something of that kind, perhaps we would have some 
deterrent focusing on the employer directly that might relieve 
the situation. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: All there is now is Cal-OSCHA and 
collective bargaining, I guess. Did you ever get that willful 
misconduct recovery? 
MR. STEINBERG: Yes, we do but you are talking about 
a relatively small amount of money. It really doesn't have 
economic deterrent involved in it. It doesn't have any economic 
bite, and it is my position that we've done a job in this field. 
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I am talking about the plaintiff's advocates, the 
themselves. I we have seen corrective measures being taken 
many lds in many areas as a result of liab ity 
suits. There have been changes in approaches by manufacturers. 
I receive calls constantly from manufacturers of new 
knowing I am involved in the other side of the fence 
litigation, saying I am coming out with this product 
do you think of it. Where are my problems? What 
this 
what 
of a 
warning should I put on it? I've got those three alternate 
designs. What should I do with it? This was unheard of 10 
or 15 years ago. I think that certainly it is a social problem. 
We decided with agreement in the Vandermark decisions 
and 1964 to afford this remedy. My point is, I don't 
3 
there 
any way we can go back on that, that some of these problems 
are basically self-correcting. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Okay. Questions? Thank you very much, 
Mr. Steinberg. We appreciate your attendance. I understand that 
the electronic importers and the furniture manufacturers are 
to submit written statements. We have about 10 minutes, and I 
suppose it would be fair if we let Dr. Epstein raise a point of 
1 privilege at this point. In 10 minutes, Epste , now. 
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: You know I don't know where to beg 
qu , so I will probably begin at the top of the list. I will 
deal, I think, first with some of the remarks Mr. Aitken made in 
the way in which I would want to respond to them. 
now fabled case of Price v. Niagara. I think that rea 
about that case is, are several. First, that I don't 
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concern the 
my point 
t same 
• 
message as he gets. I get the message, don't a seek a 
directed verdict on the cases of t sort seems als 
the court was quite sure the j was tre 
those facts presented in that case, entitled to ind for 
tiff and if so, no directed verd wou be g n to 
e plain-
defendant 
So in many ways I think that the case could be read as a 
to the initiation of these suits even s not treated 
as a spur for the appeal. The second point that I wanted to make 
about that case was that it seems to show, to illustrate real 
fundamental difference in approach between 
one hand and Professor Phillips and Mr. Ste 
That is that's a case which 10 years ago, and 
the problem is not Greenman v. Yuba Power, it 
it is the erosion in defenses and r e 
to warn cases, all of which followed the 
strict liability and the abolit of pr 1. 
and written statement which I have goes into 
detail. But that was the case under wh I a 
elf, I th on the 
on the o r. 
here I think that 
l.S not 
s defect 1. 
of 
tate 
grea 
here 
the manufacturer was not in violation of the statute. The 
statute referred to in-state use. It d not refer to manu-
facturer's duty to make the machine con to that 1.n- tate use 
and that was clearly discussed and debated in course of the 
opinion. To that extent, I disagree with Mr. Steinbe 
was a case in which custom, the state of the a 
practice would have been a directed ve ict 
as to 
r that k 
ry 
of 
system, I think; that the open and obvious nature of the da r 
would have been a complete defense in this state before Olsen and 
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Cronin that the question of whether or not there has been a cure 
of the original defect by the imposition of whatever safe in 
st on wou have been a complete superseding the cause defense 
as a matter of law. And if all three of those things had been taken 
and had been pushed into some kind of a foresight reasonableness 
test and what you really want to ask yourself is whether or not 
a system would withstand that kind of uncertainty. It may well 
be the rule which says that defective products hold liable 
is a strict and clear one but when you get to the definit of 
what counts as a defect, you get yourself into the kinds of 
reasonableness that is required which it seems to me to be very 
difficult to deal with. The second point I would want to mention 
concerns our elevator case, which was talked about this morning. 
I think that really illustrates the opposite point. Elevators 
are kind of heavy equipment that have to unde annual 
in ction by the state. They are always installed a by 
s and they are repaired by somebody. If after 10 years 
that elevator g s out, the beauty of this statute of l tat ion 
I think is that it may exonerate the original manufacturer but 
certainly leaves action against owners and occupiers under an 
occupiers liability theory and against inspection and maintenance 
irmen under some other kinds of substantive theory. You knock 
out one defendant which does not mean in many cases that knock 
out a plaintiff's recovery. In addition, if there is a recall 
notice or an OSCHA notice or something of that sort tha also 
would start the treatment of the statute anew, and it should. 
So, that under those circumstances too when you understa the 
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I 
I 
statute not only as it is construed but with some fa I think 
well drawn out and well thought out t i 
to be a pretty sensible accommodation and a sta 
Moving on. I disagree with Professor Phill about the 
desirability and foreseeability as a concept of organization. As 
far as I am concerned, there is simply no that that cou be 
reduced to a set of standards which tell you wha you do do 
not do. We spent a long time in our state of art statute and 
to in our product modification statute worrying about cr 
that kind of language in there; but in the end, we that if 
you use that kind of language there is no point n going for 
legislation. If you don't use it, you may lose the odd case but 
at least you will be able to get the 95% cases wh are cove 
by the statute correctly dec and to Mr. 
an imperfect world you get that kind of results, I 
doing very fine by the legislation. In part 1 r, 
the Guffy case, which he mentioned, would be dec 
s under this statute than it is there. Certa 
tion wasn't of a product but of a protect It seems to me 
takes 
are 
ink 
if 
very difficult for a manufacturer to say if third 
efforts to prevent him from suffering liabili wh fa led that 
he ought to be exonerated so that in my mind unless you 
operation of the conveyor belt in the bus 
the statute would say, this is one where 
ss it seems to 
inal condit 
the 
tha 
resulted in the harm in question and that you could recover from 
somebody under it. At least, I would want to inte it that 
although again, he is quite right to say s could quite 
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ssibly read the statute in the other kind of direct I mean 
that kind of thing is something which is in principle possib to 
ch 
ment 
imitat 
Dealing with some of the o po s that have n 
briefly. Another point about the statute of 
s I I ink is very nice is t to the extent t you 
re dealing with new products and a changing env 
statute of limitations will give no comfort to a k 
facturer who ought not to get it. It is the kind of 
I think, where what you say about it is the statute 
t, the 
of manu-
t will 
protect products that are around and 11 not possibly come to 
bear on current products until 10 years afterwards and even then 
it would be subject to a number of possible regula exceptions. 
So it seems to me you have very few incent ef s w respect 
to current activity where I am not really interested in cutting 
our products liability law, but that it will have effect th 
re ct to older products. With re ct to Mr. Phi 1 s 
South Carolina case about the c tch box, it seems to me 
that that is the paradigmatic case where the statute falls short. 
I don't think when I put the statute forward that I te that 
you were going to get every case right with a statute of an automatic 
r cut off, and oddly enough the ones that you want are fects 
or 1 conditions that are latent in which injury occurs 
thout a fault or participation of the plaintiff. You are 
to lose a couple of those cases. You may well even in the 
automobile case have another defendant whom you could sue to 
recover some of it, or it may well be that a r 13 
is so much more rickety than otherwise that even 
the car 
gear 
assembly was not changed over that period, the rest of the 
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automobile was. So that I am not quite sure could handle 
that case completely, but the end it seems to me to 
make a judgment as to how rna cases there are art 
how many there are of the sort 1 and lated cases. 
Dealing with the state of the art, what gets me troubled 
the capability standard which has been proposed is essential 
I don't know how you really lit te any pr led It 
• 
seems to me to talk about capability, informat about sub 
improvements come in as evidence as to what you m t have done 
then, and th~t you get yourself into the type of situat where 
every case becomes completely open-ended as to what can a 
cannot do; that is, in California for , or in a state, i 
would be quite possible to take the leg lat ndard propo 
example by the National Traff Safety Statute of 966 re d 
them back into pre'66 cases or 
example, it is always technical pass le to 
on the back of an automobile t is not 
• Is any car which doesn't have a headrest i 
going to be defective because it was w the s te o 
do that? I am terribly worried about k of t 
It seems to me that we have to rely on a of market me 
on the one hand and statutes on the other hand. Go a to the 
state of the art .... To go beyond that I th c tes 
uncertainty than it is worth. Admitted you w lose some 
cases, although I am always impressed when s at the 
Learned Hand formula of which I have a bee a nt nt 
in the T. J. Hoo12er. I don't know of a case in wh the stry 
--
is lagging. I haven't read any. It has been sort of demons 
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It seems to me that what happens just so that the indus cou 
some ing else a that's to be suff 
c ss 1 econom s 
is very hard to find that situation existing over 
time. The industry contains all sorts of ind 
act in opposi to one another and to the exte 
it is ing, somebody is going to have a ve 
nt to go forward because you could sell sa 
same way you could sell any other kinds of view. 
s abcu t 
comparat 
It is clear 
rative negligence. I am not a part 
negligence. This is not to say I am 
better than the current Californ 
rd to plaintiff's conduct in these types of lawsu 
t as a true travesty. The question once 
taken to account, what does it mean? One of the th 
we not is that when you look at states tha 
comparat 1 , the plaintiff's conduct no 
latant, usual comes into to be someth like 
o the total ss. Even if you allow comparat 
there is always a danger that the jury could tack on 
more on the s so as to completely eliminate the 
the offset. Also, I'm not very sure about how 
negligence works in multi-party suits where some 
present in the 
poi t that was 
to me 
po It 
action and some parties are not. That 
ft open by the California court in 
ts, it is not a triv 1 point, it 
well be that comparat negligence 
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e 
of 
who 
st point 
r fan of 
to 
with 
have 
ttle bi 
ffect 
t 
e are 
was the 
seems 
nt 
reasonably well on an automobile type situat I have much 
more s princ its operat 
are other ections I could raise to this k f i tellectual 
scheme. My own preferences sort of vacillate from time to 
between the efficiency of the complete bar I 't think 
to be terribly unjust; after all, the guy did br it 
self and one would say, yes, we do have a comparative negl nee 
system but instead of trying to figure out the facts of each 
individual case what the comparison ought to be, the lature 
should say in each case the plaintiff is going to have to eat 
50% of his losses to the extent that he has caused t. to 
eliminate from the fact the way in which the rees of causat 
blend in with the nature of the wrongful conduct and the seque 
of the occurrence. I don't how you 0 
in anything other than an arbitrary way. And f it 
arbitrary, it seems to me it to be done and 
so at least you have uniform danger t 
oi to 
11 
negligence as a jury matter is it opens up the tria even broade , 
increases the litigation expenses, makes it more diff lt to reach 
a settlement at the outset and in the end may result in no re 
relief because of the very tiny verdicts, or e very 
reduction which is going to be attributable to p intiffs, And 
the final statement, and I th this is one wh the AIA 
I think it is a tragedy we have to be here egislation. 
It seems to me we have gone so far off the rai from 
and from Vandermark-- not Vandermark, that's bad case -- from 
Greenman v. Yuba Power, which is a good decis , and a fine case -
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o far from it that we are now forced to try and do common law, 
as it were the abstract. I would much prefer to have courts 
c to go back 20 degrees from where they were. ere is no 
way you can turn back the clock, but if you've got 20 or 30 more 
decisions -- it may take that many, not only from the intermediate 
courts but from the Supreme Court, which started to give you a few 
directed verdicts for defendant and started to affirm the current 
situation. I might say, let's hold off a little bit on is statute. 
But at this point, it seems to me you don't have that type of 
situation and that given that I find so many results to be 
just frightfully unjust in the individual case, I am very 
reluctant to say, well let's just let the whole thing sort it out 
from the time. You know as Mr. John Kane said, in the long run 
we are all dead, but in the short run a lot of people have a 
rea many problems which, of course by varying .... Okay, nk you. 
CHAIRMAN KNOX: Thank you, Professor. Very I 
think the upshot of this is that we should just keep this 
committee in session for about five more years and the will 
care of everything. The meeting is adjourned. nk you, 
very much.# # # 
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Joint Committee on Tort Liability 
State Building, Room B-109 
1350 Front Street, San Diego 
July 18, 1977 
SECRETARY: 
JOYCE FABER 
Today's hearing on products liability lS the second in a 
serles of hearings by the Joint Committee on Tort ability on 
varlous aspects of tort liability problems • -F • l"-ornla. On 
July 11, in Los Angeles, we heard testimony on fessional 
liability, and on July 22 we will be in San cisco to hear 
testimony on insurance company underwriting lces. 
The particular problem we are considering today lS this: 
California manufacturers and consumers have, in recent years, been 
confronted by a crisis of potentially disastrous dimens 
1974, the latest year for which statistics are lable, products 
liability losses and loss-related expenses totalled almost $200 
million nationwide. If current actuarial studies are correct this 
figure may now be approaching $1 billion. Whi the breakdown is 
not precisely known for California, it is clear as in medical mal-
practice and other liability areas that California's share accounts 
for the largest portion of this amount. It is also clear that most 
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sured manufacturers in California have had premium increases 
ranging from one hundred to five thousand per cent. 
We are told the cost of products liability insurance many 
tances may exceed 20% of the manufacturer's sales receipts for 
essential products like medical supplies and packaged food items. 
simple household products such as chairs and ladders this cost 
may be as much as 40% of their receipts. 
These charges, of course, are eventually reflected 1n higher 
retail prices. As a result, an added burden is placed on the 
consumer's pocket book in an era of chronically high inflation. 
Small and medium size manufacturers, lacking the bargaining and 
economic power of the corporate giants, in many cases have been 
d to go without coverage, or a funded self-insurance program. 
Still more serious are the reports our Committee has received 
that several manufacturers have ceased production altogether. 
e obviously, if this denotes a trend, we are on the of 
a calamitous situation for California business. 
We are presented here with a dilemma: On the one hand, if 
do nothing, the result could well be economically catastrophic; 
on the other hand, presently proposed legislation may only immunize 
manufacturers from suits, leaving large classes of injured parties 
manufacturers receiving a 
thout remedies and without/meaningful reduction in premiums. 
Accordingly, the purpose of today's hearing is to consider 
causes of and possible solutions to the problems facing manu-
urers while also assuring victims of faulty products that 
will be fully compensated for injuries they suffer. 
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Our witnesses include distinguished scholars and representatives 
of manufacturers, insurance underwriters and the legal profession. 
Their testimony will form a basis for interim recommendations we 
intend to make for legislation before the next session of the 
Legislature. 
We are aware that the blame for the present situation has 
been laid on all sides. Responsibility has been fixed upon a myoplc 
judiciary, avaracious insurers and lawyers, and careless manu-
facturers. The problem is indeed complex. We ask only that witnesses 
give primary consideration in their recommendations to the public's 
interest, even though this may not always coincide with their 
immediate economic interests. 
# # # 
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FROM THE OFFICE OF: 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN T. KNOX 
STATE CAPITOL, ROOM 2148 
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814 
CONTACT: FRED HIESTAND -- (916) 445-0118 
PRESS NOTICE 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
July 14, 1977 
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATES 
PRODUCT LIABILITY CRISIS 
SACRAMENTO--Products liability problems will be the topic of 
a public hearing to be conducted by the Joint Legislative Committee 
on Tort Liability in San Diego on Monday, July 18, 1977. 
The Committee, headed by Assemblyman John T. Knox (D-Richmond), 
will hear testimony on the high cost and, in many cases, unavailabi 
of products liability insurance and will consider proposed solutions 
to the current crisis. Products liability insurance costs, which 
may exceed 20% of a manufacturers sales rece , are passed on to 
the consumer in the form of higher retail prices. Small manufac-
turers are the hardest hit by the rising cost s 
A rapidly increasing number have been forced to 
coverage or shut down altogether. 
The hearing will be held in the State Building, Room B-109, 
1350 Front Street, San Diego, from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., July 18. 
Attachments: 
Press Release for July 18, 1977 
Agenda of Witnesses 
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Statement of D K. 
To The Joint Legislative Committee on Tort Liabili 
State of California 
San D 18, 1977 
My name is Ken Holliday. I serve as Vice President for 
Commercial Lines insurance for Insurance a Mutual Company. 
My background includes almost 19 years in the Insurance Industry, 
with the majority of that time involved with the underwriting 
function on Commercial Lines of business. 
I have a B.B.A. Degree, with a major in insurance, and an L.L.B. 
Degree. I am a member of the Georgia Bar. I also hold the C.P.C.U. 
designation (Chartered Property and Casualty 
I have been active for the past year and a half in several Industry 
Committees dealing with the subject of Products At I.S.O. 
(Insurance Services Office), I am Vice Chairman of a Products 
Liability Committee that is involved in several of the 
Products Liability situation, including a or closed claim surve~ 
which covered over 20,000 products claims closed 23 from 
July, 1976 to March, 1977. The final on this survey will be 
completed by the end of the summer. 
I also serve as Chairman of a Subcommittee of thi Products Liability 
Committee t..rhich did a complete review of the standard insurance 
coverage being provided for Products At Alliance of 
American Insurers, formerly the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, 
I am a member of a Products Liabili Residual Market Task Force. 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ast year 
established a Task Force to study the Products Liabili situation, 
and I serve on an Indus Committee to that Task Force. 
This Advisory Committee was asked last December to methods 
for the Insurance Industry to voluntarily work to solve the lems 
of availability of Products Liabili insurance coverage. The 
Committee recommended that each state Insurance Commis 
an Advisory Committee to review Products Liabili and 
find markets willing to provide coverage. 
In February, such an Advisory Committee was established in Wisconsin 
and I present serve as Chairman of that Commit 
For this Joint Legislative Conmittee's informati 
two copies of material dealing with some aspects o 
Liability situation which I think you will find in 
38 
(1) an I.S.O. Report on Products Liability Statistical and 
Rating Procedures 
(2) an American Mutual Insurance Alliance pamphlet outlintng 
the problems with proposed mandatory residual market 
mechanisms for Products Liability. 
(3) Sections 3 and 5 of the Advisory Committee report to 
the NAIC Task Force on Products Liability. 
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P R 0 D U C T L I A B I L I T Y I N S U R A N C E 
Background Report on Statistical 
and Rating Procedures 
Prepared by the Staff 
of 
Insurance Services Office 
December 1976 
* * * 
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At the June 1976 meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
) representatives of ISO alluded to a "Bridge Document" currently in preparation 
which will relate past history to the present and future product insurance 
environment. Its purpose is to bridge the gap between past standard ratemaking and 
statistical data, including the Closed Claim Survey as it reflects recent legislative 
and judicial action, and future conditions likely to have an impact in this area. 
Since it will be well into 1977 before the Closed Claim Survey and a valid analysis 
will be complete, and therefore, until the final Bridge Document can be prepared, 
the ISO staff has prepared the attached material to respond to immediate needs. Many 
of the topics addressed in this document are under study by the appropriate ISO 
insurer committees. It is entirely possible, therefore, that some of the procedures 
and descriptions contained in this paper may be superseded at a later date. 
Many of the questions being asked today concern the availability of statistics, 
the types of coverage and the procedures used in pricing product liability insurance. 
The information which follows focuses on those concerns. None of this material is 
new; it has been available previously in the manual rules, policy forms, staff memo-
randa, statistical plans and the like. We hope that assembling it in one document 
will be educational and responsive to the questions about product 
and IS0 1 s functions and activities in that area. 
ISO? 
insurance, 
Insurance Services Office (ISO) is a non-profit, unincorporated association 
of insurance companies providing extensive statistical, ratemaking, and research 
services for the property-liability insurance industry. ISO functions involve 13 
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different lines of insurance and 52 jurisdictions. An insurer may affiliate with 
ISO for various services for a single line of insurance, e.g., private passenger 
automobile, in a single state, for all lines of insurance in all states, or various 
combinations of lines and services in the states it desires them. 
How is Product Liability Coverage Afforded? 
Insurance contracts under which product liability coverage is afforded may 
be broadly categorized into three different types: 
1. Monoline policies -- liability insurance policies which include 
coverage for the product liability exposure; 
2. Commercial package policies -- insurance policies which include 
a standard combination of property and liability coverages generally 
sold to small and medium sized insureds; and 
3. Composite rated, loss rated and large (a) rated policies --
insurance policies which may be of the monoline or package type 
but for which specific rating techniques are employed to determine 
the price to be paid by usually very large insureds. 
Monoline Policies 
These policies provide bodily injury (B.I.) and property damage (P.D.) 
liability coverage specifically for the product liability hazard of the insured. 
The basic limits of liability are $25,000 for each occurrence and $50,000 in the 
aggregate for all bodily injury claims arising out of occurrences during the 
policy period and $5,000 for property damage resulting from one occurrence, subject 
to an aggregate policy limit of $25,000 for all property damage claims. Increased 
144 
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liability for both Bodily Injury (B.I.) and Property Damage (P.D.) 
be provided to those insureds desiring additional coverage. 
The rules, classifications and rates for product liability coverage are 
found in the Product Liability Manual. The current classification plan defines 
over 400 separate classifications reflecting the major revision of 1974. At 
that time, approximately 120 of the then existing classifications were deleted and 
replaced with over 220 new classifications to provide a more refined breakdown 
the types of product risks. In addition, many classes which had been (a) rated 
became manual rated and several manual rated classes became (a) rated. (The 
difference will be explained shortly.) 
The most common units of exposure, that is, the bases used for determining 
premium charge, are each $1,000 of sales or each $1,000 of receipts. There 
are several product classifications which have a specific unit exposure base more 
directly related to the particular class, e.g., number of tons, 
number of gallons. 
of fillings, 
For most of the defined classes (approximately 65%-75%) a rate will be shown 
the rate pages of the ISO manual. For the risk (insured) assigned to one of 
classes, the premium is calculated by multiplying the number of exposure 
units by the appropriate rate. This calculation produces the basic limits premium 
coverage, i.e., B.I. or P.D. and if higher limits of coverage are desired, 
increased limits table is consulted to determine an appropriate factor by which 
raise premiums to reflect the increased coverage. 
The product liability manual rates are based on a review of countrywide 
under previous product liability policies. A complete explanation of 
the ratemaking procedures used by ISO is attached. 
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manual 
) fs shown instead. 
There are many classifications defined in the ISO product 
for which no rate is indicated on the rate pages, but the 
Approximately 25%-35% of the total number of classes are rated For the risks 
(insureds) to which these classes apply, the responsibility for the 
appropriate rate lies with the underwriter of the insurer who 
is responsible for risk acceptance). A statistically valid manual rate which would be 
appropriate for each insured in the (a) rated classes cannot be determined because of 
the extreme variability in their underlying hazard. 
A good example of an (a) rated class is "valve manufacturers." Risks within 
this classification differ widely in the hazard that each , since such a 
variety of valves is manufactured, all with completely different applications. 
It is intuitively obvious, for example, that manufacturers of valves to be used 
in jet aircraft present a different risk than manufacturers of valves to be used 
in plumbing in private homes. In addition, different valve manufacturers may 
have different degrees of design capability, result in differences 
Because of the importance of these and similar factors, rates are determined for 
each of these risks separately, based upon judgment and 
acteristics peculiar to the risk. 
ISO does make available to its companies suggested 
as a rough indication of the average rate that would be 
fication as a whole, but might not be appropriate for any 
classification. 
of al char-
rates which are intended 
for the classi-
risk defined 
While insureds covered by a monoline policy may be small, medium even 
risks, those purchasing a package policy or those 
loss rated, and large (a) rated are large risks. Also, within 
covered by monoline policies 
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The package policy premium is generally determined by using the monoline rates, 
modified a package discount. The large body of these 
multiline policies is currently not included in the monoline data base 
since the statistics are not recorded in sufficient detail to identify sublines. 
Although aggregate figures are unavailable, it is generally believed that multiline 
policies do generate substantial products experience. 
The new ISO Commercial Statistical Plan (CSP) being for 
implementation will capture complete detailed product liability statistics on a 
monoline basis for all multiline policies. Consequently, in the future it will 
be possible to combine-the data produced under CSP with the monoline 
(a) rated) data for ratemaking purposes. 
and 
Composite Rated, Loss Rated & Large (a) Rated Policies 
These insurance policies may provide coverage on a monoline or multiline 
(package) basis and are distinguished from the prior two broad 
distinctive rating procedure used in determining the 
these procedures tend to be very large and the rating 
tiated between the insurer and insured. 
Insureds rated under 
Composite Rating 
Composite rating was developed as an alternative to manual 
larger risks which present many different types of exposure 
may be 
for the 
under 
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smaller risks. Product liability has changed the 
of and :its to current 
ISO :insurer committees. 
This third group of composite rated, loss rated and rated risks 
generates a greater volume of total experience than of the two groups 
previously described, but that experience is for all of the coverages which are 
included in those policies. The product liability of that 
not be but it is known that a significant amount of the 
hazard is insured under policies rated by thHse devices 
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The chart on the next page shows the steps required to process product data after 
end a year It explains the time necessary to collect: edit, summarize 
these statistics properly. The time intervals shown on the chart are 
, and anticipate no delays due to erroneous reportings that cannot be cor-
rected the reporting company within a reasonable time. 
The at the top of the chart refer to processing of premium rather than 
loss statistics, since premiums are reported last and therefore have the significant 
upon the production schedule. 
Explanation of Processing Phases 
A policy year experience period includes all policies written in year 1 which ultimately 
during year 2 • 
. Exposures and Premiums are valued by companies as of June 30 
Six months are allowed after the end of the polity year to audit the insured's 
sales during the policy period. 
Exposures and Premiums are Reported to ISO 
Company submissions are due at ISO 4 months after the June 30 valuation. 
Balance, Edit and Return Errors 
The company submissions are balanced to letters of transmittal and edited 
for statistical accuracy. Invalid data are returned to the company 
for correction. 
are corrected by the reporting company and returned to ISO, 
where they are reprocessed (including re-examination). 
Consolidate with Existing Data Base and Produce Preliminary Reports 
The data for the latest accounting period are sorted and consolidated with the 
for prior accounting periods. Preliminary reports of the data 
are produced for analytical purposes. 
Review Preliminary Reports 
The preliminary reports of the ratemaking data are edited by the Data Services 
Division of ISO for reasonableness, based on guidelines established by the 
Actuarial Division of ISO. Questionable data are tracked to the source 
verification or correction. 
reports have been edited, and any errors found corrected, 
exhibits required by the Actuarial Division are produced. 
and Develops Rate Level Indications 
tuarial Division evaluates the ratemaking data and develops the rate 
level indications. 
rate level indications are presented to the Governing Committee for approval. 
- Rate fi are prepared, rates are calculated and fi sent to the 
rooriate ISO state office for filing with Insurance 156 
Process! Phase 
Experience Period 
E.,oosures and PreMiums are 
va1•Jed by companies as of 
June 30 
Exposures and Premiums are 
reported to !SO 
bposures and Premiums are 
bala~ced and edited errors e 
retur·ned 
(o~any corrects and return' 
errors 
Error corrections are processed 
at I 
Consolidate with existing data 
base and produce preliminary 
reports 
1lng 
P~oducts liability Insurance 
Present Schedule for Processing Products lfabilfty Insurance Statistics 
Yec:.c 3 Year 4 
~ ·- . -· ·~· -··· ··-
=~ p 
I 

• 
• 
PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE 
RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES 
Attachment 4 
To appreciate fully the product liability insurance situation, a basic understanding 
of the fundamental principles used in pricing this line of insurance is essential. 
This memorandum presents the ratemaking procedures used Insurance Services Office 
(ISO). Several companies which write product liability insurance do not use the 
rates developed by ISO, but employ their own ratemaking methoaology. The basic 
concepts and teminology in determining manual rates, however, are common to all 
insurers. Additionally, it must be kept in mind that many product liability risks 
are subject to (a) rating. 
The price, or rate, for "basic limits" coverage is determined by an analysis of the 
actual countrywide experience under policies written in the past, separately (but 
using the same procedure) for bodily injury and property damage. Basic limits 
coverage provides up ~o $25,000 for each occurrence and $50,000 in the aggregate 
for all bodily injury claims arising out of occurrences during the year the 
is in force. ISO uses this 25/50 coverage as its base for ratemaking purposes. 
The corresponding property damage basic limits are $5,000/$25,000. 
For product liability insurance as with other liability lines, is 
reviewed and analyzed on a "policy year" basis. That means that losses incurred 
on policies written in a given 12-month period are compared with earned 
on those same policies. The experience for policy year 1972, for , would 
consist of the premiums and losses on all policies with effective dates from 
January 1, 1972 through December 31, 1972 and expiration dates varying from 
January 1, 1973 to December 31, 1973, assuming all are in effect for one 
year . 
When analyzing experience for ratemaking purposes, the premium used in the 
is that which would be produced if the current rates were to be charged to each 
insured. The losses used in the formula are incurred losses, as describEd below. 
As stated previously, the rates are for basic limits coverage so that 
used in the formula are based upon the current rates for each clas fication 
insured and the losses are also considered only up to that limit . 
The incurred losses may be defined as the amount of money or le 
claimants including the amount of expenses involved in handling the claims. 
This figure consists of those losses and related loss ustment expenses 
paid and reserves set aside to cover known occurrences. Such reserves represent 
the best estimates by experienced claims persons for each individual case that 
has been reported. Each case reserve gives consideration to the nature and extent 
of the bodily injury and/or property damage involved, the merits of the case, 
current jury award patterns, the state of the law, and all other relevant factors. 
The first report of thes.e incurred losses and their related expenses, called loss 
adjustment expenses, encompasses losses evaluated three months after the close o 
policy year, which is 27 months after the beginning of the year. The first 
report of policy year 1972, for example, covers losses evaluated as of March 31, 
1974. All such reports submitted to ISO by individual insurers are consolidated 
and the aggregate figure is used in the ratemaking process. 
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Rising claims, Both 
lawsuits 
Price reflects 
loss 
the insurance 
voluntary 
propriate 
Cost less than 
1% of sales 
cannot obtain products 
price of many products."1 
report says that only 
tain products 
2. The cost of insurance has not had a major 
impact on the purchase price of most products. Research 
ducted by McKinsey & for the Federal Task Force, and 
separate research conducted the Insurance Services Of· 
fice,2 both document this conclusion. The Federal Task Force 
report says, "our data shows that aside from a number of limited 
situations in the products in· 
surance accounts for less than 1 % as a percentage of 
3. The casualty insurance has sustained finan· 
cia! losses on its products business in recent years, and 
is now taking steps to obtain more and more detailed 
information3 on the risk exposures those losses. 
4. Rising costs of 
insurers to devote more 
liability prevention 
availability problems. 
from a variety of sources: 
0 Manufacturer groups have testified before 
Federal Interagency Task Force, NAIC 
legislative 
statutes of limitations, 
ucts, and other reforms. 
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changes and 
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fold: To insurance 
unable to obtain adequate coverage 
to provide such coverage 
added) 
accounts As has already been noted, 
separate residual market 
cost of paying for the claims 
has absolutely no effect on the 
residual market plan or 
way a residual market plan 
would be to subsidize the plan 
some external source. The 
will be discussed in another section. 
Geographical Considerations 
liability insurance. 
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Product life 
hours or years 
12 
the loss exposure. If a products liability plan is not to per· 
mit normal underwriting by insurers, then it must designate 
someone else to do the job and specify the criteria to be used. 
Framers of a products liability plan also would have to determine 
whether the plan would accept obviously poor financial risks, ex-
tremely large risks (e.g., General Motors), and manufacturers of 
very hazardous products such as explosives and aircraft. If not, 
where is the line to be drawn and who makes the decision? 
Requirements also would have to be established for the extent of 
participation in the plan. For example, if a product manufacturer, 
supplier or seller applies for coverage in the plan, must he place 
in the plan ali products, locations and coverage levels, or will he 
be permitted to choose portions of his product risK to put in the 
plan? To put it another way, should a firm be permitted to insure 
its non-hazardous products in the voluntary market at favorable 
rates, and to place its hazardous risks in the plan at subsidized 
rates? If not, how would the eligibility requirement apply to 
conglomerates? 
Rating Considerations 
Determination of rates for product liability insurance differs sub-
stantially from the situation that exists for other lines of insurance 
where residual market plans have been created. Medical 
malpractice coverage, for example, involves a relatively few 
classifications of doctors and other health care providers. 
Automobiles and homes represent relatively homogenous risk 
exposures. All workers compensation risks are subject to a very 
elaborate classification system, developed over a long period of 
time, which sorts out variations in occupational exposures. 
By contrast, there are thousands of different kinds of products 
on the market, some with a life as short as a few hours and 
others capable of remaining in use for 1 00 years or longer. The 
infinite variety and magnitude of risks involved in underwriting the 
177 
Voluntary market 
disruptions 
Subsidy is 
critical factor 
liability exposure of those would confront any 
market plan with a difficult if not impossible classification and 
rating problem. Most product manufacturers who would be likely 
to seek coverage in such a plan are insured today under 
liability policies which lump the product risk with the 
manufacturer's various other liability exposures. Rates 
monly are set on a judgment basis, based on an extensive 
derwriting investigation of each manufacturer's 
posures, claims experience and loss control n<>lrTI""\Irm<>nr 
Considering the complexities involved, it is difficult to see how 
the plan would be able to develop credible rates on a small group 
of worse-than-average risks - especially when losses won't be 
fully known for years. 
Impact on Voluntary Insurance 
The existence of a residual market plan could well have 
devastating effect on the voluntary insurance market The 
eligibility criteria, the degree of subsidy involved, the rate 
classification used, loss control requirements, and the economic 
incentives involved, allowances to insurers and 
missions to producers, could all influence the extent 
ticipation in the plan. 
For example, when the commissions available to 
higher for risks placed in the plan than in the voluntary market, 
there could be a heavy influx of risks into the plan. The 
element is the total number of dollars of commission 
by the transaction, regardless of whether it results from 
commission rate or a low rate applied to higher premiums. 
Similarly, allowances to insurers for company expense could 
create advantages for some companies as compared to others. 
The amount of subsidy obviously is a critical factor. If 
manufacturers can obtain coverage in the at 
178 
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lower rates than those available in the 
numbers of risks will 
part of their cost of doing business to their competitors, to other 
insurance policyholders, or to the taxpayer. (In Massachusetts, 
for example, the automobile residual market plan produced 
losses in excess of premiums amounting to about $1 63 per car 
in 1975 - a net loss equivalent to more than $29 for every 
registered car in the state.) 
This process could quickly up the market, wors· 
ening the availability problems which the plan was intended to 
alleviate. It also is likely to encourage some insurers to pull out of 
that state or cease offering coverages that would subject them to 
the burdens of participation in the plan. 
Claims and Loss Control Services 
The interstate and even international dispersion of the 
liability risk creates difficult problems for a residual risk plan 
established on a limited geographical basis. It would be difficult 
for a state fund, for example, to provide claims and loss control 
services on a countrywide basis or international basis, Similar 
problems would confront many of the insurance carriers who 
might be forced to participate in the plan, if they 
in· 
surers might have in providing adequate services for a 
highly specialized product exposure unless they had 
insured such risks and had developed the specialized expertise 
required. 
The services to be provided by the plan are as important as the 
coverages. For example, would the plan provide a form of in-
rest 
upon the insured? Defense costs add substantially to the losses 
incurred under the products liability coverage. On the other 
hand, an inadequate or inept investigation and defense would ex-
pose the plan's assets to excessive awards or settlements, 
limits on 
risk capacity 
Quality of Coverage 
One of the major tasks involved in the design of a residual market 
plan is to define what coverages the plan will provide. 
What choices will the plan offer as to policy limits, deductibles, 
excess coverages, co-insurance, premium payment plans? What 
types of rating plans will be offered? What policy limits will be 
provided? 
Another key decision is whether coverage will be offered on a 
"claims incurred" or "claims made" basis. A decision to switch 
to a "claims made" basis involves complexities that require more 
extensive study than is possible in the scope of this paper. 
Insuring Capacity and Solidity 
Any plan, regardless of how subsidized or by whom organized, 
will have a maximum risk-carrying capacity. Therefore, some 
provision must be made for limiting the liability of the plan, in-
cluding criteria for detennining when the plan has reached its 
maximum insuring capacity, and some provision for restricting 
the acceptance of new business when the plan has reached its 
maximum safe capacity. 
A plan also should include contingency arrangements in the 
event that losses exceed the assets or the assessment limits of 
the plan. It may have to purchase reinsurance or have contingent 
access to the tax base in order to handle shock losses. 
The legislatures of most states have enacted medical malprac-
tice legislation designed to make this coverage self-supporting, 
including stabilization funds and provisions for premium tax off-
sets to cover any excess losses that might occur. 
15 
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V. Conclusion and Recommendation 
ommends against regulatory 
non-voluntary residual market mechanism for products 
We believe the 
on a voluntary basis within each state. 
' U. S Commerce Department Interagency Task Force on 
(hereafter "Commerce Report"). p. 40 
2 Insurance Servrces ·-orsplay of Suggested ISO Product Lrabilrty 
Classrficatrons rn Between January 1973 and De·cernbrlr 
1976 
• Commerce Report, 
Office, Product Lrabrlity 
Procedures, December 1976 
s Statement of policy adopted by the Independent 
Inc., January 20, 1977. 
s Letter dated January 24, 1 Phdrp H. Dutter of 
to Homer Moyer, U.S. Department of 
7 Brummond, Report to NAIC D·2 SubcomrrHttee on Products Lrabrhty. NrrvernhE" 
29, 1976. 
a Commerce Report, p 11 
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Section 3. The Problem of Availability and the Recorrmended 
Voluntary Harket Mechanism 
While we know of no evidence that there exists a 
••crisis 11 with respect to the unavailability of products 1 
insurance in the United States, 1 there is a great deal of 
1 
that some products liability risks have not and apparently cannot 
find a market for their insurance needs. For these risks a si 
may exist, and there is therefore an availability problem which 
must be addressed. 
To understand this availability problem requires a bas 
understanding of the products liability insurance market. It is 
market of markedly varying exposures. Each risk is almost 
unto itself. Each presents an exposure which will differ 
from others within the same industry and even with respect to 
product lines produced by the same risk. It is the function of 
insurance underwriter to assess each risk based on the obta 
facts pertaining to it and to price it accordingly. Even sks 
are within a classification for which a manual rate exists must 
assessed in terms of any extraordinary loss potential which might 
exist. 
1 
The January 1, 1977 Briefing Report of the Federal Interagency Ta 
Force on Product Liability, included as a major finding the state~ent 
"3. Only a few conpanies have been unable to obtain t 
liability insurance. The problem appears to be ~ore one 
of affordability, than availability." (Executive . 11 
This statement is consistent with specific information a 
number of states. Insurers writing products liability insurance are 
generally continuing to provide viable markets consistent with under-
writing standards and pricing flexibility. There are no indic 
that the products market is disappearing. Contrast this th 
malpractice market for individual physicians and surgeons where 
former writers of the coverage have virtually withdrawn from 
market. 
• 
The exercise of sound underwriting judgment is c 
ability of the insurer to produce a 
of business and to minimize the for susta 
underwriting losses on it. 
These underwriting judgments require a highly 
knowledge of the exposures presented, and a wel 
will, from its home office, its branch 
producers, apply essentially the same sophisticated isa 
all the business presented to it. Although judgments of 
company underwriters may vary somewhat one from the 
dependent on the individuals' varying experience 
it is the insurer's objective to maintain substantial 
sistency in these judgments. 
The collective judgments exerci by a company 
s 
to 
1 
1 con-
pricing, or rejecting business wi its ts 
for the line. An individual company's exposure to 
of business is enormous. 
s on 
A company's judgment on a sk 11 depend on many 
frequently will require an assessment, among other things, of 
1 
risk's management experience and competence, its past pro 
implementation of essential loss and aims control measures, its 
quality control program, the nature of the product, ts 
which it sells, ther it is a new product or an older t 
ma11ufactured in a rent way, its distribution tern, r 
the product is to be a component of another product, sne 
of that other product, and, overall, a determination of the s 
exposure to loss relative to the limits of exposure sought 
premium necessary to cover the exposure to loss and the rer's 
losses, expenses, and a margin for profit and contingencies 
re the greater unpredictability and vo 
of so much of this business. 
The individual risks written present exposures not only to 
losses but also to loss adjustment claims handling expenses 
great magnitude. Minimum premium requirements are in fact 
on the high cost of handling product liability claims, whe 
liability for loss is established. The 32.1% ratio of loss us 
expenses to losses for the general liability line of business, of 
products liability is a major component, is one of the highest 
line insurance (compare it to 15.9% for private pas 
and 26.1% for medical malpractice insurance); for products 1 
insurance the ratio is 42.8%1 . 
For some risks the premium may even be equal to or 
the limits of coverage provided. This would be the case 
risk is subject to a high claim frequency and it is opting, 
to buy the insurer's claims services, possibly in order to 
the risk's access to the major excess and surplus lines 
For other risks the premium will be substantially lower 
relation to the limits of coverage afforded. 
r 
For most risks the premium can be derived as a funct s 
but in viewing the relationship between sales and premium, ri 
a greater potential for loss will generally be paying a 
is a higher percentage of sales than less hazardous enterprise 
Woven th~oughout the entire fabric of the products 1 
insurance market are a nu~ber of other highly significant 
1 
ISO Closed Claims Survey, December, 1976, p. 78. (High cost 
from legal fees and other defense costs) 
. ' 
to bear in mind: 
1. 
2. 
are numerous 
liability insurance, 
lines markets; 
Not all may be writing in 
same time; 
1 
1 j ns 
3. Products liability insurance 
state in which the risk's princ off 
plant, administrative office, is located, or 
other state; 
4. The coverage provided covers insured no matter 
5. 
6. 
where the loss occurs or 
in the U.S. or Canada, so 
be legally liable for it; 
In writing products 1 li 
a judgment is 
as the 
surance 
is providing coverage losses 
policy period which may have arisen out of 
manufactured scores of years r --
is, in effect, "buying the tail" (compared to 
medical malpractice where it is "selling 
Each of the insurers providing a products 1 
insurance market operates entirely i 
the in underwriting (which includes 
acceptance, rejection, or renewal of bus 
except where bureau manual rates are appl 
pricing -- what one insurer may not find 
others may accept willingly; 
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7. The producer through whom a risk seeks coverage may 
not represent or do business with an insurer· will 
to write the business, but other producers may 
sent an insurer which does write such coverage; 
8. Some producers, like some companies, are more or ss 
sophisticated than others in developing essential 
information about a products liability risk and in 
finding a market in which to place it, including a 
surplus lines market or a market to satisfy any excess 
limit ·needs; 
9. Anticipated loss adjustment expenses, which are genera 
high in relation to losses for this line of business, 
can vary greatly between classes of products risks, 
must be considered in appropriately pricing the 
particular risk: and 
10. The very sreat disparity between types of risks, 
even between different product lines produced by the 
same risk, with respect to loss development and trend 
factors. 
It is evident that products liability insurance is a highly 
sophisticated line of business which depends greatly on the 
exercise of prudent underwriting judgment in reviewing and pric 
business. Substantial underwriting and pricing flexibility is 
generally available, however, underwriting results for general 
188 
• I 
I 
liability insurance during the past several years have ve 
unprofitable. 1 
results for general liability insurance appear to be 
management attitudes towards the products market appear to 
positive than negative. Nevertheless there is a concern on 
of insureds and producers with the availability of 
insurance. 
So it was in Connecticut where on Decerrber 10, 1976, at a mee 
held by the Insurance Department, large numbers of 
manufacturers, and dynamite blasters turned up to claim 
products liability insurance was not available to them. 
The insurance industry responded with a request for an 
Advisory Committee in Connecticut to be appointed by the Insurance 
Commissioner to review all speci legations and 
mitted, to assist producers in placing business, and 
extensions of coverage or renewals of expiring policies 
location of alternative markets. 
The Committee's Cnderwriting Task Force, within a two 
span, under virtually impossible crash conditions was able to 
its way through stacks of alleged complaints submitted 
agents' associations and the Commissioner's office. At end 
that period the Committee reported to the Commissioner that out 
of almost 165 compl nts, 34 required a renewal or extension 
1 
The products liability exposure is one of the major components 
the general liability line of business. Underwriting results 
line in 1973, 1974, and 1975 were 117.1%, 125.9%, and 116.5% respect-
ively (A.M.Best Review and Preview, January 3, 1977). The 1975 r-
writing result for g.l., excluding medical malpractice, the first ar 
it became available on an industry basis, was 114.3%. 
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of coverage and the Committee was able to effectuate one or 
thus a the Task Force to assist 
seeking out alternative markets, that only five ri 
availability problem, and of these two involved dis 
foreign devices {a French campstove and a Japanese 
container) who failed to seek vendor's coverage from 
one involved a newly patented device designed to melt tumors 
which insufficient information had been provided, but is now 
sought, and two involved manufacturers whose products 1 li 
coverage currently excluded coverage for the aircra 
manufactured and who were not aware of labili 
coverage through the U.S.A.I.G. 
The Commissioner responded with 
performed by the Committee and continued 
the future. 
The Committee's effectiveness '\vas 
critical factors: 
praise for 
and 
is dependent on 
work 
1. Shortly after· the Co~uittee's appointment at 
invitation of the Committee the Connecticut Associ 
of Insurance Agents joined it and provided 
of a highly knowledgeable staff member to work 
the Underwriting Task Force in contacting 
and companies, in delineating problems, in 
extens s of coverage or s, in 
alternative markets, and in providing informa 
producers on the pricing and placing of s 
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without this cooperative effort the Committee 
not have been fully responsive to the Commis 
charge; 
2. A cadre of company underwriters from leading 
of products liability insurance who worked 
and effectively in utilizing all available resources 
including local casualty underwriting managers 
several companies; 
3. A viable, responsive products liability insurance 
market; and 
4. An Insurance Corr~issioner who was willing to 
voluntary good faith effort on the part of the 
industry before invoking an involuntary 
and who, when convinced of the diligence and 
effectiveness of the voluntary effort shelved 
involuntary mechanism as not needed. 1 
sm, 
The Connecticut experience serves to verify prior asser 
the term "crisis" may be a misnomer if applied to the ts 
market. There may be, however, market problems involving this 1 
of business which should be addressed. 
It is herein proposed that in any jurisdiction in which 
regulator has received a substantial number of current comp 
from producers or sks with respect to the availability 
liability insurance, or in which the regulator otherwise s rea 
ts 
to believe that a market problem exists, the regulator 11 contact 
1 
Other regulators, most recently the New Hampshire Conoois 
have continued to be of similar disposition. 
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the Chairman of the Industry Advisory Committee to the NAIC Ta 
Force on Products Liability or a special subcommittee to 
for the function to determine whether a local committee is 
and, if appropriate, to assist in the appointment of a 
Advisory Committee for the particular state to be organi 
authorized to act in the manner indicated below. 
It is recommended that the Committee be composed 
1. An appropriate number of licensed producers 
with knowledge and background in underwriting 
and pricing products liability businessi 
2. Knowledgeable representatives of four or more 
insurers writing products liability insurance 
in the state; and 
3. The Insurance Department. 
The Committee shall utilize all available expertise 
resources, incl~ding, but not limited to the and assistance 
appropriate cowmittees of producer associations, and 
managers of insurers. 
al ca 
The duties of this Corr~ittee shall include: 
1. Reviewing all products liability insurance 
problems referred to it by the Commissioner to be 
certain that all markets have been explored 
assist controlling producers in placing business 
where necessary; 
2. Negotiating extensions of coverage with prior 
carrier where necessary to permit additional 
exploration of the market or accumulation of 
needed underwriting data; 
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3. 
4 . 
Where the Committee is otherwise 
the producer in otherwise a 
e to assi 
a 
voluntary acmitted or surplus s t 
Cowmittee shall encourage the development of 
alternative voluntary markets, including a 
program involving the use of volunteering 
insurers participating in a voluntary 
reinsurance agreement with other volunteering 
under which qualified risks can be referred on a 
by risk basis for underwriting and pricing and 
or rejection; 
The Committee-shall not ss frequently 
report to the regulator on its activi s, 
include in such report its assessment of 
availability problems with its recowmenda ons, 
any, with respect to therni and 
5. The Committee must, at all times, func 
the caveat that no referral program can 
underwriting judgment or pricing flexibili , mus 
not be viewed as an invitation to dumping, 
be responsive as a voluntary mechanism and not 
or be viewed as that which it was created to 
i.e.~ a mandatory pool, or as a compe tor 
voluntary market. 
It is our judgment, backed up now by our expe 
that the most meaningful response possible to products li 
availability problems without jeopardizing the present 
voluntary market is an Industry Advisory Committee to 
as herein described, created and appointed by the regulator in 
state having sufficient problems to warrant its ere 
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Section 5. Tort Reform. Why Is It 
What Are the Proposals? 
The Committee pointed out earlier 
1? 
problem is one of cost. Cost is a factor at 
the standpoint of an insurer. The risk of loss 
either as a result of the chance of a disastrous 
frequency of losses that the risk is no longer 
case insurance is not available at any cost. Or 
large loss or the frequency of recurring sses 
great that the premium which must be 
this case the insurer is willing to 
is either unwilling or in extreme ca s 
are dealing here with commercial 
of doing business, but in some case 
with jumbo exposures, the problems 
One possible solution to the cost 
preserve the current tort system wi 
government. This seems impractical at 
questionable at the federal level where 
Are 
3 
cost s 
is 
other needs is low particularly if alternate prac 
The fast, easy and impractical solution is some 
market mechanism insurers are to te 
faults of such a system have been pointed out 
section. 
The only practical way to meet is to 
and in turn the cost. Recognition of this fact has resu 
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ac 
by many of the possibilities and areas of tort reform. 
Your committee does not view its current such 
recommend any one program or attempt to des a 
time was not available. However, the CoiDmittee has 
its obligations to the Task Force in this area by (1) 
collect information on at least some of the parties 
field, (2) to provide an outline of the subjects poss 
using as basis a paper which is incorporated prepared for 
the trade associations, (3) incorporating a statement by 
Insurance Agenta showing a representative position of a 
organization and (4) attaching to the Committee's bas 
report addressed to Judge Price copies of a number of 
currently being considered. 
A partial list of those active the area of tort re 
prepared by Paul Kipp and is as follows: 
1. THE MULTI-ASSOCIATION ACTION CO.HI..UTTEE an ad 
sponsored by the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Assoc 
This committee has twenty-one state action committees 
established that will strive for tort reform as set 
in Kansas Senate Bill 852 (Revised)~ We under 
fifty trade associations are members of this ad 
2. THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE has drafted a posi 
paper calling for tort reform. 
3. TEE RISK AND INSURANCE MANAGEMENT SOCIETY. It 
a report of its Task Force on Tort Reform, has 
its membership and made the results of the 
s 
ava 
rs 
to the D-2 Committee of the NAIC, to the Inter-
1 
Renurr~ered S.B. 2007. 
agency Task Force and to the Californ zens 
mittee on Product Liability. It is also ho 
on product liability and tort s 
It is supporting the efforts MAAC. 
4. THE ~~RICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION has drafted tort 
reform legislation. 
5. THE AMERICAN MUTUAL INSUR&~CE ALLIANCE is 
tort reform in the various states. 
6. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS is 
seeking tort reform in the various states. 
7. RETORT, INC. 
8. 
c/o Hr. E. H. Rosenberg 
Thomson National Press Co. 
Franklin, Massachusetts. 02038 
U.S. SENATOR PEARSON OF KANSAS has introduced 
calling for a national product liability 
s 
9. THE SENATE SELECT CO~~ITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS ADMINI 
is sponsoring legislation that will make 
available for small business risks. 
Those who have or are conducting surveys or stud s 
1. Retort Inc. 
2. National Machine Tool Builders Assoc. 
3. Farm and Industrial Equipment Institute 
4. The Risk and Insurance Management Society 
5. The A:r:lerican ~1utual Insurance Alliance 
6. The Insurance Services Office (Closed Claim S 
7. The Federal Interagency Task Force 
8. The Machinery and Allied Products Institute 
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9. Various Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturer Assoc 
10. Insurance Information Institute (Movie) 
Others interested in the problem: 
1. Independent Insurance Agents of America 
85 John Street 
New York, New York. 10038 
2. American Machine Tool Distributors Association 
1500 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
3. Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
1615 "H" Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20063 
c/o Andrew A. Melgard, Director, 
Economic Security, Education and Manpower Section 
4. Massachusetts Bar Association 
One Center Plaza 
Boston, Massachusetts. 02108 
c/o George N. Keches, Legislative Counsel 
5. National Federation of Independent Business 
150 West Twentieth Avenue 
San Mateo, California. 94403 
c/o George J. Burger, Jr., Assistant to President 
6. National Tool, Die & Precision Machining Association 
9300 Livingston Road 
Washington, D.C. 20022 
William E. Hardman 
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7. New York State Bar Association 
One Elk Street 
Albany, New York. 12207 
c/o Mr. John E. Birny 
8. National Association of Manufacturers 
1776 "F" Street, N.W. 
9. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
c/o Richard D. Godown, Senior Vice President 
General Counsel 
Nissen Corporation 
930 - 27th Avenue, S.W. 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 
c/o Robert J. Bevencur, Executive Vice President 
10. Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce 
222 North Third Street 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 17101 
11. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
1620 "I" Street, N.W. 
12. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
c/o C. Thomas Bendorf, Director, National Af rs 
The Ohio Manufacturers Association 
100 East Broad Street 
Columbus, Ohio. 43215 
c/o Virginia D. Thrall, Assistant Director 
Midwestern Office 
13. U.S. Small Business Administration 
Washington, D.C. 20416 
c/o Maureen c. Glcbes 
100 
14. Valve Manufacturers Ass~~~ 
6845 Elm Street, Suite 
I VA. 22101 
c/o William Hopf 
There have been a substantia: ==~~ ~- --==-=-
posals for tort reform. The best -·----:: 
mittee could find was prepared fo:- ::::= ==. - -:::= ===-== ~.::::.::..=.:::.-===..s 
outlining the subjects generally "";=...::...:.. = _ .::.:.:...=; ~-:::::=..:_; :::..::-
incorporation in a program as wel:. =.; .::== -=-----= ::=;.:.._:::_ __ :..::.:...=-::;. 
In incorporating this paper in the ---
-=-=---
emphasize again that it does not ========= 
fact the introductory language to -:::.::= :::=:::.:::= ~~::.:...::=. =::-:._:...::...;;: ::;c :..nts 
out that it is merely a discussio~ ~ - ----- ----- -- -
- --- --------
a comparison of them. 
The outline is as follows: 
1. Statute of limitations. -
---
change in the statu:::.:: ::::::: :..::= :::=..-.::..::..=...= ---:::::. =---;::.. 
--- - --
product related injury ~-~ 
product manufacturers t~~- -- -- --
----
the product which has b;:=:. :::-= ::::::: ::::::::: 
manufacturer for 10 or : = _-==::= :::........::. 
injury which will be t~~ ::::. --= ~- :::::-
------
the turer. 
There is no desire --- -------
-----
::..~.::..::::.2..1."1 t 
from s r i g h t to seek ::--:--=::::..2-:::.::..:::=. :. __ ::=;:.:-;:::.::::.:-
caused injury. However, =:=:::::::: =..=-: .:::= ==== ::-=-=.:-:::::..::...:::e 
balance tween the ric;==:. -- _ ----'="--.=-...;;--=--- _ -'= 
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2. 
for his injuries and the of a 
have some basis to determine the length of s 
potential liability. 
Generally, the thrust of 
under consideration by the associations 
the statute of limitations begin to run 
the manufacturer first sold the product, or 
time that he was parted from the ssess 
and run for a specified period of years 
6 to 12, thereafter. 
Product modification and alteration. is 
agreement that there should be a defense to a 
liability action if the resulted 
a product which has been ified or alte 
other than the defendant. There have 
which manufactuers have held liable 
resulting from products have been 
altered subsequent to leaving the manufacturer' 
and in some instances, altered to the po 
the purpose for which the product was 
Manufacturers should be able to rely on 
a product will be used in substantial the 
it was manufactured and for the purpose 
manufactured. In addition, they should be 
on the t that eventual users of the product 
reasonable maintenance of the product. 
3. State of the art defenses. It is felt that a manu 
should have a determination of whether or not a 
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4. 
was based upon 
state of the art in existence at 
was Determination of 
technical knowledge 
itself subsequent to the 
product. 
liability of the manufacturer 
available to him at 
or 
acture of 
and not on the subsequent change in techno 
or manufacturing techniques which been 
come into common use. Neither should liabili 
changes or modifications or 
f product or any similar 
manufacture or in any such 
ect to the injury on which 
islation could be 
technological knowledge, 
st-accident repair or 
1 and plan the j 's 
s made in 
the state of the art was at 
was manufactured. 
state of the art defense is most 
val in so-called design defect cases. In 
1 te cost to benefit and lance 
a manu turer must make ought not to become jury 
if is is made in accord with 
accepted practice. 
Reasonable limitations shou 
upon manufacturer's duty to truct us 
202 
• 
5. 
product and duty to warn of 
not be required to foresee all 
product might be put, 
foresee the consequences 
A manufacturer should be 
which is reasonably safe for 
provide instructions in the use 
reasonably prudent and a person can 
He should also be required to warn 
might make the product unfit for 
might not be readily recogni 
Legislative proposals are 
a 
mitigate the manufacturer's of 
ing against almost unlimi poss 
be associated with the use s 
or 
In many cases involving to warn 
of hazard and the absence a 
supported other elements of a 
efforts have been made to e 
plaintiff should be required to prove 
involved actually caused the 
the plaintiff would have responded to 
alternate actions, and that had 
the warning lesser harm would have 
Punitive damages. It is general 
punitive damages have gone far 
they were originally conceived, not 
liability area, but in other areas 
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tort 
re 
t 
unconsc 
of 
It 
concept in 
cases in which the 
, a penalty upon 
ured party. However 
damages have become an 
complaint whether or not 
noted that a 
against a corporate manufacturer the 
punitive damages is borne by the 
s s 
was 
ts 
I S 
did not participate in the wrongful act or, more 1 
the company's 
are mass produced, the spectre 
damages in a series of ac 
is also present. 
is generally agreed that 
right to 
of punitive 
desirable to el 
1 actions. However, o 
can be developed 
tive damages are 
ther:1. in mer 
ts are those 
ir desirabili 
s. Some 
cases. 
ch 
f 
upon iability problem. 
been s 
' 
upon which is not a 
are curren under s Some 
as 
a. Governmen It has 
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e 
11 
re 
s 
0 
r 
I 
a products 1 
complies 
a 
lity action, evidence that a 
e federal or state standards 
to des or 
or 
the t was not 
create a de 
This could take 
form 
In 
ments from 
preclude liabil 
standards. 
or a rebuttable presump 
s been suggested that evidence 
standards are mandatory 
a manufacturer cannot deviate 
if the product complies ~~i th 
b. Codification of the theory of strict liability. 
c. 
Although a majority of states have adopted the 
of strict liability in tort with respect to 
the which the theory is appl 
widely state to state. 
It has been sted that in those states 
adopted a doctrine of strict liability, an 
made to s 
be necessary 
def 
and "unrea 
that the 
a 
the case is 
s 
y set out the conditions whi 
the doctrine to be opposed, 
terminology as "defec 
dangerous." 
It s 
demand in most claims no longer ha 
to sum \vhich would actual 
or a relationship to 
ly worth. In is 
1 money judgments tend to 
2 5 
d 
in the minds of the public and juries the value of a 
particular personal injury case. 
It has therefore been suggested that pleadings demand-
ing relief in the form of unliquidated damages make a 
prayer for general relief and, if necessary, state that 
the amount claimed is within the jurisdictional limits 
of the court. 
d. Reduction of unnecessary litigation through the elimination 
of lien and subrogation rights of the employer and his 
worker's compensation insurer. Employers and their 
compensation carriers have been active in the pursuit 
of worker's compensation lines in subrogation. These rights 
have stirred much litigation with consequential legal 
expenses. 
e. Regulation of contingent fees. By regulating the contingent 
fee, the take-home award of the injured party will be 
increased and the cost of the court system reduced proportion-
ately. This regulation or limitation of the contingent fee 
could be accomplished by placing the control of the size of 
the contingent fee and the supervision of its use with the 
proper legislative or judicial authority. The contingent 
fee scale should be one in which the fee rates decrease as 
the recovery amount increases. This should also result in 
a reduction of the nurr~er of nuisance cases filed. 
f. Modification of the collateral source rule. The collateral 
source rule should be modified so as to render admissible 
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all evic~ence of the nature and extent of all benefits 
service~; received (or to be received) by the claimant as 
a result of his injuries and damages. Evidence 
of the re-marriage of the surviving spouse should se 
be admissible in an action for wrongful death. Such a 
modification would allow the jury to be given all 
about the case before them. Duplicate recoveries in 
personal injuries would be eliminated to a degree with 
resulting cost savings in the reparations system. 
9. Limitation on pain and suffering awards. The law 
establishing the measure of damages which may be awarded 
in tort liabili litigation is largely court-made law 
which provides only vague and general guidelines. This 
leaves the jury virtually unlimited discretion as to the 
amount of damages to be awarded. This unlimited discre 
results in unfair variations in awards between different 
claimants and has produced constantly increasing 
damage awards which have contributed greatly to the 
s f 
in which liability insurance costs have become 
To keep total costs to a level which can be managed 
insurance and which socially acceptable, limitations 
on awards are needed. It a matter of simple justice 
that the a liability should re 
the injured person for all economic losses resulting 
an accident. Non-economic loss, often referred to in 
courts as pain suffering, is almost impossible to 
measure in dollars and cents. A strict statutory limi 
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on pain and suffering awards by either a specific dollar 
amount or some multiple of out-of-pocket damages should 
result in cost savings. Such a limitation to meet consti-
tutional requirements would have to be applied to the 
total tort reparations system. 
The IIAA National Board of State Directors, Executive Committee 
and Commercial Lines Committee within the past month has adopted a 
statement of position on the products liability insurance problem. 
While time has not permitted official review by other producer organiza-
tions, the statement in the opinion of the representatives of the 
Professional Agents Association and the National Brokers Association 
generally represents the position of those organizations. The state-
ment is as follows: 
The Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. (IIAA), repre-
senting over 34,000 independent insurance agencies throughout the 
nation and 126,000 licensed independent agents, strongly believes that 
the liability insurance mechanism has traditionally served American 
business well in the products liability area and that every effort 
should be made now so that businesses which produce safe products 
can continue to procure essential products liability coverage. 
In 1976 IIAA surveyed a significant percentage of its rnerr~ership, 
numerous companies with whom its merr~ers do business, and, outside 
of the insurance industry, a multitude of other trade associations, 
consumer organizations and governmental entities, to attempt to 
ascertain the scope of the products liability problem. The results 
of those surveys uniformly have shown that there are severe dislocations 
in the products liability insurance markets, manifested by spiralling 
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premiums and unavailability of insurance in certain cases. The 
results show that two basic, related reasons for these dislocations 
are the growing number of products liabili lawsuits and the s-
ing uncertainty as to s standards will be impo on 
the manufacturer under the rapidly changing law governing lawsuits. 
Our surveys have it clear to us a permanent so 
to the products liability will not until the is-
latures establish a law of products liability that will define 
these duties and standards are and restore a degree of rationali 
and certainty so that underwriters can evaluate the risk that a 
particular manu~acturer presents. It is not our intention to discuss 
specific statutes in this statement. IIAA and its affiliated state 
associations are actively studying these statutes and in some states 
proposed laws are already being endorsed and presented to the legis-
latures. 
It is also plain to us that similar problems are curren 
experienced in all liability lines. Where feasible, statutes 
be drawn to cover these other lines. Such a comprehensive 
package will get the support of the many groups who are 
affected by this problem. IIAA and its affiliated as 
work with interested parties to bring about meaningful reform 
fair to all concerned. The slative effort must be emphasi 
implementation should begin 
liability laws can we ever 
solutions to this prob 
ly. Only through revis 
to attain permanent and 
The members of IIAA thus pledge 
efforts to fting of 1 islation to s 
IIAA calls insurance try to establi 
ir 
level task s IIAA would assist in every way possible. 
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first task force would be charged with ascertaining what the insurance 
industry is currently doing to promote product safety, what additional 
measures the industry should undertake in this area, and a timetable 
for implementing these additional measures. This task force might 
want to seek the input of manufacturing groups currently working on 
this problem. 
The second task force should be charged with reviewing current 
insurance industry practices in the underwriting, rating and claims 
areas to find what changes can be made to help relieve the current 
dislocations in the products liability insurance market. 
IIAA further· invites representatives of all affected groups to 
join together to study needed legislative reform. To this end IIAA 
invites the review and analysis of legislative proposals by the many 
interested groups. We hope that the recently released IIAA research 
report, "A Survey of Specific Statutes That Have Been Proposed to 
Deal With The Products Liability Problem", can serve as a basis for 
this work, since the report incorporates the research of many of these 
groups. 
Regardless of our belief in and support for the foregoing as 
the proper method toward a long-term solution, interim solutions for 
those immediately affected must also be dealt with. We call upon the 
insurance industry to encourage the Insurance Commissioner of each. 
state to appoint an "Indu Advisory Committee" having agency, com-
pany and department representation. This committee would review 
specific complaints, and, with the assistance of the Insurance Depart-
ment, would 1 in its power to resolve these complaints satisfactorily 
Part of the committee's task would be to inform agents of where the 
current opportunities are in the products liability market, because 
this market is undergoing- changes continually. Another important task 
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of the committee would be to encourage companies to continue to provide 
coverage at affordable rates. This proposal for an "Industry Advisory 
Committee" is based on the recent experience in Connecticut where such 
a voluntary committee has been successful in identifying the problem 
areas and resolving the great majority of complaints. 
In summary, we propose that all interested parties join together, 
recognizing that solutions will not come easily. Interim solutions 
such as joint underwriting associations, reinsurance facilities or 
assigned risk plans only serve to magnify the problems by curtailing 
or destroying the voluntary market. Real solutions lie in product 
safety, enlightened insurance industry treatment of products liabil 
and tort reform. Interim insurance marketing solutions must be the 
responsibility of insureds, agents and companies working together 
to find markets while the real solutions take shape. 
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Statement by 
J. Creighton White, Vice President· 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies 
Prepared for 
The Joint Committee on Tort Liability 
San Diego, California 
July 18, 1977 
Chairman Knox, members of the Committee: 
My name is J. Creighton White. I am vice president of Fireman's Fund 
Insurance Companies. I have nationwide responsibility for Commercial Automobile 
and Liability Underwriting. The remarks I make here today are directed at under-
writing practices in the product liability area. 
Fireman's Fund is the seventh largest property-liability insurance group 
in the country and a major market in California for all types of personal and 
commercial property and liability coverages. It has substantial interest in the 
findings of this committee. Last year Fireman's Fund wrote in excess of $10-
million in net identifiable premiums for product liability coverage. About 15 
per cent of that amount, or $1.5 million, was in California. 
The policy of Fireman's Fund regarding product liability coverage is the 
same as with other lines of insurance. We want the business, but only when it is 
adequately priced. 
{more) 
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The "adequate price" for product liability insurance has, however, 
become very difficult to ascertain, because of new doctrines and procedures in the 
tort liability system that inflated the legal scope of liability and spawned 
enormous increases in litigation and jury verdicts. The Chairman of the U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission recently stated that in California, product 
liability awards have increased 800 per cent since 1965. He also affirmed that 
there is now an average of ten $100,000 product-related awards every week in the 
state. This activftY.has transformed the product liabil~rom a miscella-
neous, rather minor exposure to a most volatile, difficult one, and in a very 
short period of time. 
Naturally enough. then. product liability underwriters are taking close 
look at applications for the coverage, and are charging premiums sufficient to 
cover the loss potential and expenses. 
Fireman's Fund underWTiters are directed to review very carefully those 
businesses that seek our product liability coverage, to assess the probabilities 
of large or catastrophic loss and to make necessary judgments relating to accept-
ability of the risk and pricing of the coverage. 
The questions our underwriters are asking now give an indication of the 
breadth of the product liability exposure. For example: 
* Is product safety one of the primary considerations in new product 
design and in redesign of products already being manufactured? How thoroughly 
are prod~ct designs tested? 
(more) 
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* Are any of the components of the product made by subcontractors? If 
so, what are their qualifications and procedures? Many product liability claims 
stem from failure of a subcontractor's component. 
* What is the quality control program, and how is it organized? 
* Is the product assembled at a factory, by the distributor, or by the 
consumer? A failure by any to properly assemble the product could generate a 
loss. Therefore, if it's to be assembled outside the factory, are instructions 
provided? Are they in basic, easy-to-read language? Do they point out safe 
methods of assembly and use? Do the instructions warn of inherent operating 
dangers, no matter how obvious? 
* Do hazardous products bear a conspicuous warning and antidote infor-
mation? Inadequate labels have given rise to product liability verdicts. 
* Has proposed advertising material been reviewed by engineering and 
legal experts for technical accuracy? Statements and illustrations used are, in 
some instances, considered to be express warranties. 
* What stand-by procedures have been established to accomplish modifi-
cation or recall of the product if it shows potential for causing harm? There 
must be some means of locating purchasers if it becomes necessary to warn them 
of a hazard and to correct the situation. 
* Is the manufacturer's attitude toward product liability concerns 
positive or negative? It's been our experience that safety programs of any type 
are effective only when top management is committed. 
(more) 
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* What is the financial standing of the manufacturing concern? It 
has also been our experience that, when businesses are compelled to make 
economies, safety programs are among the first to feel the cut-backs. 
Often applicants for product liability coverage are deficient in one 
or more areas, but when they are willing to adhere to our loss control recommen-
dations, the problems can be corrected. Consumers are protected. Underwr.iters 
can assume the risk profitably, and thus develop capacity to ~ccommodate the 
always growing insurance needs of our society. 
As I perceive the product liability market today, the situation is more 
one of affordability of the coverage than of availability. There are ready 
sources ot product liability insurance in ~alitornia and across the country, pro-
vided the premiums coming in are sufficient to pay losses, expenses, and leave 
a profit. 
Manufacturers who don't keep the safety of consumers foremost, who put 
shoddy, unsafe products into the stream of commerce will always have a tough time 
getting product liability coverage, barring any government-imposed requirement to 
the contrary. After all, the insurance industry protects against the chance of 
loss, not a certainty of loss. This may be bad news for manufacturers of products 
that cause a lot of avoidable harm, but I think it's good news for the general 
public. By exercising its prerogative of risk selection on the basis of loss 
experience and loss potential, and without imposing abstract moral judgments, the 
insurance industry plays a natural check-and-balance role in the country's 
marketplace. 
(more) 
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Another check-and-balance in the marketplace is the tort liability 
system this committee is studying. In my opinion the tort system, in matters 
of product liability and other areas of liability as well, has recently become 
more of a check than a balance. Fireman's Fund has gone on record saying the 
need for consumers to have ample recourse to any loss must be put back into 
balance with what society can afford to pay and that balance can be achieved 
only through reform of the tort system. 
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to share my views on 
this subject. I shall be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank 
you. 
-v-
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EXHIBIT II 
NATIONWIDE 
1976 PRODUCT LIABILITY 
ISO CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY 
PRELIMINARY REPORT 
7,791 records were analyzed with total payments of 60 million dollars: 
Overall Averages 
Bodily Injury only 
Property Damage only 
Average Payment 
Per Claim 
16,201 
4,931 
Average Payment 
Per Incident 
29,261 
9,182 
Total (all) 12,252 22,211 
~a) For each $1.00 of loss there was an additional 42¢ of expenses incurred 
by the insurance company in defending the claim. 
b) 30¢ fqr every dollar of product liability loss involved claims wherein 
~mployer was negligent to some degree. 
c) Excluding claims on products which are consumed almost fmmediately, over 
45% of all claims do not occur until more than six years subsequent to the 
date o!-~J.L~~~c!ure • 
..-.- --......., 
d) Employees injured during the course of employment received the highest 
average payment for BI ($128,684), perhaps due to the severity of work-
place incidents. 
e) The emplo~~he injured employee was negligent in half of the employee 
injury cases. Related claim-payments -were two thirds of the payments 
dollars. Preliminary analysis indicated over 30% of the total products 
loss dollars go to employees of negligent employers • 
f) Food products seem to cause the largest number of claims, but in general 
account for a comparative small portion to the total dollars paid. 
g) Over 92% of the cases didnot involve product modification. Those involving 
some modification (8%) had significantly higher average payment involving 
18% of total payment dollars. 
h) Only 5% of Bodily Injury and 9% of Property Damage Claims went all the way 
to a court verdict. 
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EXHIBIT fF2 
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE PRODUCT LIABILITY EXPERIENCE REPORT 
DECEMBER 1971 - DECEMBER 1974 
BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE COMBINED 
Policy 
Year Ended* Earned Premiums Incurred Losses*** Loss Ratio**** 
Manually Rated Classes 
12/31/71 $ 31,661,275 $ (21' 110' 940) 66.7% 
12/31/72 41,624,498 (29,018,341) 69.7 
12/31/73 49,560,259 (35,431,429) 71.5 
12/31/74** 44,748,085 (32,679,452) 73.0 
(a) Rated Classes, excluding large (a) rated cases 
12/31/71 85,984,805 (97,574,782) 113.5% 
12/31/72 120,110,961 (96,906,925) 80.7 
12/31/73 167,144,160 (256,947,974) 153.7 
12/31/74** 158,531,975 (199,568,635) 125.9 
* - The reason more recent data are not available is due to the desire to 
report incurred losses as accurately as possible. When a loss is re-
ported, a reserve is established based on the company's best estimate 
of the ultimate settlement or award and related expenses. However, 
as time passes, some of these claims will be paid and, based on further 
information, reserves on others can be restated to more accurately re-
flect the potential loss. Thus, while incurred loss data for more re-
cent years could be compiled, it would be subject to a greater degree 
of uncertainity. 
** - Preliminary data as of 12/1/76. 
*** - Incurred losses include loss adjustment expenses as well as amounts 
paid to claimants and reserves on claims reported but not yet paid. 
Loss adjustment expenses amount to about one-third of incurred losses. 
They consist mainly of payments to defense attorneys, salaries for 
claim adjusters, and overhead expenses. 
**** - Since underwriting expenses average around 25 percent of premium, a 
loss ratio over represents an underwriting loss. 
SOURCE: Products Liability Insurance Study. u. S. Department of Commerce 
NOTE: (a) -Rated classes involve classifications which represent wide 
differences in exposures within the class. Rates are arrived at by 
underwriting judgement as applied to the particular insured. Most 
manufacturers of industrial goods fall into this category. 
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EXHIBIT #3 
NET PREMIUM-TO-SURPLUS RATIO 
<gxcluding Value of Life Insurance Subsidiaries) 
1966 1968 1970 1 972 1974 1975 
10 largest writers 
of miscellaneous 1.60 1.79 2.46 1.82 4.84 3.74 
11ab111ty insurance 
All 
Industry 1.67 1.60 2.09 1.63 2.74 2.50 
Source: Best's Aggregates and Averages, Best's Insurance Reports, Best's 
Insurance Securities Research Service, McKinsey & Co. calculations. 
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Net 
Calendar Premium 
Year Written 
1972 $3,327,526 
1973 2,092,245 
1974 3,161,312 
1975 4,752,610 
1976 9,645,132 
EXHIBIT #4 
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE Cat:PANY 
NATIONWIDE PRODUCTS LIABILITY EXPERIENCE! 
(BI & PD COMBINED) 
Net Losses 
Premium Incurred 2 Earned {Ex-IBNR) IBNR 
$3,895,836 $3,963,111 NA 
3,403,292 3,386,781 $ -26,276 
3,107,032 2,586,273 -3,266 
4,072,305 2,846,998 472,454 
8,139,430 4,067,579 1,635,228 
Unallocated Statutory 
Loss Adjustment Underwriting 
Total 
Losses 
Incurred 
$3,963,111 3 
3,360,505 
2,583,007 
3,319,452 
5,702,807 
Statutory 
Calendar Loss Expense4 ExpenseS Dividends Trade Year Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio 
1972 101. n. 11.2'7. 39.0'7. -.3'7. 1Sl.6'7. 
1973 98.7 10.9 37.0 .9 147.5 
1974 83.1 9.1 38.8 -1.8 129.2 
1975 81.5 9.0 37.3 -.2 127.6 
1976 70.1 7.1 30.8 .6 109.2 
1) Excluding Composite, Large "a" Rated, and Loss Rated Business. 
2) Including Allocated Loss Adjustment Expense Incurred. 
3) 1972 Total Losses Incurred do not Include IBNR 
4) Estimated as 11.0% of Total Loss Incurred; Factor promulgated by ISO 
5) Based on Nationwide Ratios for All General Liability Sublines. 
Statutory 
Trade 
Profit (Loss) 
(2,010,251) 
(1,616,564) 
(907,253) 
(1,123,956) 
(748,828) 
• 
EXHIBIT 415 
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY EXPERIENCE 
POLICY YEAR DATA 
VALUED AS OF MARCH 1977 
CALIFORNIA - BI 
Premium Losses* Loss 
Earned Incurred Ratio 
1971 $ 619,043 $451,238 72.90 
1972 479,432 374,044 78.02 
1973 338,811 235,998 69.67 
1974 349,476 250,963 71.81 
1975 783,018 313,922 40.09 
CALIFORNIA - PD 
1971 $ 369 '721 $266,306 72.03 
1972 302,565 113,454 37.50 
1973 238,425 235,591 98.81 
1974 260,962 181,747 69.65 
1975 680,734 112,386 16.51 
CALIFORNIA - TOTAL 
1971 $ 988,764 $717,544 72.57 
1972 781,997 487,498 62.34 
1973 577,236 471,589 81.71 
1974 600,438 432,710 72.07 
1975 1,463,742 426,308 29.13 
*Including paid allocated adjustment expense 
NOTE: Actuarial estimates indicate that, at a minimum (utilizing basic 
limits loss development factors) the California Bodily Injury loss 
ratio will ultimately develop to: 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
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CRASHWOR'I'HY VEHICLES: AX 'I'HE QUIE'l' I 
~!J'l'_ CO~PLE'l'E, .. RE~!:!TION_!!!__PRQDUC:!;'§ __ LIAB1LI:!:'£.._LA~ 
'l'lle past year has witnessed an extensive reexarn.i nation 
u£ lhe entire law of products liability. The Un1ted States 
govt~rnment has commissioned the Interagency Task Force to 
undertake a comprehensive review of products liability lawi 
mqny states have initiated their own legislative studies 
of the area; and many private organizations, including the 
American Insurance Association, have developed packages for 
legislative reform. In the current outburst of activity it 
had always been taken for granted that there had been radical 
and far-reaching changes in the substantive law since, to choose 
a convenient date, the publication of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts in 1965. With the fac!: of change safely recognized, 
Lhe important issw:s \vere: first, did the identifiable changes 
on balance represent an improvement 1n the substantive law; 
and second, if they did not, was it possible to correct past 
mistakes, be it by legislative or judicial action. 
It therefore comes as somewhat of a surprise to learn 
that there is no need to justify modern innovations in products 
liability law simply because there are no such modern innova-
tions which require justification. In particular I refer to 
the remarks of Mr. Craig Spangenberg, Chairman of the National 
Affairs Committee of the Association of 'I'rial Lawyers of America. 
In his remarks of April 27, 1977 before the United States Senate 
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Subcommittee on Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, he spoke on behalf of A.T.L.A. 
as follows: 
"there has been little change in the 
doctrines of liability in the last ten . 
years, and almost none in the last 
five. The requirement of privity was 
abolished, in suits against manufactu-
rers, well before 1965." 
And earlier in his remarks he drew his ines~apable con-
elusion: 
"We see no evidence that. products 
marketed today are of better design, 
better material, safer and more durable. 
On the contrary, as consumers we see 
products that are flimsier, lighter, 
cheaper in material and design, and 
overwhelmingly plastic. If the safety 
index in improving, it does not show up 
in the statistics. The primary cause of 
the product liability problem is defect-
ive products sold by the manufacturers 
and retailers." 
I think that the above statements are wrong and mis-
leading and give a totally false impression of the revolu-
tion in the substantive law of products liability which 
continues to run its course to this very day . 
The nub of the matter is not the safety indexes and 
it is not the privity requirement. The safety indexes to 
which Mr. Spangenberg refers speak only of the safety of 
the product in use; and products which are improperly used 
wi 11 cause damage even if they are in no way defective. 
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To learn whether the current level of accidents is attribut-
able to bad products, to bad use, or to some other cause 
requires a detailed study of each individual incident. 
Many thoughtful commentators have noted that the expansion 
of plaintiff's rights in products liability actions could 
have adverse effects upon safety by removing the incentives 
that product users have for their own safety and well-being. 
The proposition is of course empirical and may yet be 
false. It may of course be true as well. Only a detailed 
study of individual occurrences, and not casual citation 
of aggregate phenomena, will help answer th~s question. 
The privity doctrine too is not the source of the cur-
rent uneasiness. The traditional privity requirement held 
{subject to some exceptions) that only an immediate pur-
chaser could sue an immediate seller for damages caused by 
a defective product. The impact of the rule was of course 
enormous. One of its implicdtions was that no person who 
purchased a d,mgerous product through a retailer could have 
any recourse against its manufacturer. Another was that no 
worker could even sue a manufacturer or retailer who dealt 
with his employer. I have no desire to defend the privity 
doctrine 1n all its rigor and do not think that this is 
the time to explore all of the confused reasons that led 
19th century courts to embrace it in the first instance. 
Suffice it to say Uwt the rejection of the privity 
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limitation brings into the legal system a large number of 
cases which would have been excluded under the old regime. 
The crucial question is not whether privity should be abol-
ished; rather the question is how ought the claims brought 
into the system be treated once the privity limitation is 
overcome. I shall comment on the normative questions during 
the course of thi's paper but first wish to show the magnitude 
of the changes in products liability law that occurred long 
after the abolition of privity. The major reason why there 
are more "defective" products on the market is because the 
term "defect" in the past 10 years has, as a term of art, taken 
on such a broad meaning that it is possible today at least to 
argue that almost any product is defective no matter how well 
it is constructed. 
The burden of this enterprise is in one sense too vast 
for this paper, as the law of products liability covers all 
manner of products, from ordinary canned foods to the most 
complex industrial machinery. 
where. 
Changes in it have been every-
Rather than discussing the movement in products lia-
bility law in the abstract, I think it is better to fasten 
attention upon a single doctrine with a single line of 
products, while noting at the outset the story told here 
could be reproduced in other connections as well. I there-
fore choose to concentrate my attention upon an important 
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line of cases -- those concerned with the liability of 
manufacturers for injuries allegedly caused by "uncrash-
worthy vehicles." In essence the plaintiff in the typical 
uncrashworthiness case alleges that there is some defect 
in the defendant's automobile -- in most cases a defect 
in design-- which either caused or enhanced the plaintiff's 
injuries when the plaintiff was involved in a collision. 
In many cases the plaintiff alleges that the car did not 
protect him as it should have; in others, usually involv-
ing bystanders, that it enhanced the injuries that were 
otherwise inflicted. At one level the plaintiff's cause 
of action looks familiar. There is the usual split in the 
jurisdictions over whether the plaintiff's cause of action, 
when recognized, is based upon a theory of negligence or a 
theory of strict liability, and the usual uncertanity as 
to what difference, if any, the distinction makes. There 
are also the familiar references to causation, negligence, 
defect and design, coupled with a discussion of the possible 
defenses that are open to the defendant. In one sense it 
could be argued that these crashworthiness cases do not 
mark any real departure from the traditional common law 
principles of liability. But a closer look at the evolution 
of the doctrine gives a very different story. 
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For our purposes it is only necessary to go back as 
far as 1958, to the California case of Hatch v. Ford Motor 
Company, 163 Cal. App. 2d 393,329 P.2d 695 (1958). The 
plaintiff was a boy, aged six, who lost his eye when he 
ran into a pointed ornament whose tip extended beyond the 
front end of the radiator grill. A local statute made it 
unlawful for the defendant to construct the car in this par-
ticular manner. The plaintiff brought his action for damages 
under two theories. His first claim asserted that the de fen-
dant was in breach of its common law duty of ordinary care; 
his second was predicated specifically upon a breach of the 
regulatory statute. The trial court dismissed both of plain-
tiff's causes of action as a matter of law; its decision was 
affirmed on appeal. With respect to the common law negligence 
action, the Appellate Court held that the defendant did not 
owe any general duty of care to the public at large and to 
the plaintiff in particular t:o "prevent the type of injury 
sustained by the plaintiff when said automobile was at rest, 
properly parked on the highway", and it noted as well that 
plaintiff's attorney furnished the court with no cases which 
supported the recognition of a duty that would make the jury 
"an arbiter" on the question of design. 
The plaintiff's cause of action on the statute 'also 
failed. Even though it was clear that the statute did 
place an affirmative duty upon the defendant, the court 
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barred recovery because the injury was not of the type which 
the statute inlended to prevent. The statute, it s d, 
"was designed to deere ase the hazard 
created by the driving of said auto-
mobile upon the highways where its 
negligent operation might cause it to 
come in contact with others. It was 
not designed to protect those who, solely 
by reason of their own act or omission, 
might come in contact with it as an inert 
object lawfully standing unattended on 
the highway. 11 
In essence the opinion rested upon the assertion that 
the defendant was under ~ duty to guard the plaintiff 
against this sort of contigency where the moving force, 
literally understood, was not the defendant {who was "an 
inert object" etc.) but the plaintiff. The central point 
that here emerges is that the duty limitation remained a 
significant issue 1n all products liability cases even 
after the passing of the privity limitation. How many 
duties, of what description and against what contingencies, 
The !_!atch case then represents the early and complete 
rejection of any crashwor vehicle doctrine. rehe next 
point at which to assess the legal situation is 1965, for 
in that year the American Law Institute published the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which contained 
a new section 402A announcing a general principle uf strict 
liabili of the sellers of products "in a defective con-
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dition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or 
to his property." The section also expressly rejected 
two defenses which might have otherwise been available in 
a products liability case. First it confirmed the death 
of the privity limitation by treating as immaterial the 
absence of a direct contractual relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. Second it accepted (largely 
in advance of the cases which it was supposed to be re-
stating) the doctrine of strict liability by treating as 
ineffective the defense that the defendant had "exercised 
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his pro-
duct." 
It is clear that the strict liability provisions 
of §402A marked an important doctrinal shift from the 
first Restatement of 1934, which contained no provision 
analogous to §402A. A closer ceading of the comments to 
§402A and of the other sections in its chapter (entitled 
quaintly "'rhe Liability of Persons Supplying ChattE:ls for 
the Use of Others.") suggest in retrospect however that 
the s were not as vast as some might suppose. '!'he 
central concept within the Restatement provision is that 
of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." The ex-
pression itself, apart from its obvious clumsiness, is 
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not se 1 f-de fining, particuL..trly as it applies to al] pro-
ucts of whatever kind and descr t 'it'Je get a senst:; 
what it intended only by exa1nining e cases which the 
draftsman thought fell within its ambit. The specific in-
stan s are prosaic, largely limited to and drugs. 
The Res ta tc:~ment talks of whiskey "with rous amounts of 
fusel oi , or tobacco "contai something like marijuana", 
or bad butter "contaminated with fish oil." The original 
preoccupati is with food and drugs in §402A and is under-
standable n that the earlier versions of §402A confined 
its ration first to food and drugs, and then in a later 
draft tD products "intended for intimate body use." The ex-
\ 
pa s f the provision to cover all products was probably 
made I know of no good contemporary discussion of the 
po1nt the assumption that the defects to be embraced by 
r provisions were to be analogized to those pre-
s y men t.i orw . In e feet the only class of defects clearly 
red by the section is the class of construction defects, as 
ll d, as when the plaintiff is injured by a 
l which roper funct icJns because, say, it lacked a 
washe or a seal on a crucial pa r of the equipment. So 
rpreted the s of the section turns out hindsight to 
st indeed. 
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There is yet another sense in which §402A of the 
Restatement represents only a limited change in the sub-
s tan t i ve law. Before the adoption of the strict liability 
standard in products liability cases, the courts in vir-
tually all jurisdictions allowed the plaintiff, where the 
defect in the product was established, to hurdle the 
negligence barrier with the aid of the presumption of res 
ipsa loquitur. The effect of res ipsa was to place the 
defendant under a very heavy burden to establish that he 
had acted with the requisite due care. 'rhe use of the 
presumption was very useful in these cases because it help-
ed eliminate from trial the troublesome question of just 
how m~ch inspection and care should be given to prevent 
accidents. Questions of degree admit of no precise answer, 
and their elimination in this context not only served (pro-
perly in my opinion) to expand liability, but also to 
simplify the adjudication or settlement of product related 
claims. 
The attention given to §402A should not, however, be 
allowed to obscure the fact that there were many design 
defect cases on the books at the time of the Restatement. 
Nor should it obscure the fact thc1t other provisions of the 
Restatement (sections 395 to 398) were directed towards the 
application of negLigence theories to cases of bad desHJn. 
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Yet here it is necessary to emphasize yet again how far 
removed from the crashworthy vehicle cases were the typical 
design negligence cases first decided only around the time 
of the publication of the Restatement. 
The typical design case involved a product sold by 
the defendant which when used in the y_ery ~~ in which the 
defendant had intended it to be used was of insufficient 
strength or safety to bear the stresses and strains associ-
ated with such use. To illustrate the nature of the limi-
ta ons liability, it is useful to recount some of 
the cases in which the plaintiff recovered under this type 
of theory. Thus a rather "heavy set" woman was allowed to 
recover when she fell out of an S-shaped chrome chair de-
s gned the defendants, when the center of gravity of the 
chai w unusually far forward, because the chair did not 
h the s li ty needed for its intended function. 
___________ : __ .§..:=:J::le~~!:e!> 167 Cal. App. 2d 306,334 P.2d 225 
959). kewlse the plaintiff recovered when his car ex-
p oded when he turned the key in the ignition; gas fumes 
h d scaped from the tank to be trapped in the trunk com-
part_men t where they were set off <t spark cnoated when 
the nition was turned 
8 F. 2 d 7 3 9 (5th C i r. 
on. 13l:~!_Zsi::~ in ~-__!'~rd ~ot~E-.~~-..:, 
1961). The plaintiff was allowed 
to re ver as well when the towing attachment on the defert-
t's rva r- broke as the car 1.vas being towed in the man-
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ner specified by the defendant, when the towed automobile 
was released from t:he tow truck striking another automobile. 
e~lmo_~~-~aratono, 28 Mich. App. 217, 184 N.W. 2d 367 (1970) 
The plaintiff was also entitled to recover when the alumi-
num ladder which he used collapsed under his weight. Lifritz 
v. Sears, Roebuck_~~~, 472 S.W.2d 28 (197l)i and when a ramp 
upon which his trailer was being driven collapsed under its 
weight. Berry v. Fruehauf 'f'rail!:::E Co:...L 371 Mich. 428, 124 N.W 2d 
290 (1963). Indeed the very California case which first 
adopted the rule of strict products liability, Greenman v. 
Yuba Pow~, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 
(1962), was a design defect case of this sort because it in-
volved a situation in which the claimed defect was the ex-
istence of "inadequate set screws" to hold wood in place 
during the normal use of a lathe of defendant's manufacture. 
All of these cases (whether decided on a neqligence 
or a stri~t liability theory) can easily be fit into a con-
ception of defect slightly broader than that embrace,] by 
the original text of Restatement 402A, but still emjnently 
workable and eminently defensible: the defendant will be 
responsible for whatever forces are released in the use and 
operation of his product where these forces are the ones to 
which the product must be subjected as a matter of course 
2 36 
with ordinary use. The diff lt question in these cases 
is wh uses are regarded as ordinary 
a stion which should not be answered 
which are not, 
reference to 
the manufacturer's subjec unexpressed intentions 
the way in wh the shou be used. The 
s of public limitations upon product use and 
per may be tricky (how heavy a load can be lifted 
w lf-inch rope) but the cases already referred to 
As Just 
in 
i 
was 
icate that it no means an unmanageable task. 
t of strict products liabil-
mach 
ntat 
'l'raynor, the 
said in the course of his opinion: "Implicit 
's ence on the market, however, was the 
that it would safely do the jobs for which 
ilL It is that implicit representation which needs 
, both to create liability and to limit it. 
ict l 
de 
ili 
negl 
doctrines of the second Restate-
nee cases of the ear 1960's 
t~aken in combination, a far c from the 
0 1 in uncrashworthy vehicle 
the state of the law in 1967 well illustra-
le f Ra Nader and Joseph Page: Automo-
.;,__-.e;;;.___..-..-.----c.;...___;;;:;.;,_,_._..;.;;.;.....,...__;;;_..:....:.:..;:_.__;;_.~--==-=----_:...-s_ , 5 5 c a l i f • L • Rev • 
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authors were in favor of imposing a general duty upon manu-
facturers to make crashworthy vehicles, but even with their 
own intellectual orientation they recognized that the current 
body of case law gave no support whatsoever for the recog-
nition of that duty. The then most recent case on the 
issue, Evans v. General Motors, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) 
had just held that "a manufacturer is not under the duty to 
make his automobile accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must 
he render the vehicle "more" safe where the danger to be 
avoided is obvious to all." It then dismissed the plaintiff's 
cause of action based upon the theory that the defendant's 
Chevrolet station wagon was negligently designed in that it 
had an X-frame without side protection for the decedent who 
had been killed when another vehicle collided with the left 
side of the wagon. Nader and Page attack the logic of the 
Evans opinion, arguing that the decision simply misstated 
the essential problem by insisting upon talking of a duty to 
design a "fool-proof" car. 'I'hcy argued that the duty con-
templated only required the defendant to proceed with reason-
able care to design a car which was reasonably safe. 
The Nader article also recognized the limitations upon 
the plaintiff's new cause of act~ion. "Even if the defendant's 
conduct was substandard, however, each new plaintiff must prove 
that the conduct caused the harm; the defendant has in each case 
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the defenses of contributory fault, assumption of risk and 
abnormal use." (p. 663) 
The uncrashworthy vehicle cases came out of the law 
reviews and into the courts with the now famous dec is ion 
of Larsen v. General Motors CO:r:£., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 
1968). Doctrinally speaking, the point in question was 
whether the involvement of an automobile in a road crash was 
an "intended use" of the vehicle. The court held that it 
should be so treated because of the foreseeable certainty 
of involvement in collisions, however unwanted they might 
be. The Evans case, decided but two years before was dis-
cussed and rejected, as the court held that "general negli-
gence priciples" should be extended to crashworthy vehicle 
cases. 
The endorsement of a yeneral ngeligence standard leaves 
o course a great deal of uncertainty as to what is expect-
of any given defendant in any particular case, for that 
s andard opens still wider the intractible question of just 
how much precaution must be taken against what sorts of harms. 
I other areas of admitted negl iqence liability, routine 
running down cases fur example, the courts have sought with 
but mixed success to find more particular standards to 
counteract the vagueness of the general negligence rule, 
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and to that end they have turned to both statutes and custom 
as sources of the standard of care. 
With respect to automobiles there are today fairly ex-
haustive statutory standards under the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. It is moreover quite 
proper to base private causes of action upon these standards 
because the standards themselves give explicit direction to 
vehicle manufacturers as to what must be done with their 
products. The question of how much, always the bane of the 
negligence inquiry, is in effect hammered out \in an admin-
istrative hearing where the pros and cons of certain safety 
precautions can be resolved with inputs from all interested 
p es. The results of these deliberations may not always 
be wise, but for the purposes of the tort system this is quite 
immaterial, as a manufacturer faced with definite and clear 
standards knows that he deviates from them only at his peril. 
Th manufacturer can, where statutes are the sole standard of 
care, use the statute as a "safe harbor" against tortious 
liability, while remaining free to better his product still 
further to meet market demands for additional safety. 
The argument just made presupposes that the statutes 
involved form the sole standard of care, such that compli-
ance with the statutory norm carries with it, at least in 
crashworthy vehicle cases, insul from the threat of 
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tortious liability. This is not, however, the position 
under the current law. With reference to motor vehicles, 
the 1966 National Safety Act makes it quite clear that 
compliance with the statutory requirements is not a com-
plete defense, by providing: "Compliance with a Federal 
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchap-
ter does not exempt any person from any liability under 
• common law." (Section l08C) 
This provision is crucial for unders·tanding the 
doctrinal developments in the crashworthy vehicle cases, 
for it raises the question of what supplementary stan-
dards should determine, not whether an automobile is safe 
in ordinary use, but whether is it safe enough to with-
stand severe impacts from without. At this point the 
inquiry turns to the relationship between custom and 
state of the art on the one hand, and the "general cost-
benefit" formula on the other. In dealing with this issue, 
Larsen treated the state of the art as the standard 
• 
against which to measure the suitability of the defen-
dant's vehicle. The court did not, however, attempt to 
resolve one major ambiguity that lurked within its basic 
rule. One possible approach was to treat the state of the 
art as analogous to the usual role of custom in medical 
malpractice cases, suc:h that any defendant who complied 
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with that state of the art, as measured by current prac-
tice, escaped all liability, even if the standard was in 
time superseded. 'l'his approach would mean it would not 
be possible, at least in the context of private damage 
actions, to challenge the practices of an ent~re industry 
(or even that of a substantial proportion of it) on the 
grounds that the standards themselves were lax under some 
aggressive application of the reasonable care test. The 
state of th~ art becomes the safe harbor, although one 
less definite than that offered by statute. 
The courts in most jurisdictions, including Califor-
nia, have taken, however, the alternative position that 
the custom within the industry is s i.mply evidence on the 
question of reasonable care, but that the ultimate issue 
of negligence is one to be decided by the jury in each 
indiv dual case on the full totality of the evidence. And 
here rely upon the famous opinion of Learned Hand ln 
'I'. J. lAnd see 
for my criticism of the 'I'. ,J. Hooper rule Epstein, ~~c!_~ca! 
ce: The Case for Contract, 1 Am. Bar. Found. 
·------
Re s . J . 8 7 ( l 9 7 6 ) . ] The problem with the T. J._}!~ope!: ap-
proach quite simply is that it leav€~s us with no standards 
whatsoever by which any given sort of product should be 
j ed. All agree that the design of any product requires 
the trade-off of, among other things, price, quality, ease 
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of operation, safety and durability. Even the expenditure 
of infinite resources on product safe leaves open the 
finite chance of product danger. The objective of absolute 
safety only can be met, not by taking reasonable precautions 
but by stopping straight away the manufacture of all products. 
Repetition of the general negligence formula used in Larsen 
only tells us what we already know, that the balance needs 
to be drawn. It does not tell us where or how. In effect 
the law on the subject is reduced to little more than a 
laundry list, as the jury is told to take into account: 
the utility of the product to the user and the public as a 
whole, the likelihood that it will cause injury, the 
seriousness of the injury caused, the availability of sub-
stitutes, the cost of eliminating the defects without im-
pairing the essential worth of the product or without mak-
ing it too expensive, the ability of the user to avoid the 
damage, the user's knowledge of the product or the know-
ledge of the product held by the public at large given the 
obvious product features, and the ability to spread the loss 
through liability insurance. (See for this list Wade, On the 
r Products, 44 Miss. L.J., 
837-838 (1973). 
The application of this formula cannot be done by any 
court or any jury which conscientiously tries to measure 
with precision each of these factors mentioned in the 
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formula. And, even if the measurement hurdles are sur-
mounted, there is nothi about s s which tells us 
how the different factors s 
reach ,our answer. Juries 
be combined in order to 
be instructed about this 
formula and may do their best to come in with proper ver-
dicts. But we should never confuse the fact of a decision 
th the disciplined applicat this elaborate and in-
definite calculus. The former is always present; the lat-
ter is never possible. The state the art is never the 
perfect standard, but the reasonable care standard in all 
its sophistication is no standard at all. 
This formal elaboration of the design defect standard 
shows how different design def~ct cases are from construction 
defect cases, once we move away the restricted inter-
pre tat of intended use. In the construction defect area 
the movement towards strict liability was fully supportable 
rgely on the ground it reduced the defect question to a 
rison between the product the manufacturer•s own 
specifications. 'The question of how much care, how much 
quality control, how large a lure rate, etc. never were 
answerable, and the strict liabi s dispensed 
with the need to answer Lik se ·in the design defect 
cases involving product failure in ordinary use, the strict 
liabili standard could p r in the sense that 
the manufacturer should be held to standard of perform-
ance which it was desi The rig should support its 
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own weight, and the car should not explode when the key is 
turned in the ignition. 
The acceptance of the crashworthiness doctrine in auto-
mobile cases, however, now makes it quite impossible to 
decide cases simply by squaring the product against the 
standard. Now it becomes first necessary, without adequate 
guidelines, to decide what the standard is. Here, moreover, 
it is not simply enough to prove that the product as 
designed is defective or unsafe. The acceptance of a 
general negligence theory in design defect cases places a 
far greater pressure on the general causation requirements 
of the law of torts, for it is simply not possible to 
relate the particular injuries which the plaintiff suffered 
to the design defects of the defendant•s product unless we 
have an exact knowledge, not only of the forces to which the 
product is subjected, but also of the extent to which those 
forces could have been resisted if the car had been of an 
acceptable design. Thus if it is decided for example that 
a gas tank is too close to the exterior of an automobile, 
the question of liability requires us to know exactly where 
it should be placed and to know as well how it would have 
resisted the blow if it had been put into that position. 
Indeed it requires nDre, as we must know if the relocation 
of other parts of the car would have created some alterna-
tive source of danger given the external pressures applied. 
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Even if there is some sense that the j 
wrong, there is little hope that there 
knows what is 
ll be any reason-
able agreement as to what is How much protection 
is enough protection? 
We have said enough to show that des defect cases 
involving crashworthiness ckly on a surrealistic 
air as the plaintiff hires an rt who will testify to 
the jury that some additional sa precaution (but only 
at which ght have preve or reduced accident) 
have been well worth its cost. Then given the wide 
degree of discretion that is left to j s in cases of 
s type, it will be up to the jury to decide whether the 
marginal costs of the additional precaution are greater or 
less than the marginal benefits to be gained. There will 
often be no effort to provide the J with an actual al-
ternative design, or to show that the design in question 
11 not create more problems it solves. In some cases 
the defendant may be lucky enough to get a rected verdict 
after a long and expensive trial, but in most the decision 
wi 11 n one for the jury. 
A brief glance at the reported cases helps illustrate 
the extent to which liabili lS ssi under design 
de feet theories. Thus cases have held that the jury is to 
decide whether or not an automobile gas tank could have 
been more safely positioned to avoi the re damage that 
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resulted when the car was struck from the left rear by 
another vehicle going somewhere between 65 and 85 miles 
per hour. Self v. General Motors , 42 Cal. App. 3d l, 116 
Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974). Or whether the hood of an auto-
mobile should be designed to enable the driver to see under 
it in the event that it opened, because left unlatched, 
while the car was in motion. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 
525 P.2d 125 (1974). Or whether the front posts of a Volks-
wagen minibus were sufficiently strong to withstand the force 
of a head on collision with another vehicle. Seattle-First 
Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of Ame~ica, 11 Wash. App. 929, 525 
P.2d 286 (1974). Or whether the divider which separates 
the headlight from the turn light should have been designed 
with a softer material in order to protect another motorist 
who was run down by a care less driver. ~~~en_'!.__· Ford Motor 
Company, 546 F.2d. 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976) Or whether the doors 
of an automobile should be designed to make sure that an 
unlocked door does not fall open when struck in the side by 
another automobile. !:!elia_v. Ford Motor Comp~E2'' 534 F.2d 
795 (8th Cir. 1976). 
There are of course some cases in which the defen-
dant is able to pcevall in spite of a jury verdict against 
him. Thus the plaintiff's jury verdict was overturned on 
appeal when the court decided that it was improper to ~n­
struct the jury that a Volkswagen bus should have the same 
247 
-24-
resistance against a head on collision as a Ford sedan with 
an eight cylinder engine in front of the passenger compart-
ment. Driesonstok v. Volkswasen, 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 
1974). Likewise in a recent California case the appellate 
court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the 
claimed design defect was the hinging of the rear doors in 
a four door car from the rear panel. Kuxli v. Ford Motor 
Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d ll5, ____ Cal. Rptr. ____ (l977). 
If these cases show the extremes to which cases can go 
before they are taken from the jury (and then only upon ap-
al)1 then it seems clear that there is far too much play 
in the joints in crashworthiness cases. The source of the 
problem to my mind lies in the fact that the reasonable care 
formula, always the soft-underbelly of the tort law, cannot 
possibly deal with the range of problems that are raised 
once the common law duties are extended as they were in 
Larsen. The formula creates the illusion of precision where 
there is but unprincipled chaos. Complete acceptance of 
statutory and state of the art standards is needed if the 
tort system is to remain workable. 
The discussion as it has taken place has assumed that 
all crashworthiness cases should be decided upon a negli-
gence theory. One of the important developments which has 
n place after Larsen has been to treat the crashworthi-
ness cases under the strict liability principles, either 
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contained in or patterned upon §402A of the Restatement. 
California, in the important case of Cron~.~!._Q_!~, 
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1151, 104 Cal Rptr. 433 (1972), 
now treats crashworthiness cases under such a strict 
liability standard, indeed one tougher than that contained 
in the Restatement itself. 
It is important to note the consequences that do and 
do not follow from the shift to strict liability. 
~irs!, whatever its precise doctrinal nuances, the standard 
involved becomes somewhat higher than it would otherwise be 
under a negligence standard. One possible interpretation of 
the shift is to say that the strict liability standard 
means that in all cases the defendant should be charged 
with knowledge of the dangerous condition of the product 
in question, whether or not he could have discovered it 
with reasonable care, and to then ask whether the defendant 
with such knowledge would have taken some precaution against 
it. Wade, supra. Another way to look at the shift' is to 
treat it as demanding the best possible set of design choices, 
not those which might have been reasonably suited under the eir-
e urns tances. 
Second, no matter which of these (or indeed any other) 
1nterpretation is adopted of a strict liability requirement 
in design defect cases, it is still clear that they 
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involve issues that sharply separate them from the con-
struction defect cases. Restatement §402A treats as 
immaterial the degree of care involved in the preparation 
of the product; yet there is no doubt that the costs of 
discovering and implementing a new design technology must 
remain relevant under a strict liability test for design 
defects no matter how it is phrased. Strict liability 
still demands the same tradeoffs as negligence, for the 
only way that such tradeoffs can be eliminated is to hold 
a manufacturer of an automobile responsible for all harms 
to passengers in that vehicle no matter how they were 
caused. This the courts are still not prepared to do. 
And short of this position the movement to strict liability 
only helps shift the balance in each case further to the 
plain ff's side. 
Third, the shift to a st ct liability standard has 
nabled the California Supreme Court to circumvent at least 
tradi onal rules of evidence. The California Civil Code 
provides that the introduction of a product improvement or 
modification after any accident shall not be admissible to 
establish the negl of the defendant. In Ault v . 
International Harvester Co.,. 13 . 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 
1 7 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974) the court held that where the 
pl ntiff's action was based upon a theory of strict 
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liability the evidentiary bar did not apply, 
because the defendant 1 s wrong was not based upon "negli-
gence or culpable conduct." The decision is criticized 
in the American Insurance Association Product Liability 
Package, and here I wish to note only that the ability 
to introduce all manner of subsequent design changes in 
products liability actions since the Ault decision has served 
to increase the probabilities of success for the plaintiff, 
especially in those areas in which rapid technological ad-
vance has made improvement the rule instead of the exception. 
Fourth, the characterization of design defect cases 
as strict liability actions has severely undercut the af-
firmative defenses based upon plaintiff's wrongful conduct 
which were once available to defendants in products liability 
actions. Recall for the moment the observations of Nader 
and Page that the defendant in the crashworthiness cases 
had recourse to the defenses of abnormaL use, assumption 
of risk and contributory negligence. Today all of these 
defenses have been sharply cut back . 
The more recent cases make it quite clear that as the 
defendant can design a product which will guard a 'Plaintiff 
against most forms of misuse, only those types of misuse 
which are completely unforeseeable will constitute a defense. 
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Contributory negligence too has been completely eliminat-
ed in design defect actions, the argument being that as 
negligence has no place in the plaintiff's case, so too it 
has no place in the defense to it. The hostility towards 
contributory negligence has a strong appeal in the case of 
contaminated foods and drugs which were the main preoccu-
pation of the Second Restatement. It makes no sense to 
ask a consumer to finger bits of tuna fish in order to 
search for slivers of tin. But with design defect cases 
the possible types of contributory negligence consist of 
more than searching for a latent defect in a product which 
the defendant represented as fit for human consumption. 
Now the conduct of the plaintiff which is ignored is the 
runn of a red light or speeding upon the open highway, 
[see Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) .] 
All of these would be sufficient to hold the driver of an 
automobile accountable for the injuries of third parties 
even if his car contained some defect of design or con-
ruct , and should make him responsible for his own 
injuries as well. The expansion of the prima facie case does 
not invite, as has been suggested, the contraction of avail-
able defenses. To the contrary it suggests the greater need 
to preserve these defenses lest the defendant's conduct be 
treated in law alone as the only source of plaintiff's in:jury. 
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Innocent plaintiffs should be protected, but all plaintiffs 
should not be regarded as innocent as a matter of law. 
Assumption of risk has also been transformed, so that 
today it is applicable only where a plaintiff, with a specific 
knowledge of the defect and of the type of harm to which he 
is exposed, proceeds to encounter the risk unreasonably and 
voluntarily. Whereas the obligation of the defendant is 
cast in terms of reasonable foresight, with most anything 
which does happen being foreseeable, the obligation of the 
plaintiff is cast in much narrower terms. See Luque v. Mclean, 
8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972). If 
the defendant in Dreisonstok cannot get a directed verdict on 
assumption of risk where the plaintiff-passenger knows that 
there is no engine in front of the passenger compartment, then 
it is clear too that this defense too has been eroded nearly 
to the vanishing point. 
The sum and substance of these observations should now 
be clear. The law of products liability has been the subject 
of constant transformation, both in California and elsewhere, 
and at no time has that change been greater than in the last 
ten years. The crashworthiness cases provide but one illus-
tration that typifies that pattern across the law of products 
liability. Before l9b8 there was no duty to make a car which 
could protect its occupants against collision. Then there was 
a duty to take reasonable care to prevent the occupants 
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against such harm. Subsequently the negligence was, at least 
in California, replaced by some form of a strict liability 
standard. And finally the affirmative defenses based upon 
either state of the art or the plaintiff's conduct have 
ci ther been restricted or eliminated, to the point where 
the defendant in the normal case will have left to him the 
denial of the defect or of its ca"§al relationship to the 
injury. The story told with uncrashworthy vehicles could 
be told with machine tools or with commercial drugs (think 
only of the swine flu cases and recognize that not a 
single cause of action rests upon the ground that the vaccines 
themselves were poorly prepared), or with many other con-
sumer or industrial products. Everywhere the tempo of 
change has been rapid and everywhere the changes have worked 
in favor of recovery. With some of those changes there can 
I think be little quarrel, as the law of the late so•s was 
restrictive. Other of the changes, however, are not 
welcome, and we must resist the tendency to convert the 
tort system into a system of universal entitlement for 
injured parties. I have already expressed some of my mis-
glV s th the more recent shifts in the rules governing 
des gn liabi ty. There is still time to argue the merits 
the substantive shifts once it is conceded by all that the 
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shifts have indeed taken place. It is, however, simply 
wrong to say that the "primary cause of the product liability 
problem is defective products • . " They may be part of 
the problem, but so too are defective laws . 
* * * 
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-- A POSITION PAPER PRESENTED.TO THE 
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON TORT REFO~l ON JULY 18, 1977 
BY WYLIE A. AITKEN, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSN. 
Conservatively estimated, each year ordinary consumer products 
produce 20 million injuries, 30,000 deaths, 110,000 disabilities and 
disfigurements and the 5.5 billion economic losses. That is the 
"crisis" in products liability to the extent there is a "crisis," 
not the artificial one promoted by the liability insurance industry. 
Th(~re are not a million or a half million la\vsuits on file in 
products liability; the only authoritative study I have seen indicates 
50,000. I can tell you that statistically in the State of California 
that the products liability cases are less than one percent of the 
civil filings that we have here in California. 
The Federal Interagency Task Force appointed by the Commerce 
Department to find and seek out the products liability crisis --
reported that there, in fact, was no crisis. What they did discover 
though was the reason we have products liability cases is because 
people are making unsafe products and people are getting injured ny 
unsafe products. And they further told us that the cost of products 
liability insurance accounts for less than one percent of the per-
centage of sales of t.he companies involved. We submit, is that too 
much of a price to pay for safe products; too much of a price to pay 
to see that people who are injured by unsafe products are compensated? 
I think we've seen and heard enough in California about stories 
about the little farmer who is going to lose his farm unless you vote 
a certain way on a proposition or the doctors that are going to leave 
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August 10, 1977 
alifornia Legislature 
oint Committee on 
Tort Liability 
Committee Members: 
I'm Gerald Cashion, President of Meyer Machinery Company of Los Angel 
and Redwood City, and representing the California P duct Liability 
Task Force, which is an unincorporated organized association. We are 
group of wholesalers and distributors in the State of California work 
together for a common purpose; that of the enactment of legislat 
the State level to provide equitable product liability laws. 
How many businesses and employers are directly affected here in a 
ornia? In the 1972 census there were approximately 24 000 who e 
and distributors in California that generated 28.9 billion dollars wo 
of sales per year and employed approximately 269,000 employees. 
In our opinion, product liability has reached a cr sis in this state 
small business. The proliferation of product liability suits poses o 
the industry, and especially the small businessman, a threat uneq 
that faced by the medical profession. It is driving insurance 
of range for many small businesses. It is forcing some companies to 
operate without insurance. It is eroding the foundation of the 
industrial system and the common market place. It i , as a result, 
pumping millions of dollars worth of inflation into the economy annuall 
in the form of higher prices for goods manufactured that must be paid 
by the consumer. 
266 
1 
s 
r 
ed hat the eve 
e last two years is 
the r doors. Of the 1 
increase of thei 
ease of 100%; the ne 
ived 400% incr 
would 
rting, almos 
fee his 
t e. 
eas 
aws i ur s 
50 s 
b 
as having been modified. We as wholesaler-distributors have no 
ontr roduct after it is sold, and in many s neve 
ee the i te it is ordered and is shipped direct to c stome 
from the manufacturer. What the user ultimately does with the 
product cannot be controlled by us. 
We should act now with: 
Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort 
State of the Art 
Statue of Limitation 
Contingent Fees 
pro tee ot only the wholesaler distributors, but the consumer 
om the s a ing increase for costs in products 
c Fred Nag estad 
Clarence Bush 
Jim Hamilton 
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Testimony at Products Liability hearing in San Diego 7/18/77 
by Dick Romney 
CHAIRMAN KNOX JULY 19, 1977 
I have been asked to reply to your letter of June 6th. 
I am Dick Romney - President of Pac-Power, a Walnut Creek-Woodland 
California utility equipment firm. 
We sell, service, and overhaul hydraulic aerial manlifts and mobile 
derrick cranes; perform dielectric, stability, structural testing; 
and certify. We are licensed by the State Industrial Commission 
as a mobile c~ane test and certification agency- No. A-97. Our 
customers are public utility companines, municipal governments, 
State of California, Federal agencies, and some export accounts. 
We currently employ 27 people. Since inception - one liablity 
action - $900 loss. 
We represent two of the leading midwestern lift and crane 
manufacturers. 
Our company was founded in 1973 - I've been in the ut 
field thirty-three years - my partner seventeen years. 
Assemblyman Knox asked that I answer three specific questions. The 
first is: 
1 - How much have your premiums increased since 1974?' 
In July of 1973, with a major carrier we paid about $3,200 
for $500,000 primary and $1,000,000 umbrella policy-products 
and completed operations. 
270 
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tmas 1976 -
• 
Yes, we have to date approached vigorously 42 carriers; 
received coverage from none. We have utilized a small-
town agent, a broker specializing in construction and 
industrial liability coverage. and three of the 
brokerage houses in San Francisco. We have been repeatedly 
commended by insurance comapanies for our well run and 
documented business. Some three weeks ago, after detailed 
plant inspection, documentation, and testing review with 
the carrier and brokers group, we received this quote: 
$100,000 primary coverage only - with $10,000 deductible 
per occurance - written on a claims-made basis for 
in premium. This is 37 times manual rate. 
One occurance - and we would be out $73,000 This means we 
would be spending 73 cents to protect 27 cents - this makes 
no sense to me. 
We have been repeatedly turned down by or carriers 
write firms in other states doing the same job, 
the same lines we do - and with realistic premiums costs. 
Salt Lake City, Denver, Portland, San Antonio are all 
The Colorado company in June saved some $19,000 in 
costs due to legislative change; Texas, $11,000 with 
commission help. 
Twelve western utility equipment dealers, we are one of them, 
are so concerned a captive insurance company is 
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Statement of Berry L. Griffln, Jr. 
before the Joint Committee on Tort 
Li.abili ty. 
San Diego. California 
July 18, 1977 
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• 
of 1 will not rehash the many reasons we 
What 1 will do is propose solutions to 
problem so that manufacturers can 
price. 
Fi.rstly, manufacturers should be producing ,..,..,f'Vi •• ,.. 11 ... 
defect. Industry is spending many mUlions of dollars make sure 
~oducts are safe. Industry must continue these efforts~ 
agencies are carefully watching industry's efforts~ 
Secondly, much more must be done to educate 
the tort syatem..-to let. the public know what happens 
the price of any product purchased 
the insurance industry must get a 
They must d~velop mesn1ngful statistics which 
mium.s now demand. 
lastly, the .kn.?.ri cen Tort System, enccnpassj 
is a cmcept wh:i.ch sbould be retained~ The 
cept of li ab:ll i ty, the lncreased use of the courts to 
tm and i.nefftd ency of the system evidance 
the system. 
We support responsible, meaningful legislation 
the basic ca~~es of our tort system problemft 
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